Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 25 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. CR 09–355.,CR 09–355.
• Citation: 2010 Ark. 89,377 S.W.3d 168
• Parties: Roderick WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2010 Ark. 89

377 S.W.3d 168

Roderick WILLIAMS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 09–355.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 25, 2010.

Adam Lee Hopkins, Fayetteville, AR, for appellant.

Karen Virginia Wallace, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice.

Appellant Roderick Williams was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment plus seventy-two years. On appeal, he contends that the circuit court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a witness falsely accused him of having been previously convicted of terroristic threatening. He further contends that the circuit court's admonition to the jury following the statement only served to bolster the false testimony and constitutes an additional ground for reversal. Williams also contends that the circuit court erred in admitting a statement that his son allegedly made to law enforcement on the night of the murder because the statement was manifestly prejudicial, lacked probative value, and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Finally, Williams makes a cumulative-error argument, contending that this case requires reversal because all of the errors committed by the circuit court were patently prejudicial to his defense and prohibited him from receiving a fair trial. Because this is a criminal appeal in which a sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(a)(2) (2010). We reverse and remand to the circuit court.

Testimony at trial revealed the following facts. On the evening of April 26, 2007, Clara Cobb was shot and killed while on the front porch of her home in Pickens. At home with her at the time of her murder were her daughter, Kerman Harris, and Harris's infant daughter, KyBriunna. Williams, the father of KyBriunna, went to the house that evening, and Cobb went out on the porch to speak to him. While on the porch, Williams loaded the shotgun he was carrying and shot Cobb in the abdomen. He then went inside the house and forced Harris and the baby outside and into the car with him and his uncle. Williams beat Harris with a shotgun until it broke, breaking her arm and wrist, and then put his uncle and the baby out on the side of the road. Williams experienced car trouble, and he and Harris caught a ride to a trailer, where they stayed until the following afternoon when the SWAT team arrived. Williams was then taken into custody.

Williams was subsequently tried by a jury and, as already noted, was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life imprisonment, plus seventy-two years. He now appeals.

Williams contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after Harris testified falsely that he had previously been convicted of terroristic threatening for threats he made to Cobb. Additionally, Williams contends that the circuit court's admonition to the jury to disregard the testimony only served to further bolster the false statement and constitutes an additional ground for reversal.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse or manifest prejudice to the appellant. Johnson v. State, 366 Ark. 8, 233 S.W.3d 123 (2006). A mistrial is a drastic remedy and should only be declared when there is errorso prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, and when it cannot be cured by an instruction to the jury. Tryon v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007).

At trial, during the direct examination of Harris, the prosecutor questioned her about Williams's relationship with her mother, Cobb. The following colloquy took place between the prosecutor and Harris:

Q: To the best of your knowledge, all right, do you have any great knowledge from actually being present in any conversation or anything like that to whether your momma and the Defendant, Roderick Williams, did not like one another? Was there any kind of—Was she preventing him from seeing the baby or anything like that?

A: No, she wasn't.

Q: Did she ever sign a protection order on him or anything like that?

A: No, she didn't, but he had threatened her. And when she went to court it was terroristic threatening, which Roderick Williams was convicted of.

At that point, defense counsel objected, contending that Harris's statement was false ¹ and that no instruction could cure the prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion and instructed the jury as follows:

The Court: Also, there's one thing I want to bring to your attention and that is, during the questioning by the prosecutor just before the recess, in response to a question, the witness here indicated or stated that the Defendant Roderick Williams had been convicted of terroristic threatening. That particular response is to be disregarded. And when I say it should be disregarded, basically that means that during your deliberation you should not consider that particular response. Okay.

Williams asserts that, based on established precedent, Harris's false accusation was so prejudicial, he is entitled to a new trial. In support of this argument, Williams cites Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 915 S.W.2d 284 (1996); Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 671 S.W.2d 757 (1984); Wingfield v. State, 303 Ark. 291, 796 S.W.2d 574 (1990); and Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006).

In Moore, the defendant was on trial for the capital murder and rape of a ninety-year-old woman, and of the burglary of her home. During cross-examination by defense counsel, a witness who testified that the defendant had confessed to killing the woman was asked if anyone else was present at the time of the confession. The witness answered, “No, but he admitted to killing another woman to his brother.” Moore, 323 Ark. at 536, 915 S.W.2d at 288. The defendant moved for mistrial, and the motion was denied. The trial court admonished the jury to disregard the witness's answer to defense counsel's question. We reversed the trial court, stating that the witness's “unresponsive testimony that the appellant had admitted he killed another woman was so prejudicial that it could not be cured by an admonition to the jury,” and that “the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial was abuse of discretion in the face of such a patently inflammatory and prejudicial statement.” Id. at 537, 915 S.W.2d at 289.

In Lackey, the trial court permitted the State to elicit testimony that the defendants,who were on trial for rape, had given marijuana to three children. The defendants moved for a mistrial, contending that the evidence was highly prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but admonished the jury to disregard the testimony. We reversed, due to the irrelevant and prejudicial nature of the testimony, stating that the “admonition in this case was useless, the damage having been done.” Lackey, 283 Ark. at 153, 671 S.W.2d at 759 (citing Maxwell v. State, 279 Ark. 423, 652 S.W.2d 31 (1983) (holding that, in a prosecution for the first-degree murder of a woman, where defendant admitted on the stand that he was a convicted rapist, a mistrial was warranted and an admonition could not cure the error where a prosecutor referenced the age—eleven years old—of the rape victim)).

In Wingfield, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial where, during direct examination by defense counsel, a law enforcement witness referenced a polygraph examination that he had given to another witness who was favorable to the prosecution. The defendant moved for a mistrial, contending that the jury would presume that the police and prosecution believed the witness because he took—and must have passed—a polygraph examination. We reversed and remanded, holding that, under the facts of the case, the reference to the polygraph test was an attempt by the police officer to bolster the veracity and credibility of a witness; therefore, it constituted prejudicial error.

In Green, the defendant was tried on four counts of capital murder and one count of kidnapping. At trial, a witness for the State testified that she was afraid for her brother, one of the murder victims, because her brother and her nephew had stolen some of the defendant's marijuana plants and her nephew had died mysteriously after the theft. The defendant moved for a mistrial, but the trial court instead offered a limiting instruction. The defendant accepted the offer, but a limiting instruction was not immediately given. After the same witness made another reference to the theft of marijuana plants, the defendant renewed his motion for mistrial. The trial court again offered a limiting instruction, but this time the defendant responded, “I don't know yet.” Green, 365 Ark. at 495, 231 S.W.3d at 652. Later, the trial court offered a limiting instruction that “there's been absolutely nothing to prove” a link between the defendant and the nephew's disappearance, and that “it was only elicited for the fact to show fear on behalf of [the witness].” Id., 231 S.W.3d at 652. The defendant declined the limiting instruction on the basis that he feared it would be more prejudicial. Upon reviewing the testimony, we stated: “First, [the witness's] statement was clearly prejudicial and alluded to her belief that Appellant played a role in [her nephew's] murder and disappearance. Second, no admonition could have cured this statement, even if a trial court had intervened and attempted to curb the statement's effect on the jury.” Id., 231 S.W.3d at 652. Accordingly, we held that a mistrial was warranted.

Williams contends that, like the cases cited above, the instant...