Williams v. United States

Decision Date21 October 1959
Docket NumberNo. 7873.,7873.
Citation271 F.2d 703
PartiesCharlie Lewis WILLIAMS, Thelbert Eugene Williams, and James E. Pleasants, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

David K. Stewart, Dunn, N. C., and Robert L. Gavin, Greensboro, N. C. (Doffermyre, Stewart & Johnson, Dunn, N. C., and Gavin, Jackson & Gavin, Sanford, N. C., on brief), for appellants.

H. Vernon Hart, Asst. U. S. Atty., Greensboro, N. C. (James E. Holshouser, U. S. Atty., Boone, N. C., on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges.

BOREMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, defendants below, were found guilty on the first count of a seven count indictment charging them and others with conspiracy to violate the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371.1 In addition to conviction on the first count, defendants Charlie Lewis Williams and James E. Pleasants were convicted of substantive violations of the White Slave Traffic Act set forth in the second and sixth counts, respectively.

Charlie Lewis Williams, a resident of Benson, North Carolina, was engaged in the wholesale gasoline and oil business at certain locations in North Carolina and South Carolina on Highway 301. These locations were primarily truck stops with restaurant facilities where numerous prostitutes, in the guise of waitresses, were plying their trade. During February 1958, special agents of the Bureau of Investigation began an investigation of the locations owned and leased by Charlie Lewis Williams to determine whether activities there constituted violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422. Specifically, the locations under investigation were: Benson Motor Court and Bus Station, operated by Shirley McDaniel, a stepdaughter of Charlie Lewis Williams, and her husband under lease from Charlie Lewis Williams; Truckers' Rest Truck Stop at Wagram, North Carolina, operated by Thelbert Eugene Williams, a nephew of Charlie Lewis Williams; Carolina Truck Stop at Laurinburg, North Carolina, operated and managed part of the time by James E. Pleasants and F. L. McLamb; Jim's Truck Stop at Society Hill, South Carolina, operated a portion of the time in question by James E. Pleasants, a nephew of Charlie Lewis Williams or Mrs. Charlie Williams; and Tobacco Trail Truck Stop at Wilson, North Carolina. Floyd L. McLamb, who was not related to Charlie Lewis Williams, entered a plea of guilty. Shirley W. McDaniel was convicted but did not appeal.

The first assignment of error is that prejudicial error resulted from certain statements or comments over objection of defense counsel. In support of their argument, they cite the following statement made by the Assistant United States Attorney: "Your Honor, we have got a conspiracy and he was * * *". The court interrupted and stated: "I know we have a conspiracy". Counsel argues that at this time no conspiracy had been established and that these statements, made before the jurors, could have misled them into believing that the court was of the opinion that a conspiracy had been established.

It is well settled that isolated instances of possible prejudice will not form the basis for reversible error. Todorow v. United States, 9 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 439, 448; Ochoa v. United States, 9 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 341, 344. See Beaty v. United States, 4 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 652, 657. The remarks complained of occurred at the beginning of the trial and, at that time, it would have been impossible for the court or anyone to have formed or expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of these appellants as to conspiracy as there was then no evidence before the court upon which to base an opinion. Upon an examination of the entire record, we are impressed by the complete fairness and impartiality exhibited by the trial judge throughout the trial and in the court's charge to the jury. Appellants are attempting to lift out of context two separate comments, completely ignoring the balance of the record. At no time throughout the trial did the court express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants. On the contrary, the jury was told to keep an open mind and to make no determination until all of the evidence had been presented. We conclude that the statement made by the trial judge was a mere acknowledgment on his part that the case before the court involved a charge of conspiracy and that the jurors could not have been misled thereby.

As a second assignment of error, the appellants urge that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their conviction under any of the counts of the indictment. There was a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Government's case and it is well settled that, upon such motion, it is the duty of the trial judge to determine whether there is substantial evidence which, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would justify a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Linden v. United States, 4 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 560; Bell v. United States, 4 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 302; Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. It is true that the burden is upon the United States to prove the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt; also, it is the duty of the court to define and explain the meaning and application of "reasonable doubt". The court's charge in that particular was clear, forceful and unchallenged. The evidence, the sufficiency of which is challenged, is later reviewed and evaluated.

The Conspiracy Count

The evidence disclosed that Charlie Lewis Williams owned, leased, operated or sublet each of the truck stops here involved and that all bookkeeping for the truck stops was done in his headquarters at Benson Motor Court and Bus Station at Benson, North Carolina. There was a close family relationship, as well as a close business relationship, between and among these defendants. There was evidence that Charlie Lewis Williams participated in the profits of the illegal enterprise at each truck stop; that the cash received by each prostitute from customers was placed in a cigar box, identified by a "guest check", with the name of the prostitute thereon and the amount received; that each girl was furnished with a book of "guest checks"; that division of earnings was made by the operator with each prostitute at the end of each day or "work period", the operator retaining one-half; that the operator placed his share of earnings in an envelope; that envelopes, with names of prostitutes thereon and containing cash, were seen at headquarters at Benson; that each prostitute wore the uniform of a waitress and served food to customers at the truck stop restaurant although she received no salary; that the earnings of each girl were derived solely from prostitution; that the records kept at the Benson office falsely indicated the payment of salaries through social security withholdings and payments; that these defendants participated in the profits of the illegal enterprise; and that this same custom or pattern was followed at each of the truck stops.

There was evidence that numerous telephone calls were made from telephones located at the truck stops to or from different women in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, West Virginia, New York and Florida, and that some of the women named were identified as having been engaged in prostitution at one or more of the truck stops. Further evidence of the coalition, arrangement and conspiracy is supplied by evidence of the constant interchange of confessed prostitutes from one of these truck stops to another located in North Carolina and South Carolina. There is no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence tending to establish an arrangement, agreement and conspiracy between and among the three appellants and other defendants named in the indictment to conduct an interstate illegal and immoral enterprise at these various truck stops, and as charged in the first count of the indictment.

As stated by this court, speaking through Sobeloff, Chief Judge, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 4 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 397, at page 401, "The proposition is too elementary to require elaboration, that participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; `a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a "development and a collocation of circumstances."' Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680." See also United States v. Wilson, D.C.N.D.W.Va.1927, 23 F.2d 112, 117, where it is held, "* * * such charge of conspiracy may be sustained by evidence...

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