Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 19 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 09-12-00350-CR,09-12-00350-CR |
| Parties | DENETTE ELIZABETH WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
A jury found Denette Elizabeth Williams guilty of the first-degree felony offense of intentionally or knowingly, by omission, causing serious bodily injury to a child, Braylan Hood.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(b)(1) (West Supp.2013).2 The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years of confinement. On appeal, Williams contends the trial court erred in admitting inadmissible testimonial hearsay at trial and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. After review of the trial record and application of the proper standards of review, we find no error in the trial court's admission of the complained of evidence, but do find insufficient evidence to support Williams's first-degree felony conviction and modify and render judgment of conviction for the lesser included second-degree felony offense of causing injury to a child recklessly by omission. See id. §§ 22.04(a)(1), (e). As modified, we affirm the finding of guilt, reverse the portion of the judgment imposing sentence, and remand the cause to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
Braylan was born to Williams and J.P. Hood on February 1, 2011. He was born five weeks premature, weighing four pounds, nine ounces, and measuring about seventeen and a half inches in length. After seven days in the hospital's neo-natal unit, Braylan was discharged into his parents' care on February 8, 2011, weighing about four pounds, seven ounces. On March 11, 2011, Williams called911 because Braylan had stopped breathing. Braylan was transported to Conroe Regional Medical Center for treatment, but medical professionals were unable to resuscitate him, and Braylan was pronounced dead in the early morning hours of March 12, 2011.
Following an investigation, Williams was arrested and charged with injury to a child by intentionally or knowingly failing to seek medical care for Braylan. A jury found Williams guilty and assessed punishment at fifteen years in the penitentiary.
Williams contends the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her when it allowed Dr. Joni McClain to testify as a substitute witness for Dr. Meredith Lann, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Braylan. Dr. Lann did not testify at trial. Instead, the State called Dr. McClain, who is the deputy chief medical examiner of Dallas County, to give her opinions regarding Braylan's injuries and cause of death. Dr. McClain was not present during the autopsy. Williams timely objected to Dr. McClain's testimony and argued that allowing her to testify about the content of Dr. Lann's work product denied her the right to confront Dr. Lann. At trial, Williams also objected to the admission of the autopsy photographs and slides because she was unable tocross-examine the individual who took the photographs and made the slides. The trial court overruled Williams's objections. Williams argues on appeal that the admission of these exhibits was also reversible error.
The Confrontation Clause guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right also applies to out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Confrontation Clause bars a witness's out-of-court testimonial statements, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 68. The determination of whether a particular out-of-court statement is testimonial is a question of law. De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A court's error in admitting evidence in violation of a defendant's confrontation right is constitutional error, which requires reversal unless the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a).
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court held that a forensic report prepared by an analyst in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution was a testimonial statement, and thus subject to theConfrontation Clause. 557 U.S. 305, 309-11 (2009). The Court emphasized that the analyst's certificates were created for "the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant[.]" Id. at 323. The certificates were executed under oath before a notary and were introduced to prove the nature of the substance found in the defendant's possession, which the Court concluded did "'precisely what a witness does on direct examination[.]'" Id. at 310-11. Absent a showing that the analyst was unavailable to testify and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to examine the analyst, the defendant was entitled to be confronted with the analyst at trial. Id. at 311.
Later, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court considered "surrogate" testimony regarding forensic reports in a DWI case and held that a blood analysis report was testimonial and that the expert who prepared the report must be the same person to present it at trial to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). The Court analogized the facts to those in Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 2717. In Bullcoming, the officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory utilized to assist the police in its investigation. Id. An analyst at the state laboratory tested the evidence and prepared a certificate containing his analysis. Id. The analyst formalized the certificate in a signed document, which was labeled as a report, and included a reference to the court rules that provide forits admissibility at trial. Id. The Court concluded that the "formalities attending the 'report of blood alcohol analysis' are more than adequate to qualify [the analyst's] assertions as testimonial." Id. In her concurring opinion in Bullcoming, Justice Sotomayor stated, "We would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others' testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence." Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
In Williams v. Illinois, the Court made an allowance for an expert witness who had not personally been involved in any testing to testify at a bench trial. 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012) (plurality op.). The Supreme Court concluded that admission of expert testimony regarding the results of DNA testing performed by a non-testifying analyst did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2227-28. The testifying witness relied on a DNA profile procured from a third-party laboratory that had performed the DNA testing before a suspect was identified in a rape investigation. Id. at 2227-28, 2234. The plurality of the Court concluded that the defendant's rights were not violated. Id. at 2227-28, 2231.
When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Applyingthis rule to the present case, we conclude that the expert's testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 2228. In distinguishing its opinions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Court explained that the report in Williams was used only to explain the basis for the expert's opinion and not to establish its truth. Id. at 2240-41. Also, in both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the certificates were introduced into evidence for substantive purposes. Id. at 2232-33.
We conclude this case is likewise distinguishable from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Here, the autopsy report was not admitted into evidence. Rather, Dr. McClain provided her own independent opinion about Braylan's injuries and cause of death, and was subject to cross-examination. Dr. McClain testified that she reviewed the entire autopsy file, including Dr. Lann's autopsy report, the autopsy photographs, and the microscopic slides. She testified that she formed an independent opinion that Braylan's death was caused by "blunt force injuries." She based her opinion on her independent review of the autopsy report, photographs, and tissue slides.
Like the report in Williams, Dr. McClain used the autopsy report in this case to explain the basis for her opinion. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2232; see also Tex. R. Evid. 705(d) (). We conclude that Dr. McClain's independent evaluation of the evidence collected during the autopsy did not violate the Confrontation Clause and the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2232; see also Tex. R. Evid. 705(d).
However, from our review of the record, it appears that Dr. McClain repeated a comment made by Dr. Lann, presumably from her autopsy report. After discussing a "Beta hemolytic Streptococcus group B" finding in Braylan's blood sample, Dr. McClain explained her basis for independently determining that the "Strep b" finding was a contaminant. She concluded her finding by stating, ...
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