Williams v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1950
• Citation: 325 Mass. 244,90 N.E.2d 320
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. TRUSTEES OF NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

Page 320

90 N.E.2d 320

325 Mass. 244

WILLIAMS v. TRUSTEES OF NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 7, 1949.

Decided Feb. 2, 1950.

H. J. Williams, Boston, B. M. Rudman, Boston, for plaintiff.

N. W. Deering, Boston, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILKINS, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.

LUMMUS, Justice.

This is an action of tort against the trustees of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, who were engaged in managing that railroad. The plaintiff was hurt on March 22, 1942, while in the employ of the defendants and engaged in removing garbage from dining cars. The original declaration, filed on June 1, 1942, contained two counts. The first count alleged negligence of the defendants in failing to keep the 'appliances and ways' in a safe condition, and depriving the plaintiff of 'diligent fellow employees.' It alleged that the defendants were not subscribers under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The second count was similar. Neither made any reference to any Federal statute. The plaintiff concedes that both counts were based upon liability at common law.

On October 1, 1948, the plaintiff moved to amend his declaration by alleging in the first count that the defendants were trustees of and managed a corporation which was a common carrier by railroad and engaged in interstate commerce, that the plaintiff was employed in such commerce, and was injured through the negligence of the defendants in requiring the plaintiff to do work and furnishing him insufficient appliances and equipment with which to do it. The plaintiff moved to amend the second count by alleging that the defendants were engaged in operating a railroad in intrastate commerce in Massachusetts, and did not have in force a policy of workmen's compensation insurance as defined by law, and that the plaintiff sustained personal injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment.

On November 1, 1948, the judge denied the motion to amend 'as a matter of law.' The plaintiff excepted.

By his motion to amend the first count, the plaintiff sought to make out a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., under section 56 of which State courts and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Section 51 of that act provides that 'Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce * * * resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.' By section 56 of that act, 'No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.'

It is true that an amendment which merely expands or amplifies the original statement of the cause of action may be made after the expiration of the three years. Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 36 S.Ct. 567, 60 L.Ed. 1006; Robinson v. Trustees of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 318 Mass. 121, 125, 60 N.E.2d 593. But it has been held that a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is a different cause of action from one at common law or under a State statute, and that it cannot be introduced by amendment after the three years have expired. Renaldi v. New York Central Railroad, 256 Mass. 337, 152 N.E. 373; Hughes v. Gaston, 281 Mass. 292, 296, 183 N.E. 752; certiorari denied 289 U.S. 737, 53 S.Ct. 656, 77 L.Ed. 1485; Gallagher v. Wheeler, 292 Mass. 547, 553, 198 N.E. 891; McCabe v. Boston Terminal Co., 303 Mass. 450, 456, 22 N.E.2d 33.

But cases in the Supreme Court of the United States appear to us inconsistent with the Massachusetts cases just cited. The question is governed by the Federal law and not by the law of...