Williams v. United States

• Decision Date: 01 August 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:09-cr-116-T-33EAJ,Case No. 8:11-cv-427-T-33EAJ
• Parties: DAMON GERARD WILLIAMS, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

DAMON GERARD WILLIAMS, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Case No. 8:09-cr-116-T-33EAJ

Case No. 8:11-cv-427-T-33EAJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

Dated: August 1, 2011

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Damon Gerard Williams' motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (hereinafter "motion to vacate" or "motion"). (Doc. cv-1; cr-174). The government responded to the motion. (Doc. cv-3). Although invited to do so, Williams did not file a reply to the response.

A review of the record demonstrates that the motion to vacate must be denied.

BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2009, Williams pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiring with other persons to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three). Docs. cr-1 (Indictment); cr-49 (Plea Agreement); cr-53 (Minute Entry); and cr-162 (Transcript). In his plea agreement, Williams waived his rights to appeal and to attack his sentence collaterally as follows:

The defendant . . . expressly waives the right to appeal defendant's sentence or to challenge it collaterally on any ground, including the ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground that the sentence exceeds the defendant's applicable guidelines range as determinedby the Court pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution; provided, however, that if the government exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), then the defendant is released from his waiver and may appeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

Doc. cr- 49 at 13.

On March 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Williams to 200 months incarceration. Docs. cr-145 (judgment) and cr-163 (transcript). On March 19, 2010, Williams filed a notice of appeal. However, Williams later filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, and on June 23, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Williams' appeal pursuant to his motion. On March 1, 2011, Williams timely filed the present section 2255 motion raising four grounds for relief. Doc. cv-1 at 5.

COGNIZABILITY

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes an attack on a sentence on four grounds: (1) it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) it was imposed without jurisdiction; (3) it was imposed in excess of maximum authorized by law; or (4) it is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Only constitutional claims, jurisdictional claims, and claims of error so fundamental as to have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice are cognizable on collateral attack. E.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-86 (1979); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988). Claims of lesser error are not cognizable--they simply cannot support collateral relief. See, e.g., id. Even a defendant's demonstration of cause and actual prejudice, which will allow a defendant to get around procedural bar, does not render an incognizable claimcognizable. See id.; see also Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990).

Williams is challenging his conviction as unconstitutional based on receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (ineffective assistance claims should be decided in section 2255 proceedings).

GUILTY PLEA WAIVER

The right to collaterally challenge a sentence is statutory and can be waived if done so knowingly and voluntarily. Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005). For this Court to enforce such a waiver, the United States need only demonstrate either (1) that the district court specifically questioned the defendant concerning the waiver during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy; or (2) that it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993) (appeal waiver).

Williams is barred from raising a challenge to the factual basis of his plea in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion either directly or disguised as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.1992). In the context of a section 2255 motion, "a defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be sustained." Id. This waiver includes constitutional claims. Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992) (pre-plea ineffectiveness waived); Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324 (11th Cir.) (double jeopardy claim waived), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 837 (1990). Moreover, guilty pleas foreclose most claims from collateralattack. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).

A defendant's waiver of the right to appeal "directly or collaterally" encompasses his right to challenge his sentence in a section 2255 proceeding. See Williams, 396 F.3d at 1342; United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 341-44 (5th Cir. 2002); Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273 F.3d 506, 508-09 (2d Cir. 2001); Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183-87 (10th Cir. 2001); Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 2000). The waiver is enforceable against claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, because "a contrary result would permit a defendant to circumvent the terms of the sentence-appeal waiver simply by recasting a challenge to his sentence as a claim of ineffective assistance, thus rendering the waiver meaningless." Williams, 396 F.3d at 1342; see also Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1182 (appeal and collateral attack waiver provision in plea agreement waives the right to section 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel unless challenge concerns the validity of the plea or waiver); Mason, 211 F.3d at 1069 (same).

In particular, if the complaint underlying the ineffective assistance claim was waived by a defendant's plea agreement, then the ineffective assistance claim also was waived. See Williams, 396 F.3d at 1342 (acknowledging that exceptions in plea agreement to defendant's waiver of appeal did not apply to the claims raised in the petition); United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (although "dress[ed] up" as a Sixth Amendment claim, defendant really is challenging the correctness of his sentence under the guidelines and, therefore, is barred by the plain language of his plea agreement; to allow his claim would be to "render[ ] meaningless" such plea agreement waivers). For the reasons explained below, the record plainly demonstrates that Williams expressly waivedhis right to challenge his sentence either directly, or collaterally, as he attempts to do now.

DISCUSSION

First, Williams' blanket allegation that he "admitted guilt to charges under duress" is without merit. Doc. cv-1 at 2. After fully reviewing Williams' plea agreement with him, including the charges, penalties, and factual basis, the Court inquired if he were pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, and specifically asked if anyone had forced or coerced him to plead guilty. Williams responded that "yes," he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and "no," he had not been forced or coerced. Doc. cr-162 at 46. Williams provides no support showing otherwise.

At the beginning of the change of plea hearing, the Court asked Williams if his initials on each page of the plea agreement and signature on the last page signified he reviewed each page with his lawyer and understood each page of the plea agreement. Williams answered affirmatively. Doc. cr-162 at 17-18. Before concluding the hearing, the Court also asked Williams if anyone had coached him or told him how to testify other than providing truthful answers. Williams responded, "[n]o, sir." When asked by the Court if his answers had been the truth, Williams stated, "[y]es, sir." Doc. cr-162 at 47.

Williams expressly waived his right to appeal his sentence directly or to challenge it collaterally. At his change of plea hearing, the Court conducted a detailed colloquy with Williams, fully explaining the plea waiver contained in Williams' plea agreement. The Court made the following summation and asked Williams if he understood:

COURT: I want to emphasize paragraph five. First, I will tell you that even though you are pleading guilty, you have a right to appeal your sentence. But under -- and that doesn't include anything relating to the search or anything else, but youhave a right to appeal your sentence.

But under paragraph five, you limit the extent to which you can appeal your sentence. Under paragraph five you can only appeal if the sentence exceeds the guideline range as determined by the Court under the guidelines, or the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty, which in Count Three is life, or the sentence violates the Constitution, which in the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment.

Those are the only three things you can appeal. In particular what you cannot appeal is the way the Court calculates the Sentencing Guidelines. Do you understand that?

WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

COURT: And furthermore, you cannot come back

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