Williams v. Wyrick

• Decision Date: 06 February 1952
• Docket Number: No. A-3407,A-3407
• Citation: 151 Tex. 40,245 S.W.2d 961
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WYRICK.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 961

245 S.W.2d 961

151 Tex. 40

WILLIAMS v. WYRICK.

No. A-3407.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 6, 1952.

Kelley, Looney, McLean & Littleton and Sidney L. Farr, all of Edinburg for petitioner.

Albert E. Coneway, Harlingen, for respondent.

HICKMAN, Chief Justice.

The principal question in this case is whether a trial court has authority to render judgment nunc pro tunc on a special issue verdict after the term of court at which the verdict was returned had expired, no judgment having been rendered during that term.

The respondent, Wyrick, sued the petitioner, Williams, for damages for breach of an oral contract for the sale and purchase of tomato plants and tomato seed. The allegations of his petition would have supported a judgment for $1941.23, but his prayer for recovery was for $1851.23. The jury in answer to a special issue assessed his damages at $1941.23. All answers of the jury were responsive to the issues and were favorable to respondent. The verdict was returned at 5:00 o'clock p. m. on the last day of the court's term. No judgment was pronounced during that day. Later, upon motion by plaintiff and after a hearing, the court rendered judgment nunc pro tunc in favor of plaintiff for $1941.23. The Court of Civil Appeals reformed that judgment by reducing the amount thereof to $1851.23, and, as reformed, affirmed the case. 242 S.W.2d 669.

The power of the court to enter judgment nunc pro tunc after term time is not limited to cases where judgment was actually rendered during the term in which the case was tried but was not correctly recorded. In a proper case the court has the power to both render and enter a judgment nunc pro tunc after term time. Black on Judgments, Second Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 126, p. 186, states: 'The cases calling for the exercise of this power of the courts are chiefly of two kinds; first, where no judgment was actually rendered although one might or ought to have been; second, where a judgment was actually rendered, but never entered or put upon the records.'

It is stated in Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Vol. 1, § 122, p. 222, that cases in which judgments have been both rendered and entered nunc pro tunc have been more numerous than cases in which judgments have been rendered but not correctly entered during the term. The rationale of the rule is stated by the same author in § 121, p. 220, to be: 'The policy of entering judgments and decrees nunc pro tunc is agreeable to the maxim * * * an act of the court shall prejudice no one. This maxim, says Mr. Broom, 'is founded in justice and good sense; and affords a safe and certain guide to the administration of the law.''

The same thought is expressed in McDonald's Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 4, § 17.06, p. 1321.

Why should it be held that a prevailing party must be deprived of his legal right to a judgment on a verdict by the failure or neglect of the trial judge to render judgment during the term? No statute prohibits the court from rendering and entering the judgment at a subsequent term in a proper case, and from earliest times courts have exercised that power under principles of the common law. In those cases in which the court may both render and enter a judgment nunc pro tunc after term time, the delay must have resulted from the process of the law or the delay of the court. The author last cited in Section 17.07, p. 1325, states: 'In general, where the delay in rendition after the case is fully ripe for judgment has resulted solely from the process of the law or the delay of the court, and not from any fault of the prevailing party, rendition of judgment nunc pro tunc is proper.'

That test has been widely accepted, but it should be pointed out that the word 'fault,' as used in the text, has but little meaning, if any. The real test is whether the case was fully ripe for judgment before the end of the term at which it was tried. In 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 118b, p. 249, the test is stated in this language: 'A judgment can be entered nunc pro tunc only in a case which was ripe for judgment at the date to which the judgment is to relate back. A judgment may, if justice so requires, be both rendered and entered nunc pro tunc.'

It seems not to be questioned that it is the settled law in his State that rendition as well as entry of a judgment on a general verdict is a ministerial act, and that judgment may be both rendered and entered on such verdict nunc pro tunc. Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1; Carwile v. William Cameron & Co., 102 Tex. 171, 114 S.W. 100. It was formerly held that the rendition of a judgment on a special issue verdict involved the exercise of judicial discretion and was not a ministerial act. Under that view the courts would possess no power to both render and enter a judgment nunc pro tunc after term time on a special issue verdict. But in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 285 S.W. 296, 302, that view was rejected, and the power of the court both to render and enter a judgment after term time upon such verdict was upheld. In that case it was held: 'When the necessary effect of a special verdict is clear and plain, the writ of mandamus as prayed for herein should issue just the same as has been done in general verdict cases.'

Like holdings have been made by courts of civil appeals in the following cases: Wright v. Longhorn Drilling Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W.2d 285, error refused; Farmer v. Denton, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 908; Stewart v. Gibson, Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 1002; Nalle v. Walenta, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 1070.

The author of the opinion in the Canty c...