Williamson v. Ask In & Marine Co
Decision Date | 08 December 1926 |
Docket Number | (No. 12118.) |
Citation | 136 S.E. 21 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | WILLIAMSON. v. ASK IN & MARINE CO. et al. |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; W. H. Townsend, Judge.
Action by Mrs. Delia Williamson against the Askin & Marine Company and another.
Judgment for defendants on demurrer to the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for trial.
Nelson & Mullins, Cooper & Winter, and J. B. McLaughlin, all of Columbia, for appellant.
E. A. Blackwell and R. Beverly Herbert, both of Columbia, for respondents.
This is an action for damages based on alleged libel.
The complaint sets forth that on or about December 15, 1922, the plaintiff purchased, on credit, certain merchandise from the defendant Askin & Marine Company, of which the defendant J. M. Broome is manager, and that she completed payment of her account on or about July 7, 1923, but that the defendants still claim that there is a balance of $2 due on her account; and that, in attempting to collect the said alleged balance, the defendants wrote and published certain writings which, taken together and separately, contained matter that was libelous to her, copies of said writings, 23 in number, being attached to the complaint and marked as exhibits.
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the following grounds:
"That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this defendant, for the reason that the only cause of action alleged in the complaint is based on alleged libelous matter contained in certain letters attached to the complaint, which letters appear on their face to be harmless and nonlibelous."
The demurrer was heard by Hon. W. H. Townsend, who, on September 4, 1925, passed the following order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the suit:
The plaintiff appeals from this order upon the following exceptions:
Exhibit 23 is as follows:
The exhibits attached to the complaint and containing the alleged libelous matter consist of communications addressed to the plaintiff, urging the payment of the balance claimed to be due on her account. The language used is not always of a mild and gentle nature, but were it not for Exhibit 23, set out above, we would have no hesitancy in affirming the judgment of the circuit court. Without reference to the present case, this court notes with regret the lamentable lapse of business conscience into which so many of our people have fallen within the past few years. Theprovocation put upon creditors by delinquent debtors who ignore just claims is very great. But, even so, this provocation does not remove the protection which the law throws around the good name of every citizen until it is shown to be unmerited.
In the present case the circuit judge appears to have had in mind, in passing his order dismissing the suit, that the words used were actionable only, if at all, upon the well-established principle that "words, not actionable in the case of a common person, may become so, when spoken of another, in relation to the office he fills or the trade or profession which he carries on" (Davis v. Davis, 1 Nott & McC. 200) or upon allegation of special damage. But we do not think the case rests upon these principles.
Language alleged to be defamatory "must be construed as a whole; that is, the words must be construed in connection with other parts of the conversation or published matter, written or printed." Exhibit 23 is, as stated, one of a series of communications, alleged to have been published in the same manner, of and concerning the plaintiff and so must be construed with the other communications. But even if it be considered alone we cannot say, as a matter of law, that, taken as a whole and its parts being construed together, its language is not actionable.
Exhibit 23, after setting forth what purports to be a "Notice of intention to Commence Action" against the plaintiff, contains this sentence:
"The laws of this state provide that all persons guilty of obtaining goods under false pretenses shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, as the case shall be."
To charge one with having committed the crime of obtaining goods or money under false pretenses is actionable per se. 18 A. & E. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 882; 36 C. J. 1202.
If, therefore, the quoted words had unquestionably referred to the plaintiff, they would have been actionable per se. However, they are not used directly of the plaintiff, but the language is in the form of a general statement in the third person, and this peculiar form of the language constitutes what is, in our opinion, the only difficulty in the case.
It is a well-settled principle that it is not necessary that the words, in terms, should charge the crime.
"If, taking them all together, in their popular meaning, such is the necessary inference, then there is no doubt that they are actionable." Morgan v. Livingston, 2 Rich. 573.
In 18 A. & E. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) at page 989, it is said:
In 36 C. J. at page 1153, we find:
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