Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 18 March 2016
• Docket Number: 129 CAF 14-01589.
• Citation: 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 01939,137 A.D.3d 1579,26 N.Y.S.3d 895 (Mem)
• Parties: Shikema WILLIAMS, Administratrix of the Estates of Frederick Velez and Christine Cox, Deceased Frederick Hall, and Shamia Hall, by Her Mother and Natural Guardian, Sabrina Hall, Claimants–Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

137 A.D.3d 1579
26 N.Y.S.3d 895 (Mem)
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 01939

Shikema WILLIAMS, Administratrix of the Estates of Frederick Velez and Christine Cox, Deceased Frederick Hall, and Shamia Hall, by Her Mother and Natural Guardian, Sabrina Hall, Claimants–Appellants,
v.
STATE of New York, Defendant–Respondent.

129 CAF 14-01589.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

March 18, 2016.

Benno & Associates P.C., New York City (Ameer Benno of Counsel), and Jeffrey A. Rothman, for Claimants–Appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM:

Claimants appeal from an order denying those parts of their motion for permission to file a late claim against defendant with respect to claims for damages under theories of constitutional tort and negligent training, arising from the stabbing death of decedent Frederick Velez, an inmate in a correctional facility. We affirm. “The Court of Claims has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application for permission to file a late ... claim and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion” (Matter of Martinez v. State of New York, 62 A.D.3d 1225, 1226, 881 N.Y.S.2d 190; see Collins v. State of New York, 69 A.D.3d 46, 48, 887 N.Y.S.2d 400). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying that part of the motion with respect to the proposed constitutional tort theory (see generally Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 83, 735 N.Y.S.2d 868, 761 N.E.2d 560). To the contrary, “recognition of the claimant [s'] State constitutional claims was neither necessary nor appropriate to ensure the full realization of [their] rights, because the alleged wrongs could have been redressed by ... timely interposed common-law tort claims” (Lyles v. State of New York, 2 A.D.3d 694, 695, 770 N.Y.S.2d 81, affd. 3 N.Y.3d 396, 787 N.Y.S.2d 216, 820 N.E.2d 860; see Peterec v. State of New York, 124 A.D.3d 858, 859, 998 N.Y.S.2d 900; Shelton v. New York State Liq. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 1145, 1150, 878 N.Y.S.2d 212).

We also reject claimants' contention that the court abused its...