Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011–KA–01895–COA.,2011–KA–01895–COA.
• Citation: 126 So.3d 85
• Parties: Robert Marquez WILLIAMS a/k/a Robert Williams a/k/a Robert Maequez Williams a/k/a Robert Markez Williams, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

126 So.3d 85

Robert Marquez WILLIAMS a/k/a Robert Williams a/k/a Robert Maequez Williams a/k/a Robert Markez Williams, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2011–KA–01895–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Nov. 5, 2013.

Sanford E. Knott, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Laura Hogan Tedder, attorney for appellee.

Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL and FAIR, JJ.

MAXWELL, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Madison County sheriff's deputies pulled over Robert Marquez Williams for a traffic violation. During the stop, Williams, who was driving a rental car, was questioned about possessing drugs. When a deputy mentioned using a drug-detection dog to sniff around the car, Williams, who was standing outside of the car, made a dash for the vehicle. Though one of the deputies shot Williams with a taser, Williams jumped back in car, put it in gear, and sped away. A high-speed chase on the interstate ensued, ending up with Williams flipping the car, then fleeing from the abandoned vehicle. Williams was later caught and convicted of felony evasion.

¶ 2. On appeal, Williams argues the initial traffic stop was illegal, and thus the evidence of his subsequent felonious evasion was inadmissible. We disagree and find the traffic stop was justified. But even if it were not, Williams would not have been immunized from criminal liability for a distinct, voluntary crime. We also find the evidence was sufficient to support the evasion conviction, the jury instruction on flight from the abandoned vehicle was proper, and the circuit judge's rulings on four of Williams's Batson challenges were not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm Williams's conviction for felony evasion and his five-year prison sentence.

Background

¶ 3. On July 22, 2008, Williams was driving east on I–220 in Madison County, Mississippi, when Madison County sheriff's deputies saw his vehicle cross the “fog line” on the right side of the road. When the deputies pulled Williams over, they discovered he was driving a rental car listed in someone else's name. According to one of the deputies, Williams appeared extremely nervous. Williams was asked to step out of the vehicle and did. When questioned if he possessed certain illegal drugs in the vehicle, Williams answered “no” to each question. But when asked about cocaine, his demeanor markedly changed, though he denied possessing the drug. After Williams declined a request for consent to search the car, one of the deputies told him he as going to walk his drug-sniffing dog around the car. And when the deputy went to get the dog, Williams jumped back into the rental car. In an effort to stop Williams, one of the deputies shot him with a taser.

¶ 4. After being tased, Williams did not stop. Instead, he jammed the car in gear and sped back onto the interstate, almost running another vehicle off the road. According to the deputies who pursued him, Williams was going over one hundred miles per hour when he veered onto I–55 and crossed into Hinds County. The deputies halted their high-speed pursuit at the Hinds County line. But minutes later they learned from neighboring law enforcement officers that the rental car had been found flipped over on the next interstate exit. However, Williams did not wait around for law enforcement to arrive. Instead, he abandoned the wrecked car and fled. Williams was apprehended a few days later when he falsely reported to the rental-car company that the car had been stolen.

¶ 5. The State indicted Williams for felony evasion in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–9–72(2) (Rev.2006).¹ A Madison County jury found him guilty of felony evasion, and he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. SeeMiss.Code Ann. § 97–9–72(2). After his post-trial motion was denied, Williams timely appealed.

Discussion

¶ 6. On appeal, Williams challenges four separate rulings by the trial judge, none of which we find were erroneous.

I. Denial of Motion to Suppress All Evidence

¶ 7. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence of the felony evasion. At the suppression hearing, he argued the traffic stop—which was the but-for cause of his speeding away from the deputies—violated his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable search and seizure. SeeU.S. Const. amend IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures). Because of this alleged constitutional violation, he asked that the evidence of what happened after the stop be deemed inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

¶ 8. “The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is an exclusionary rule that makes inadmissible tangible evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure.” Mosley v. State, 89 So.3d 41, 45 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citations omitted). But this exclusionary rule only applies where the search or seizure was not justified. And here, we find the stop and later mentioning of the drug-detection dog were both lawful.

¶ 9. Law enforcement officers have authority to stop motorists “if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person is committing a traffic offense.” Burnett v. State, 876 So.2d 409, 411 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). By observing Williams weave out of his lane of traffic and across the fog line, the deputies had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Williams for a traffic violation. Tran v. State, 963 So.2d 1, 14 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (holding crossing the fog line is a reasonable basis for a traffic stop). And having a trained dog sniff the outside of a vehicle during a valid traffic stop is not a Fourth Amendment violation. This drug detection technique is permitted during a brief detention, even if there is no reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. Jaramillo v. State, 950 So.2d 1104, 1107 (¶¶ 7–8) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)).

¶ 10. But even if, as Williams argues, the deputies had lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over, or exceeded the scope of the traffic stop with the drug dog, we find it would be unreasonable to expand the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for a new, distinct crime like Williams's evasion. Such an expansive view would give the defendant, as one federal appellate court put it, “an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts” as long as they are sufficiently causally connected to the initial police misconduct. United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1016–17 (11th Cir.1982).

¶ 11. While Mississippi has not addressed this particular issue, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that “if the defendant's response is itself a new, distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that crime.” Id. In Bailey, federal agents attempted to seize the defendant at an airport, in violation his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant responded by fleeing on foot, throwing a bag containing illegal drugs and cash as he ran. When an agent caught up with him, the defendant assaulted the officer. The Eleventh Circuit held that, because the defendant's response to the agents' illegality was to commit a new, distinct crime—evasion of and assault on an officer—the agents could legally arrest him. Id. The agents were also justified in seizing the drugs and cash as part of a search incident to the arrest for the new crime. Id. The court explained its reasoning:

[W]here the defendant's response is itself a new, distinct crime, there are strong policy reasons for permitting the police to arrest him for that crime. A contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.

Id. at 1017.

¶ 12. The Ninth Circuit has also refused to recognize “any self-help right [that would] immunize suspicious conduct” by the defendant during an illegal stop. United States v. Garcia, 516 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir.1975). In Garcia, the defendants, who were detained at a border stop, feigned compliance with the stop but then sped off. The court held no taint attached to the drugs found as a consequence of the ensuing pursuit by border agents based on the defendants' new suspicious voluntary activity.

¶ 13. And in United States v. Garcia–Jordan, 860 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit held that it was “unnecessary to address the legality of the stop” because the defendant, even if detained illegally, was “not immunized from prosecution” for the assault on a police officer, which he committed during the detention.

¶ 14. So here, even if Williams had been illegally detained, he would not be immunized from arrest, prosecution, and conviction for felony evasion. He committed this new, distinct, and voluntary crime after he was stopped. Thus, we find the trial judge properly denied Williams's motion to suppress, as the evidence of the crime of felony evasion was not tainted by any Fourth Amendment violation.

II. Denial of Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or a Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Jury's Verdict

¶ 15. After the State presented its case-in-chief, Williams moved for a directed verdict. Williams presented no additional evidence in his defense. After he was found guilty, Williams filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the jury's verdict. Both motions challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. And on appeal, Williams reasserts his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support finding him guilty of felony evasion.

¶ 16. This court reviews a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and asking if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [felony evasion] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005) (quoting Jackson v....