Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1940
• Docket Number: A-9556.
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

98 P.2d 937

68 Okla.Crim. 348

WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. A-9556.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

January 25, 1940

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The general rule is that when a defendant is placed upon trial for the commission of an offense against the criminal laws is to be convicted, if at all, on evidence showing his guilt of the particular offense charged against him. It is a well established common-law rule that evidence of the commission of other crimes, and at other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one charged, are incompetent and inadmissible for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular crime charged.

2. To this general rule there are well-recognized exceptions and limitations. See opinion as to this distinction.

3. This case was reversed by this court on a former appeal ( Williams v. State. 61 Okl.Cr. 396, 68 P.2d 530), for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment and sentence. On second appeal the material evidence, in addition to that of the former trial, was clearly inadmissible. Held, that under the facts this case should be reversed and defendant discharged.

Appeal from District Court, Okmulgee County; J. Harvey Smith, Judge.

Johnnie Williams was convicted of rape, and he appeals.

Reversed.

Eaton & Wheeler, of Okmulgee, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q Williamson, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Wallace, Co. Atty., of Okmulgee, for the State.

BAREFOOT Judge.

Defendant was charged with the crime of rape in Okmulgee County; was tried, convicted and sentenced to serve a term of 60 years in the penitentiary, and has appealed.

This is the second conviction of this defendant upon this charge. His prior conviction was reversed by this Court. Williams v State, 61 Okl.Cr. 396, 68 P.2d 530. The facts were stated fully in that opinion, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. It will be noted that the former case was reversed because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The evidence introduced in this trial was substantially the same as that introduced in the former trial with two exceptions which will hereafter be noted.

The witness, Tom Berry, a deputy sheriff, was permitted to testify that immediately after the arrest of the defendant some four days after the crime had been committed that he went to the home of the mother-in-law of defendant, which was also the home of defendant, for the purpose of searching the premises. That he did not procure a search warrant, but that while on the premises he observed a tan shirt and a pair of blue bib overalls on a clothes line. That they had been recently washed. There had been testimony by those who identified the defendant, that he was wearing clothes of this description at the time they saw him. Some of the witnesses testified that he was wearing a grey shirt.

The additional evidence was that of Joanna Burkhalter, and an attempt to offer the evidence of Bessie Shamley, which was finally excluded by the court. The court first excused the jury and heard the evidence of these witnesses in the absence of the jury. After hearing the evidence the court decided to exclude the evidence of the witness, Bessie Shamley, but permitted the evidence of the witness, Joanna Burkhalter to go to the jury. Before the jury was excused the witness Bessie Shamley was placed upon the stand and in the presence of the jury was asked: "Q. What is your age? A. Was I raped?"

A few preliminary questions were asked and at the request of counsel for defendant the jury was then excused and the court heard the evidence in their absence. After the court had decided that the evidence of Bessie Shamley could not be introduced, the county attorney was permitted, after the witness Joanna Burkhalter had testified, to place the witness Bessie Shamley upon the witness stand in the presence of the jury, as he stated, for the purpose of making a record, and she was asked:

"Q. Are you the same Bessie Shamley that testified in this case yesterday afternoon? A. Yes sir.

Q. In the presence of the Court, but in the absence of the jury? A. Yes sir, I am.

Q. And you are ready and willing to testify to the jury now as you did yesterday afternoon? A. Yes sir.

Mr. Eaton: We object to that, as to whether she is ready and willing to testify.

Mr. Wallace: Now, if the Court please, we tender the testimony of this witness, as given in the presence of the Court, and in the absence of the jury, yesterday.

The Court: The objection to the offer and tender will be sustained for the reasons stated, as inadmissible because of its remoteness.

Mr. Wallace: Exception. That is all, the witness may be excused."

Without going into a discussion of the evidence of these two witnesses, one of which was admitted to the jury, it may be said that they testified to defendant having raped Bessie Shamley, and attempted to rape Joanna Burkhalter. The rape of Bessie Shamley having occurred in May, 1935, and the attempt to rape of Joanna Burkhalter in November, 1935. The defendant in this case was charged with the rape of the prosecuting witness, Leota Smith, on the 15th day of June, 1936. The court refused to admit the evidence of the witness Bessie Shamley because of its remoteness, but admitted the evidence of Joanna Burkhalter.

From a reading of the record and the evidence given by the witness Bessie Shamley before the court, one might assume, that this evidence was not only excluded by reason of its remoteness, but also by reason of its unreasonableness. It is not only unreasonable but practically impossible for the defendant to have done the things testified to by this witness.

While the record does not disclose, and this case has not been briefed by the state, it may be presumed that the evidence of the witness Joanna Burkhalter was permitted to be introduced on the ground that there are well-founded exceptions to the general rule, that evidence of other crimes may not be admitted, and that based upon the fact that the evidence is so connected that it will throw light upon the guilt of defendant, or that it was committed as a part of the same transaction, and is a part of the res gestae, or proves a scheme or intent on the part of the defendant, or to prove guilty knowledge. Also that the general rule does not apply to cases involving illicit sexual relations. Pruett v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 359, 250 P. 1029. This is where the act was between the same and not different parties, and at different times. See also, Morris v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 241, 131 P. 731; Ellsworth v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 452, 137 P. 1188, 1189; Koontz v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 553, 139 P. 842, Ann.Cas.1916A, 689; State v. Rule, 11 Okl.Cr. 237, 144 P. 807; Reniff v. State, 53 Okl.Cr. 448, 13 P.2d 592; Boyer v. State, decided by this Court on December 21, 1939, 97 P.2d 779.

The general rule, which is universally followed by the courts of this country, is that evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it is a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible. To this general rule there are several well-defined exceptions, but by the recognition of these exceptions the courts should not permit the annihilation of the general rule. The general rule is founded in reason. A defendant, when placed upon trial for the commission of an offense, comes prepared only to meet the offense of which he stands charged, and he cannot in the nature of things be prepared to defend against other charges of crimes, which are wholly independent and have no connection with the crime of which he stands charged. Moreover, it is not the policy of the law to convict a man of one crime by showing that he is guilty of another. Nor is it the law to permit the state to attack the character of the defendant unless he first puts it in issue by offering evidence of his good character.

The recognized exceptions to this general rule are:

(1) Evidence of other offenses similar to that charged is relevant and admissible, when it tends to prove some element of the one charged, as when it shows or tends to show guilty knowledge or intent in the commission of the offense charged.

(2) Evidence that tends directly to prove the defendant's guilt is not rendered inadmissible because it proves or tends to prove him guilty of another and distinct offense.

(3) Evidence of a different offense from the one charged is admissible when both offenses are so closely linked or connected as to form a part of the res gestae (4) Evidence of other offenses is competent to prove the specific offense charged when it tends to establish a systematic scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more offenses so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.

These exceptions are founded on as much wisdom and justice as the rule itself. This court has often recognized the exceptions to the general rule. The case of Boyer v. State, supra, recently decided by this Court on the 21st day of December, 1939, and not yet reported [in State Report], fully discusses the exceptions to the general rule, and recognizes when they are applied. State v. Rule, 11 Okl.Cr. 237, 144 P. 807; Koontz v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 553, 139 P. 842, Ann.Cas.1916A, 689; Reniff v. State, 53 Okl.Cr. 448, 13 P.2d 592; Miller v. State, 13 Okl.Cr. 176, 163 P. 131, L.R.A.1917D, 383; Carter v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 421, 250 P. 807.

The case of State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 24 Am.Rep. 69 is one of the leading cases which discusses this general principle, and the facts in that case are almost identical with the facts in the case at bar. In this case the court sa...