Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 22 February 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC17–506,SC17–506
• Citation: 242 So.3d 280
• Parties: Rodrick D. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

242 So.3d 280

Rodrick D. WILLIAMS, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC17–506

Supreme Court of Florida.

[February 22, 2018]

Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent

LABARGA, C.J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Williams v. State (Williams II ), 211 So.3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In its decision, the Fifth District ruled upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM?

Id. at 1073. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we hold that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual finding, but conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. Where the error cannot be deemed harmless, the proper remedy is to resentence the juvenile offender pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b) 2., Florida Statutes (2016).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2013, a jury found Petitioner Rodrick D. Williams guilty of first-degree murder and kidnapping. During the evening hours of April 26, 2010, and through the early morning hours of April 27, 2010, victim James Vincent Brookins was beaten and bound with duct tape at a "trap house"¹ in Jacksonville, then transported in the trunk of a vehicle to a rural road in St. Johns County, where he was shot twice. Two other individuals, Harry Henderson and Sharina Parker, were also involved in the death of Brookins. Williams and Parker were involved in a sexual relationship. Although Henderson and Parker were adults at the time of the murder, Williams was sixteen years old. The firearm used to commit the murder was never located.

The predominant evidence offered during trial to connect Williams to the offenses included: (1) the police interrogation of Williams, during which his mother was present and Williams signed a Miranda² waiver; (2) a text message purportedly sent by Williams to Parker at 6:24 p.m. on April 26, in which Williams stated, "Bae thx killah^{[3 ]} i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae ima take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight"; and (3) the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

During the interrogation, Williams contended it was Henderson who shot Brookins. According to Williams, Parker called him between 2 and 3 p.m. on April 26—less than five hours before the text message was sent—and told him she had been robbed of marijuana by a relative of Brookins during a drug transaction, and Parker believed Brookins had "set her up." Williams asserted that Parker and Henderson brought Brookins to the trap house later that day in an attempt to force him to give them money or disclose the location of his safe, where Parker believed the stolen marijuana was stored. Parker subsequently picked up Williams and drove him to the trap house, where, upon entering the house, Williams saw "blood all over" and Brookins begging for his life. According to Williams, Henderson beat Brookins with a gun, and Henderson and Parker bound his arms and legs and covered his mouth with duct tape as Brookins screamed. Williams stated that while at the trap house, Parker told him she and Henderson planned to leave Brookins alive in the trunk of the vehicle.⁴ Williams admitted he drove the vehicle with Brookins in the trunk to the rural road while Henderson and Parker rode in a separate vehicle. He stated that upon arriving, Henderson wiped down the vehicle used to transport Brookins, opened the trunk, and shot Brookins. Williams asserted that he only participated in the offenses because he feared he would be harmed if he refused.

In contrast, during trial, the informant testified that while they were housed together at the St. Johns County jail, Williams admitted that he brought a gun to the trap house and shot Brookins. According to the informant, Williams stated he was involved in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on the pretense of having gold teeth created⁵ and then force him to disclose the location of his safe. Coincidentally, prior to his interactions with Williams, the informant was housed with codefendant Henderson at the St. Johns County jail. The informant testified on cross-examination that Henderson assisted him by filing a motion on his behalf with respect to a drug-related charge and, as a result of Henderson's assistance, the charge was dropped. However, the informant testified that Henderson never spoke with him about the Brookins homicide.

The jury was instructed on both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder with robbery, attempted robbery, kidnapping, and attempted kidnapping as the underlying felonies; however, the verdict form did not require the jury to specify the theory upon which it found Williams guilty of first-degree murder. Upon conviction, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in twenty-five years for the murder. The court relied upon Horsley v. State (Horsley I ), 121 So.3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), quashed , 160 So.3d 393 (Fla. 2015), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the implications of Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), for Florida sentencing law. See Williams v. State (Williams I ), 171 So.3d 143, 144–45 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Because Miller determined "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders," 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, the Fifth District in Horsley I held that in Florida, the only sentence available for a juvenile offender convicted of capital murder was life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Williams I , 171 So.3d at 144.

On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed Williams's convictions but reversed his sentence with respect to the murder conviction. Id. The district court recognized that while the trial court properly relied on Horsley I when it imposed the sentence, this Court subsequently granted review of Horsley I based upon a certified question. Id. at 144–45. In Horsley v. State (Horsley II ), 160 So.3d 393 (Fla. 2015), we held the appropriate remedy for juveniles whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is to resentence them in conformance with chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida. See Williams I , 171 So.3d at 144. Chapter 2014–220 was enacted to bring Florida juvenile sentencing law into compliance with United States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Horsley II , 160 So.3d at 394. It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent part:

(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).

2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).

Ch. 2014–220, § 1, Laws of Fla. The session law also created section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2017), which provides, in pertinent part:

(2)(a) A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b) 1. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years [unless the juvenile offender has been previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses that were part of a separate criminal transaction or episode].

....(c) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 15 years under s. 775.082(1)(b) 2., s. 775.082(3)(a) 5.b., or s. 775.082(3)(b) 2.b. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 15 years.

Ch. 2014–220, § 3, Laws of Fla.

The Fifth District in Williams I instructed the trial court as follows:

On remand, the trial court shall hold an individualized sentencing hearing ... to consider the enumerated and other pertinent factors "relevant to the offense and [Williams's] youth and attendant circumstances." Ch. 2014–220, § 2, Laws of Fla. Because the jury did not find that Williams actually possessed and discharged a firearm during the crime, the court must make a written finding as to whether Williams killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Ch. 2014–220, § 1, Laws of Fla. Based on that determination, after holding the individualized hearing, the trial court may sentence Williams to life imprisonment if it finds that life is an appropriate sentence. Id. If the trial court determines that life is not an appropriate

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