Williams v. Williams, No. 2-06-143-CV (Tex. App. 1/11/2007), 2-06-143-CV.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-06-143-CV.,2-06-143-CV. |
| Parties | DANIELLE WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. JERRY W. WILLIAMS, JR., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 393rd District Court of Denton County.
Panel F: HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
This is an appeal from the trial court's property division in a divorce proceeding. In four issues, appellant Danielle Williams contends that the trial court erred by refusing to recognize her separate property claims and in making its valuation findings. Because we conclude that the trial court did err in one of its property characterizations, constituting reversible error, we reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.
In her third issue, Appellant complains that the trial court failed to make a just and right division of property, based in part on the errors she asserts in her first and second issues. In her fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to require the return to her of her separate property.
A trial court has broad discretion in making its "just and right" division of the marital estate. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 2006); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb that division. Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974); Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). An abuse of discretion does not occur where the trial court bases its decisions on conflicting evidence. In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). Furthermore, an abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court's decision. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
In this case, the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law after the judgment. Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury's answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury's answer. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).
Property possessed by either spouse at the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property, and a party who seeks to assert the separate character of property must prove that character by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003 (Vernon 2006). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994). This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979). While the proof must weigh heavier than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence, there is no requirement that the evidence be unequivocal or undisputed. Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570.
This higher burden of proof elevates the appellate standard of legal sufficiency review. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 622, 625 (Tex. 2004). In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. We must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. This means that we must assume that the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. We must also disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170; Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 627. We must consider, however, undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. The City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005); Hall, 168 S.W.3d at 170. That is, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
Where a sufficiency review overlaps the abuse of discretion standard, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) did the trial court err in its application of discretion? Ho v. Ho, No. 02-04-00231-CV, 2006 WL 239087, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Sandone v. Miller-Sandone, 116 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.). The traditional legal sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question. Ho, 2006 WL 239087, at *2; Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at 206. We then must proceed to determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a decision that was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Ho, 2006 WL 239087, at *2; Sandone, 116 S.W.3d at 206. We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo as legal questions. See In re Marriage of Royal, 107 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.). A conclusion of law will not be reversed unless it is erroneous as a matter of law. Id.
In her first issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by refusing to recognize her separate property claim in and to twelve acres of real property containing a barn, an apartment, and horse stalls ("Ranch Property"). The trial court made the following findings of fact with regard to the Ranch Property:
• The Court finds that [Appellant] does not have a separate property claim in the [Ranch Property]. . . . [Appellant] and [Appellee] purchased the [Ranch Property] on August 7, 1997, and had a note with a final maturity payment due on August 1, 2000. When the final maturity payment became due . . . [they] entered into an agreement with [Appellant's] mother Rita Soto Lang and her husband Paul Lang. The agreement was for Mr. and Mrs. Lang to pay the final maturity payment on the [Ranch Property] in August of 2000, and [Appellant] and [Appellee] would then pay Mr. and Mrs. Lang. The Langs made two payments in August 2000, one for $50,000 on August 8, 2000, and the one for $62,000 on August 25, 2000. [Appellant] and [Appellee] made payments to Mr. and Mrs. Lang.
• In 2002, the Langs attempted to have a Promissory Note in the amount of $112,000.00 and secured by the [Ranch Property] executed by [Appellant] and [Appellee]. Appellant did sign the promissory note on May 6, 2002, however, [Appellee] did not sign.2
• Prior to [Appellant] filing for divorce, she took out a loan from her retirement plan on March 26, 2004, to pay for her attorney fees. On April 19, 2004, the Langs executed a document purporting to convey a gift solely to [Appellant] the balance of the property loan of $51,097.24. The same document also purports to acknowledge a gift to [Appellant] on August 8, 2000, for the original $50,000 payment made by the Langs. This same document also recognizes that the original loan for $112,000.00 made by the Langs to [Appellant] and [Appellee] was $112,000.00.3
• Because the property was originally purchased as community property and the subsequent loan was a debt of both parties the court finds that any forgiveness of debt benefitted the community estate and [Appellant] has no claim for separate property reimbursement from the community estate.
It filed the following conclusion of law:
• Because the [Ranch Property] was originally purchased as community property and the subsequent loan by the Langs was a debt of the community estate, the court concludes as a matter of law that any forgiveness of debt by the Langs benefitted the community estate and [Appellant] has no claim for separate property reimbursement from the community estate in regards to the [Ranch Property].
At trial, Appellant testified that the Ranch Property was community property and that she and Appellee borrowed $150,000 to purchase it. Appellant's separate property claim is based on the Langs' payment of $112,000 on the original $150,000 debt, which they made because Appellant could not get another mortgage loan and faced foreclosure. Appellant claims a separate property interest of $101,097.24.
Appellant, her mother ("Lang"), and Appellee testified at the bench trial. Appellant and Lang testified that the Lang payments of $50,000 and $62,000 to the Ranch Property's owner were gifts to Appellant, but that they initially considered the $62,000 payment a loan. Appellant made approximately the same monthly payments to the Langs that she had made to the Ranch Property's owner. Appellant and Lang testified that the Langs later waived the remaining balance, $51,097.24, on the $62,000 loan, as a gift to Appellant. The characterization of property is determined by the inception of title to the property. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). There was legally sufficient evidence at trial that the Ranch Property was community property, because it was purchased during marriage, and property purchased on community credit does not change its character even if the debt is later paid with separate property funds. Broussard...
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