Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 11 March 1968
• Citation: 288 N.Y.S.2d 159,29 A.D.2d 338
• Parties: In the Matter of Bennie VINSON et al., Respondents, v. GREENBURGH HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 159

288 N.Y.S.2d 159

29 A.D.2d 338

In the Matter of Bennie VINSON et al., Respondents, v. GREENBURGH HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 11, 1968.

Bleakley, Platt, Schmidt, Hart & Fritz, New York City (John C. Marbach, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Levine & Frost, New York City, and Rudolph D. Raiford, New Rochelle (Robert P. Levine, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

Before BELDOCK, P.J., and CHRIST, BRENNAN, HOPKINS and MUNDER, JJ.

HOPKINS, Justice.

The petitioners in this proceeding under CPLR article 78 are husband and wife and the tenants in a housing project owned and managed by the appellant, the Greenburgh Housing Authority (hereafter called 'Authority'). The Authority exists as a public corporation through act of the Legislature (Public Housing Law, § 3, subd. 2; § 457). The petitioners have occupied an apartment under a written lease since July 16, 1962.

The lease provides for a term of one month, to be automatically renewed for successive terms of one month, unless terminated by either party upon giving one month's prior notice in writing. The rental is stipulated at $66 a month, which may be increased in the event that the petitioners' family income shall have increased beyond a certain ratio to that rental.

On March 29, 1966 a written notice of termination of the lease was given by the Authority to the petitioners, effective April 30, 1966. The notice states no reason for the termination. The petitioners did not comply with the notice and on May 3, 1966 the Authority commenced summary proceedings to evict the petitioners in the Justice's Court of the Town of Greenburgh. This proceeding to annul the determination of the Authority to evict the petitioners and to stay the summary proceedings followed on May 12, 1966.

The petitioners allege that the regulations of the Authority establish a standard of eligibility and conduct for continued occupancy by its tenants, that is, so long as the tenants do not constitute a detriment to the health, safety and morals of their neighbors or to the community, or an adverse influence on sound family and community life, or a source of danger to the premises or the peaceful occupation of other tenants. Further, they allege that, upon receipt of the notice of termination of their lease, the petitioner-wife was told by the attorney for the Authority that she and the children of the family would be permitted to remain as tenants, provided that she compel her husband to leave the apartment and that she seek public welfare assistance and an order of support by her husband in the Family Court; and that she refused to comply with this instruction. In further support of their proceeding, the petitioners submitted an affidavit by their attorney who stated therein that the attorney for the Authority had refused to discuss the matter with him or to give any reason for the eviction, other than the termination of the lease itself.

The Authority's return alleges no reason for the termination of the lease; it admits that the petitioners' attorney spoke to its attorney, who informed the former that the Authority was not required to give a reason for the eviction. The Authority claims as a defense that the notice validly terminated the lease and that its determination was neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act and hence not reviewable by the court.

Special Term in effect granted the relief sought by the petitioners, unless the Authority submit an appropriate return stating the grounds for its determination. Special Term reasoned that the petitioners had asserted grave charges of irresponsibility by the Authority and that the latter's contention that its exercise of discretion to terminate the lease was absolute could not be sustained. By permission of Special Term, the Authority appeals (CPLR 5701, subd. (c)).

The Authority argues that the provisions in the lease for its termination are plain and binding on both parties and cannot be modified by the court. To interfere with its determination by requiring an explanation, the Authority urges, imposes a burden not demanded from other landlords and thus discriminates unfairly and invalidly against it. On the other hand, the petitioners press on us the contention that the Authority may not act arbitrarily toward its tenants, for otherwise a tenant might be evicted without cause or justification.

We meet, then, the question of the nature of the relationship between a housing authority and its tenants. Ordinarily, provisions in a lease permitting its termination upon the service of a notice of a stated period are enforcible by the landlord at will (Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend. 76; cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc.2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693). The relationship between landlord and tenant is considered contractual simply; and the terms of the lease for termination, unless calling for a reasonable basis for action, may be exercised without explanation. But a housing authority is not an ordinary landlord, nor its lessees ordinary tenants.

Our Constitution recognizes low rent housing as a proper governmental function (N.Y.Const., art. XVIII). The Legislature, in response to its direction, has enacted the Public Housing Law. The statute empowers the construction of housing through the agency of authorities (Public Housing Law, § 30), which may appoint a general manager (id., § 32), make by-laws and regulations (id., § 37, subd. 1, par. (w)), and conduct hearings (id., § 37, subd. 1, par. (x)). The authorities are empowered to select tenants qualified as persons of low income (id., § 156), under leases which provide for rents adjustable according to income (id., § 37, subd. 1, par. (k)).

Thus, our State has distinguished low rent housing as a human need to be satisfied through governmental action and has created by specific statutory provisions the structure of the relationship between the housing authority and the tenant. The statute consequently enters into and becomes a part of the lease; and its spirit and intent must be the guiding beacon in the interpretation of the terms of the lease.

"Due process of law,' is not confined to judicial proceedings, but extends to every case which may deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property, whether the proceeding be judicial, administrative, or executive in its nature' (Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 190--191). Once the State embarks into the area of housing as a function of government, necessarily that function, like other governmental functions, is subject to the constitutional commands. Low rent housing is not the leasing of government-owned property originally acquired for a different purpose, but now surplus or not required for that purpose, on a sporadic or temporary basis (cf. United States v. Blumenthal, 3 Cir., 315 F.2d 351), where the traditional notions of private property might well be applied; rather, it imports a status of a continuous character, based on the need of the tenants for decent housing at a cost proportionate to their income, subject to the compliance by the tenants with reasonable regulations and the payment of rent when due. 'The Government as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law' (Rudder v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 226 F.2d 51, 53).

What may be complete freedom of action under private contractual arrangements falls to restricted action under public housing leases (cf. Housing Auth. of City of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App.2d Supp. 883, 279 P.2d 215, cert. den. 350 U.S. 969, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 841; Kutcher v. Housing Auth. of City of Newark, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1; Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill.2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522; Lawson v. Housing Auth. of City of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605; Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (D.C.App.)). We think that a housing authority cannot arbitrarily deprive a tenant of his right to continue occupancy through the exercise of a contractual provision to terminate the lease. In other words, the action of the housing authority must not rest on mere whim or caprice or an arbitrary reason.

Several considerations combine to justify the difference in treatment between governmental agencies and private individuals. Realistically, it must be acknowledged that the housing authority prescribes the terms of the lease and that the tenant does not negotiate wih the authority in the usual sense (see, Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 749--752; Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An overview, 54 Cal.L.Rev. 642, 660; note, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 508, 512). In this condition of affairs, to impose a requirement of good faith and reasonableness on the party in the stronger bargaining position when he exerts a contractual option is but a reflection of simple justice (cf. New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967; Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214).

That requirement, even before the advent of housing as a public function, was read into municipal agreements dealing with the use of governmental facilities (Gushee v. City of New York, 42 App.Div. 37, 48, 58 N.Y.S. 967, 976; cf. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N.Y. 34, 40, 103 N.E. 768, 770, L.R.A.1915F, 1009). In Gushee (supra), thus, it was said (42 App.Div. pp. 48--49, 58 N.Y.S. 976):

'But if, at any time in the future, it shall determine in good faith to take away the restaurant, the plaintiff must submit, because he takes his agreement subject to the power which the law has given to make these regulations. Until, however, some such regulation is made, the plaintiff has the right to his contract, and to the protection of the court to prevent any capricious or unnecessary interference with it.'

Moreover, in...