Stephenson v. Csx Transportation, Inc., 2002-CA-001796-MR.
| Decision Date | 12 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2002-CA-001796-MR.,2002-CA-001796-MR. |
| Parties | DAVID ROY STEPHENSON APPELLANT v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. APPELLEE. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
A. Scott Coburn, Jeffrey D. Hensley, Flatwoods, Kentucky, BRIEF FOR APPELLANT.
James E. Cleveland, III, Ashland, Kentucky, BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
BEFORE: PAISLEY AND TACKETT, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
REVERSING AND REMANDING
David Roy Stephenson has appealed from an order of the Greenup Circuit Court that denied his motion to amend the complaint brought pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Procedure (CR) 15. We hold that the trial court erred, and thus, reverse and remand.
Stephenson became employed by a predecessor railroad to CSX Transportation, Inc. (hereinafter CSXT) in 1974 primarily as a brakeman in the rail yard. In 1988, he also performed services as a hostler in addition to his duties as a brakeman, both of which required him to be exposed to noise from running locomotive engines, retarders on coal cars, and exploding torpedoes. In November 1990, Stephenson was informed that his periodic hearing test administered by CSXT indicated that he had some mild hearing loss. He subsequently filed a hearing loss claim with CSXT that resulted in a settlement between the parties with Stephenson receiving a $3,300.00 lump sum payment.
On December 11, 1998, an air hose ruptured as Stephenson was assisting in the connection of two locomotive engines to a group of railcars. Following the explosion, Stephenson experienced ringing in his ears and hearing problems. Shortly thereafter, he was examined by Dr. Ernest Behnke, an otolarynologist, who performed audiological testing that revealed mild to severe hearing loss. Stephenson continued working but eventually stopped working in approximately 2001 due to various physical problems including his hearing loss.
On December 11, 2001, Stephenson filed a complaint in Greenup Circuit Court seeking compensation for hearing impairment due to negligence by CSXT in violation of the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. Stephenson alleged that in the course of his employment with CSXT, he was "required to work amidst excessive, extreme and continuous noise . . . which caused his severe and permanent injuries" resulting in "hearing impairment and disability." In the ensuing months, the parties exchanged interrogatories and documents. In June 2002, Stephenson was deposed by CSXT and stated that the primary focus of his suit involved the December 11, 1998 incident.
On June 24, 2002, Stephenson filed a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to CR 15 to add a paragraph specifically stating that on December 11, 1998, he suffered a traumatic hearing loss and that he suffered from depression related to the hearing loss injuries. He also requested that the amendment relate back to the filing date of the original complaint pursuant to CR 15.03. On June 26, 2002, CSXT filed a response opposing the amendment arguing that it involved a new cause of action barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See 45 U.S.C. § 56. On July 1, 2002, CSXT filed a supplemental response reiterating its previous argument and citing O'Loughlin v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1991).
On July 9, 2002, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to amend the complaint finding the O'Loughlin case controlling. On July 17, 2002, Stephenson filed a motion to vacate the order denying his motion to amend. Following a response by CSXT and a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to vacate. This appeal followed.
Stephenson contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to amend his complaint. The importance of the amendment implicates the application of the statute of limitations and the relation-back principle. As stated earlier, actions under FELA are restricted by a three-year limitations period. Because the motion to amend to add the language concerning the December 11, 1998 incident was filed on June 24, 2002, more than three years after the incident, Stephenson also sought application of the relation-back principle.2
As an initial matter, we address CSXT's assertion that the federal rules of civil procedure, rather than the Kentucky rules of civil procedure, apply to the amendment of Stephenson's complaint in this action filed pursuant to FELA. This action was brought in the state circuit court under provisions in FELA that authorize concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See 45 U.S.C. § 56. Because the plaintiff's claim arises under this federal statute, state courts are required to apply federal law as stated in the provisions of the statute and interpretive decisions of the federal courts construing the statute as to "substantive" legal issues. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. McCoy, 270 Ky. 603, 110 S.W.2d 433, 435 (1937); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411 105 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985); Morant v. Long Island R.R., 66 F.3d 518, 522 (2nd Cir. 1995). While federal law controls issues of substantive law, state courts are free to apply state law to procedural issues. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., supra; Atlantic Coast Line R.Co. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532, 37 S.Ct. 188, 61 L.Ed. 476 (1917); Crafton v. Union Pacific R. Co., 7 Neb. App. 793, 585 N.W.2d 115, 121 (1998). Cf. Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 108 S.Ct. 1837, 100 L.Ed.2d 594 (1988). However, state procedural law will not apply if it results in a denial of a federal right under FELA. See, e.g., Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949); Dice v. Akron, C & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398 (1952); Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 31 Cal.4th 1, 6, 71 P.3d 770, 773 (2003).
CSXT argues that because the applicability of the statute of limitations is generally considered a substantive matter, see, e.g., Emmons v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 701 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983); Huett v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 644 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. App. 1994), the federal rules of civil procedure, rather than the Kentucky rules of civil procedure, should apply to the amendment and relation-back of Stephenson's amended complaint. The courts have recognized the difficulty in distinguishing substantive from procedural issues. See, e.g., Brown, supra; Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed 2079 (1945). Generally, the question of applicability of a state rule of procedure must be resolved in light of the particular circumstances and principles of noninterference with federal rights. Courts have recognized rules involving burden of proof, sufficiency of the evidence, and the measure of damages as being "substantive" and governed by federal law; whereas, formal rules of pleading, discovery, the form of instructions, and evidence apart from sufficiency of the evidence have been treated as "procedural" and governed by state law absent interference with a federal substantive right. See Annotation: Applicability of State Practice and Procedure in Federal Employers' Liability Actions Brought in State Courts, 79 A.L.R. 2d 553 (1961 & Supplement).
Although of rather ancient origin, the United States Supreme Court indicated in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 293, 36 S.Ct. 567, 568, 60 L.Ed.2d 1006 (1916), that permitting an amendment to the complaint beyond the limitations period with relation back to the date of the original complaint was a federal question. See also Hogarty v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 255 Pa. 236, 99 A. 741 (1916); Williams v. Trustees of New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 325 Mass. 244, 90 N.E.2d 320 (1950); Graham v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 240 N.C. 338, 82 S.E.2d 346 (1954). The Court stated that if the amendment introduced a "new or different cause of action," it would not be treated as satisfying the limitations requirement. However, "[i]f the amendment merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in support of the cause of action already asserted, it related back to the commencement of the action and was not affected by the intervening lapse of time." 241 U.S. at 293-94, 36 S.Ct. at 568. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the language and lack of more recent case law in this area, we will assume that federal law of civil procedure governs the issues in this case.3 While a trial court's decision whether to allow an amendment under Rule 15(a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the issue of relation-back under Rule 15(c) is subject to de novo review. See Miller v. American Heavy Lift Shipping, 231 F.3d 242 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995).
The current federal law on amendment of pleadings and relation-back is reflected in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, which states in relevant part:
(a) A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . .
. . .
(c) An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . . . .
As the language of Rule 15(a) indicates, leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, but the court is directed to exercise its discretion freely in favor of permitting amendment. Although the decision whether to permit amendment to a complaint is committed to the discretion of the trial court, "[t]he thrust of Rule 15 is . . . that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings." Tefft v....
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