Williams v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 03 October 1969
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 460 P.2d 961 Cletis U. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 29623.

Page 761

81 Cal.Rptr. 761

71 Cal.2d 1144, 460 P.2d 961

Cletis U. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 29623.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 3, 1969.

As Modified Nov. 26, 1969.

Opinion by PETERS, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent. The writ of prohibition should issue.

The purpose of a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is to 'weed out groundless or unsupported charges * * * and * * * relieve the accused of the degradation and the expense of a criminal trial.' (Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338, 135 A.L.R. 775.) The hearing is 'designed to protect the rights of the accused and to see to it that no one is detained in custody indefinitely or capriciously in order that a case may be developed in the future, or circumstances arise that will justify a trial.' (People v. Bucher, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 346, 346 P.2d 202, 204.)

Although every legitimate inference must be drawn in favor of the information (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197), there must be some evidence from which the committing magistrate can Reasonably infer the existence of Each essential element of the crime charged. (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Supra, at pp. 474--475, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197; Garabedian v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 59 Cal.2d 124, 127, 28 Cal.Rptr. 318, 378 P.2d 590.)

To establish grand theft of an automobile, the state must prove (1) the taking away of an automobile (2) from the owner (3) into the possession of the accused (4) without the consent of the owner or under claim of right (5) with the specific intent to deprive the owner of his property wholly and permanently. (Compare Pen.Code, § 487, subd. 3, with People v. Walther, 263 Cal.App.2d 310, 316, 69 Cal.Rptr. 434.)

To establish the crime of receiving stolen property, the state must prove (1) that the property found in the possession of the accused was acquired by theft or extortion; (2) that the accused received, concealed, or withheld the property from its owner; and (3) that the accused knew the property was stolen. (Pen.Code, § 496; People v. Williams, 253 Cal.App.2d 952, 957, 61 Cal.Rptr. 238.) These elements were not proved here.

It is settled that evidence of possession of recently stolen goods is insufficient to sustain a Conviction for theft, burglary, or receiving stolen property. There must be, in addition, evidence in the form of suspicious circumstances or statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt. (E.g., People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 754, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449; People v. Lyons, 50 Cal.2d 245, 258, 324 P.2d 556; People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288, 294 P.2d 32; People v. Wissenfeld, 36 Cal.2d 758, 763, 227 P.2d 833.)

The question presented in the instant case is: If mere evidence of possession of recently stolen goods coupled with a defendant's failure to explain possession will not support a Conviction for theft, burglary, or receiving stolen property, will it nonetheless support an order of Commitment for prosecution under section 872 of the Penal Code?

The answer must be no; the mere fact of possession of recently stolen property does Not provide the basis for a reasonable inference either that the possessor was the one who stole the property or that the possessor knew that it had been stolen, and thus cannot be sufficient to support a conviction (e.g., People v. Wissenfeld, Supra 36 Cal.2d 758, 763, 227 P.2d 833) Or to hold a defendant to answer.

Were the rule otherwise, any person purchasing or receiving as a gift a chattel, whether new or used, could be held for trail if the chattel turned out to have been recently stolen. Even persons seeking to explain their possession as legal might be held since the magistrate need not believe their explanation. And the reviewing court is obliged to view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the validity of the information and to draw every legitimate inference from the evidence in favor of the information. (Rideout v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Supra, 67 Cal.2d 471, 474, 62 Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197.) Only if the explanation established legality of possession as a matter of law would the magistrate be prevented from disregarding it. Allowing authorities to hold all persons for trial who are found to be in possession of recently stolen goods would impose an undue burden on many innocent purchasers and donees, a burden of the sort which the preliminary hearing is designed to obviate. (Jaffe v. Stone, Supra, 18 Cal.2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775; People v. Bucher, Supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 346, 346 P.2d 202.)

The majority do not contest this point. They do Not rely on the mere fact of possession of recently stolen property to provide the basis for holding petitioner to answer, but admit that in a case of mere possession of a stolen item, without more, 'perhaps * * * the mere fact of possession affords less than significant support for an inference that the possessor was the thief or had received it with guilty knowledge, * * *.'

In the present case the majority purport to find the corroborative evidence needed in addition to evidence of possession of recently stolen property in order to convict or to hold defendant to answer. For such corroborative evidence, the majority rely on what they consider to be the 'highly significant' fact that 'defendant was found in possession of All or practically all of the accessories which were stripped from Tom's car. * * *'

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that it is 'difficult to infer that 'practically everything' stolen from one Chevrolet would normally be found incorporated in another Chevrolet of the same year within a relatively short time (eight weeks) thereafter.' The fact that petitioner was apparently found in possession of 'practically everything' that had been 'stripped' from the stolen car, approximately eight customized items, reasonably suggests at most that petitioner obtained the customized accessories as a 'package deal' for his car, which was the same type of car (1956 Chevrolet) as that from which the accessories were 'stripped.' It is probably as 'normal'--or even more so--for customized accessories to be sold in 'packages' as singly.

I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of the stolen items found in petitioner's car as 'functionally unrelated.' That characterization flies in the face of the facts of this case. The items stolen were 'customized accessories' for a car 12 years old at the time of its theft, a 1956 Chevrolet. When those stolen items were recovered eight weeks later, they were found on another 12-year-old car, again a 1956 Chevrolet. There is no showing that the 'customized accessories' were suitable for use on other automobile models without substantial modification.

We are not here dealing with functionally unrelated items like a watch, an umbrella, and a car. We are dealing with items which can be expected to be sold as often in packages as singly because they are of utility only to a small part of the populace and a purchaser of one would be expected to be interested in the others. In the present case the items are so closely related and it is so normal for them to be sold as a 'package' rather than singly, that it is unreasonable to infer that a person in possession of the 'package' eight weeks after the theft is either the thief or a knowing receiver of the stolen property.

I consider that the majority's reasoning in footnote 7 reaches a conclusion based on so-called 'knowledge of practical realities' by magistrates which is not only erroneous but is slanderous to many of the citizens of this state. The footnote reads: 'In drawing this inference of guilty knowledge the magistrate would have been warranted in reasoning on the basis of his knowledge of practical realities that one who receives from another individual a collection of diverse automotive accessories such as those here involved (which included items ranging from a transmission and tires to window mouldings and an etched glove compartment cover) does so with an awareness that they might well have been obtained by stripping a stolen car.'

At the outset I cannot agree with the thought implicit in this footnote that a magistrate has knowledge of the 'practical realities' of the practices of trade in...