Williams v. White Plains Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 10 April 1970
• Citation: 309 N.Y.S.2d 454,62 Misc.2d 613
• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Parties: Application of Emily WILLIAMS, Petitioner, For a Judgment under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, v. The WHITE PLAINS HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.

Page 454

309 N.Y.S.2d 454

62 Misc.2d 613

Application of Emily WILLIAMS, Petitioner, For a Judgment

under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, v. The WHITE PLAINS HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Westchester County.

April 10, 1970.

The Legal Aid Society of Westchester County, White Plains, for petitioner.

Alonzo J. Drummond, White Plains, for respondent.

JOHN C. MARBACH, Judge.

Petitioner brings an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit respondent, The White Plains Housing Authority, from evicting petitioner unless petitioner is afforded a full and fair hearing prior to the termination of her tenancy. Petitioner also seeks a determination that the termination of petitioner's tenancy is contrary to law. Petitioner has been served with a notice to terminate her tenancy dated October 30, 1969. The facts are as follows:

Petitioner and her husband executed a lease agreement with respondent on April 1, 1965. The lease agreement is the standard month-to-month tenancy for low income housing developments throughout this State. It provides, in paragraph 3, for termination upon one month's written notice by either party. Petitioner resided in her apartment with her three children. Her husband does not live with her, and her husband has stated that he is in the process of getting a divorce. On April 29, 1969, the Authority sent a letter to petitioner advising her that acts and conduct on the part of members of her household constituted a breach of her lease agreement and requested that she appear before the Authority Review Board on May 7, 1969.

Section 1627--7.2 of the Official Compilation of the Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York, 9(c) Executive (added November 29, 1968), sets out standards of desirability for los income housing tenants. The Authority Board of Review was established pursuant to Section 1627--7.3 (added November 29, 1968). These sections were added after the decision in Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 A.D. 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (,2nd Dept. 1968). Vinson held that a housing authority cannot arbitrarily deprive tenants of their right to continue occupancy through the exercise of a contractual provision to terminate the lease. The actions of a housing authority need not rest on mere whim or caprice but must be predicated on a reasonable ground for said termination.

Section (a) of the Regulations establishing an Authority Board of Review provides that the Review Board shall consist of three members of the Authority to be appointed by the Chairman. Section (b) provides for review of appeals of an administrative authority ruling or finding of ineligibility for admission or continued occupancy. The review procedure is initiated by written appeal for a hearing within 30 days of the ruling or finding of ineligibility. Petitioner may appear by counsel or other qualified representative. Section (c) provides that a decision of the Board is final except for review by appropriate judicial proceedings. If the Board of Review cannot agree on a decision, the matter is remanded for a hearing before all the members of the Authority. A decision of a majority of the members of the Authority has the same effect as a decision by a majority of the Review Board. Section (d) provides for minutes to be taken of the meetings of the Review Board. Section (e) states that a written demand for review shall not affect any legal action taken by the Authority, but the Authority shall not evict any tenant whose appeal has not been finally determined. The Order to Show Cause staying the eviction pending a decision by this Court was signed on January 19, 1970.

Petitioner was also advised by the letter of April 29, 1969, that she had a right to be represented by counsel or any other representative of her choice to protect her interest. She appeared on May 7, 1969, and was not represented by counsel or anyone else. Her husband also appeared.

The Board of Review consisted of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and another member of the Authority. Mrs. Williams and her husband stated they understood they had a right to counsel or anyone else to represent them. Mrs. Williams and the Review Board discussed the fact that unauthorized parties were living in the apartment, in particular her brother who had recently been released from jail. Mrs. Williams related the problems she was having with her stepson relating to general housekeeping and noise which annoyed her and other tenants. A son-in-law of another tenant apparently had a key to the apartment and went in and out of Mrs. Williams' apartment at will.

Mr. Williams stated that Mrs. Williams is expecting a child which is not his. He stated that Mrs. Williams and his son never got along but feels the son is better off living in the apartment than somewhere else. Mr. Williams could not be said to have been a witness in his wife's behalf.

The Board of Review found that the family is undesirable on the grounds that (1) unauthorized persons have lived in the apartment for extended periods of time, and although they purported to pay board to the leaseholders, the rental for the apartment could not be evaluated on the basis of the aggregate income of the occupants; (2) the occupants and their visitors are an annoyance to other tenants, and the apartment is maintained in such a manner that the boy's room is a fire hazard; and (3) that Mrs. Williams' pregnancy by a man other than her husband constitutes immoral behavior. Mrs. Williams was then served the notice to vacate on October 30, 1969.

Petitioner contends that (1) the Authority must have reasonable grounds in order to terminate the lease; (2) a determination that reasonable grounds exist can only be made after a hearing which complies with federal and state requirements of due process and equal protection of laws; (3) if the Authority does not afford tenant a hearing with proper procedural safeguards, then a de novo hearing must be held by a court.

The Authority argues (1) that it has afforded a full and fair hearing pursuant to Regulation 1627--7.3; (2) that petitioner's concealment of earnings is a fraud upon the taxpayers of the State of New York, in violation of the 1627--7.2 regulation relating to standards of desirability; and (3) that the procedure followed by it was in all respects proper.

This Court agrees with The White Plains Housing Authority that it proceeded in accordance with existing regulations. However, the regulations governing the hearing afforded petitioner by the Authority did not meet the constitutional standards necessitated by the requirements of due process of law.

One of the best expositions of general legal principles applicable to low income housing is contained in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Hopkins in Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing, 29 A.D.2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2nd Dept. 1968). Low rent housing is recognized by our Constitution as a proper governmental function (N.Y.Const. Art. XVIII). Our State, in its Public Housing Law, has recognized that low rent housing is a human need to be satisfied through governmental action and, in pursuit of this objective, has created by specific statutory provisions the structure of the relationship between the Authority and its tenant. Due to its governmental aspects, the Authority is not the ordinary landlord, nor is the lessee the ordinary tenant; see 'Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of Undesirables from Public Housing Projects', 77 Yale L.J. 988--994, 996--997 (1968). The Authority's interest in property is in its usefulness as a tool of national and state housing policies.

The tenants' need for decent low rent housing is subject only to their compliance with reasonable regulations and the payment of rent. This doesn't mean, of course, that a public authority is powerless to evict a tenant. It may do so if the tenant's conduct is dangerous, destructive or harmful to others, but its eviction must not be arbitrary or based upon mere whim or caprice.

Once the State has recognized and acknowledged that low income housing is a proper governmental function, then the function, like other governmental functions, is subject to constitutional mandates. Foremost among our constitutional mandates is that a citizen may not be deprived of property without due process of law. Rudder v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 226 F.2d 51, 53.

It can no longer be disputed that due process of law extends to those situations where a citizen may be deprived of life, liberty or property whether the proceeding be judicial, administrative or executive in nature. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 190--191; Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, supra; Ruffin v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, D.C., 301 F.Supp. 251 (1969). This is rooted in a fundamental concept that the essence of due process is 'the protection of the individual against arbitrary action'. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302, 57 S.Ct. 724, 729, 81 L.Ed. 1093; Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 559, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692. Due process requires that not only evictions but also selections for public housing must be made in accordance with reasonable and ascertainable standards. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2nd Cir. 1968); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F.Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y.1968) Once it has been established that due process standards should apply, the question arises what constitutes due process in this type of proceeding.

On January 13, 1969, the United States Supreme...