Williams v. Williams

• Decision Date: 28 July 1887
• Citation: 2 So. 768,23 Fla. 324
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

2 So. 768

23 Fla. 324

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.

Florida Supreme Court

July 28, 1887

Appeal from Fourth judicial circuit, Duval county.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The usual definition of extreme cruelty as a cause for divorce is that it consists of such conduct of husband or wife as will endanger the life, limb, or health of the other, or create a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. But what conduct will reach the requirements of this rule will depend upon the circumstances of each case.^[1]

In this state and others the rule is extended to mental as well as bodily injuries. If the mental injury is not of itself sufficient to constitute cause of divorce, it may serve to aid bodily injury to constitute such cause.^[1]

Conjugal unkindness, amounting to cruelty, will revive former acts of cruelty, after condonation.

Where the wife has no means but alimony for her own support, and the children prefer to remain with the father, who is in condition to give them a comfortable home and support, and it appears to be to their interests, the better course is to leave them with him.

COUNSEL James R. Challen, for appellant.

A. W Cockrell & Son, for appellee.

OPINION

MAXWELL C.J.

The appellee sued appellant for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and the habitual indulgence of violent and ungovernable temper. Appellant in his answer denied all the material allegations of the bill, and subsequently filed his cross-bill praying for a divorce from appellee on just the same grounds, and also on the ground of desertion. The answer of appellee to this cross-bill denied its material allegations. The trial, on the evidence taken, resulted in a decree of divorce for appellee, and in the dismissal of the cross-bill of appellant. This appeal is from that decree, and the only error assigned is that 'there is manifest error in the decree and proceedings of the court below, and that the decree of the court below should have been for the defendant below.'

We will confine our discussion of the case to the first ground in both the bills, extreme curelty. The definition of extreme cruelty has puzzled the most eminent judges and writers; and while any number of detinitions may be found in the books concurring for the most part in the essential requisites, it is apparent from numerous cases on the subject that where the cruelty is not flagrant violence and injury to the body clearly endangering life or limb or health, or creating reasonable apprehension of such violence and injury, each case must furnish its own definition through the circumstances attending it, including, not merely the acts complained of, but also the manner of life, physical condition, temperament, personal habits, and such like criteria that may serve to give the acts their true significance. One general definition is this: 'Cruelty is such conduct in one of the married parties as, to the reasonable apprehension of the other or in fact, renders cohabitation physically unsafe to a degree justifying a withdrawal therefrom.' 1 Bish. Marr. & Div. § 717. Another: 'Cruelty is either actual violence endangering life or limb or health, or conduct creating a reasonable apprehension of such violence.' Another: 'Legal cruelty may be defined to be such conduct on the part of the husband as will endanger the life, limb, or health of the wife, or create reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. What must be the extent of the injury, or what particular act will create a reasonable apprehension of personal injury, will depend upon the circumstances of each case.' Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286, 317.

It may, however, be remarked that the law in regard to cruelty as a ground of divorce has been considerably modified in late years, both in England and in the United States, in so much that, while formerly it required actual violence to the body of the person to constitute such cruelty, it is now being held in many, if not most, of the courts, that there may be cruelty short of blows or other violence to the body which will authorize a divorce; such as the torture inflicted upon the mental and emotional nature by constant insinuations of evil doing, unfounded and repeated charges of unfaithfulness, studied and gross discourtesies, and long neglect, habitually harsh and irritating demeanor, and the like, which go to the extent of affecting bodily health. This doctrine has found favor in this state. In the case of Donald v. Donald, 21 Fla. 571, this court said, as applicable to the case of a wife: 'The better opinion, and one more consonant with humanity and justice, is that the cruelty to the wife need not necessarily be a bodily infliction.' But we have no occasion to invoke such doctrine in this case, except so far as it may serve to emphasize the force of mental injury in aid of physical violence.

As illustrative of the rule generally, we cite a few of the many cases on the subject, from which it will appear that, whatever the character of the violence to the body, if it be calculated to injure life, limb, or health, even if inflicted but once, and there is reasonable ground to apprehend further acts of the same or similar kind, relief will be granted; the rule being that it is impracticable to discharge the duties of the marriage state when such apprehension exists. See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 7 Eng. Ecc. R. 114; French v. French, 4 Mass. 586; Cook v. Cook, 11 N. J. Eq. 195; Hughes v. Hughes, 19 Ala. 307; Pillar v. Pillar, 22 Wis. 658. See, also, 1 Bish. Mar. & Div.§§ 744, 745, 747.

Guided by the law as we find it from the teaching of the preceding paragraphs, we now proceed to consider the facts of the case. In his answer to the bill, appellant gives general and specific denial of the material facts alleged, and appellee does the same in her answer to the cross-bill, with the addition, in regard to desertion, of an exculpatory statement of her reasons for absenting herself from the home of appellant.

In appellee's testimony she states that in 1876 appellant struck her with his open hand a hard blow, that made her nose bleed; that in the fall of that year he struck her with paddles he made for the purpose; that afterwards (date not given) he beat her in the kitchen with a board; that in 1882 he kicked her twice, and jerked her into the bed-room by her arm, and got a stick. Once, she says, when she was sick, he slapped her with his open hand, and she fell to the floor, and he struck her once or twice in 1881 with paddles; also struck her with the paddles one morning in 1884, before she left to go to Mr. Richards.' That was when she quit her home the first time. She further states that in 1884 he said he would cowhide her till he cut her back; also that he cut some hickory limbs, and said he was going to cut her in pieces, and said her back ought to be salted and peppered. Mary Richards, daughter of the parties, and witness for appellant, confirms the statement that appellee was slapped to the floor. She says that in the spring of 1878 she saw him (appellant) slap and knock her to the floor. We cannot hesitate to say that, if these statements are true, appellee is fully entitled to a divorce, if there has not been condonation. But, on the other hand, appellant in his testimony denies all the allegations of the bill, and these statements, as to blows and kicks; and two of the daughters deny even having seen anything of the kind. Other witnesses who were about the premises from time to time testify that they never saw any violence on the part of appellant towards appellee.

This is substantially the state of the oral testimony in the case on the subject of cruelty; and, if this were all, we could not but say that appellee has failed to sustain her charge. Perhaps, if we had heard the testimony of the witnesses as given in the presence of the chancellor, where there was opportunity to judge of their credibility, our impression might have been different. But, besides this, fortunately for appellee, there is other evidence which, we think, not only gives her the preference for credibility, but also seems to strengthen her appeal for relief. The appellant positively denies that he ever struck her, except once with a shingle, before they came to Florida. He is emphatic in denying the paddle striking. Yet, when his wife was away from him the first time, in 1884, he wrote her a letter in which is found this language: 'I spatted you once or twice with a paddle; but for what?' In another letter to her, artfully seeking to avert her divorce proceedings, he says: 'I have erred, but through provocation, and done and said things to you in passion that I would not otherwise have done.' Again, in a letter, January 19, 1884, to appellee's brother, after detailing her shortcomings and misdeeds, he says: 'In consequence I did things that I by no means would have done had she been a wife to me.' What are these things? Not words surely, but deeds; and, taken in their connection with the purport of the letters, deeds of such grave character as to require attempts at justification. These admissions in his letters, so at variance with his testimony, and in effect confirming the testimony of appellee, compel the conclusion that, as between the two, the award of credibility must go to her.

Still there are the other witnesses in his behalf. It is enough to say that, as to all of these, their testimony is of a negative character, to the effect that they never saw any of the blows or kicks she complains of; and it is to be remarked, further, in regard to the principal of these, that their relations to him were such that the basis of their testimony evidently resulted from his influence over them. Then, as to the two daughters, they testify mainly in the same negative way, but in one or two instances deny...