Williamson v. HOSPITAL SERVICE OF JEFFERSON
| Decision Date | 01 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-C-0451.,2004-C-0451. |
| Citation | 888 So.2d 782 |
| Parties | Vayneary WILLIAMSON v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 1 OF JEFFERSON d/b/a West Jefferson Medical Center. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Tarcza & Associates, LLC, Robert Emmet Tarcza, Michael Anthony Triay, New Orleans, for applicant.
Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, LLP, Michael Charles Luquet, Peter J. Butler, Peter J. Butler, Jr., Ralph T. Rabalais, New Orleans, for respondent.
Lewis Kullman & Sterbcow, Lawrence S. Kullman, New Orleans, for amicus curiae Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association.
Not every unintentional tort committed by a qualified health care provider falls within the Medical Malpractice Act, only those "arising from medical malpractice." La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41(l). Plaintiff alleges in her petition, as supplemented and amended by her second supplemental and amending petition, that she was being pushed in a wheelchair by an employee of the defendant, West Jefferson Medical Center, when the wheel fell off causing her to fall and suffer injury. She further alleges that the defendant and its employee negligently failed to repair the wheelchair and negligently failed to insure that the wheelchair was in proper working condition prior to returning it to service.
Finding that the plaintiff should have presented her claim to a medical review panel, the district court sustained the defendant's exception of prematurity, and the court of appeal affirmed that ruling. Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson Parish, 03-1066 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So.2d 962. We granted the writ to consider the correctness of the appeal court's analysis in which it employed a "broad interpretation" of the Act's definition of medical malpractice before determining whether the plaintiff's claim fell within the purview of the Medical Malpractice Act. Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson Parish, 04-0451 (La.4/8/04), 870 So.2d 261. For the reasons assigned below, we find the court of appeal erred in not strictly construing coverage of the Medical Malpractice Act. See Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1992)
. Instead, we find that the plaintiff's petition, as supplemented and amended, alleges a claim of ordinary negligence that does not fall within the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal, as well as the ruling of the district court, and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
The facts of the case at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings are taken from the plaintiff's original petition as amended by her second supplemental and amending petition. In her petition as supplemented and amended, the plaintiff alleges that on July 31, 2000, after she was discharged from West Jefferson Medical Center, and as she was being pushed in a wheelchair by an employee of the defendant, a wheel on the wheelchair fell off causing her to be thrown to the ground resulting in injury. She alleges that, according to the defendant's risk management officer, the wheel of the wheelchair had been repaired by the defendant's personnel several days before the incident. She alleges that her injuries were caused by the fault of the defendant or its personnel in negligently failing to repair the wheelchair, negligently failing to supervise the repair of the wheelchair, and negligently failing to insure the wheelchair was in proper working condition prior to returning the wheelchair to service. She further pleaded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The defendant filed an exception of prematurity in response to the plaintiff's original petition asserting her claim was a medical malpractice claim that should have been, but was not, presented first to a medical review panel, as required by the Medical Malpractice Act.2 One day prior to the hearing on the defendant's exception of prematurity, the plaintiff filed the second supplemental and amending petition. At the hearing on the defendant's exception of prematurity, the plaintiff argued her petition as that supplemented and amended by the second supplemental and amending petition, rather than argue the allegations of her original petition. The defendant referred primarily to the original allegations, rather than the supplemental and amending allegations. The district court apparently granted the defendant's exception of prematurity based largely on the original petition, but it nonetheless granted the plaintiff leave to supplement and amend that petition.3
The court of appeal considered both the original petition and the second supplemental and amending petition, finding that the plaintiff was "alleging WJMC should have known of the defect in the wheelchair and that WJMC's negligence caused the wheelchair to fail." The court of appeal applied the factors set forth in Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 813 So.2d 303, and affirmed the ruling of the district court granting the defendant's exception of prematurity. We granted writs to review the correctness of the appellate court's judgment and reasoning therefor.
The dilatory exception of prematurity provided in La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 926 questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe for judicial determination. Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation, 98-1977 (La.2/29/00), 758 So.2d 116; see also Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 21-3(f) (1996). An action is premature when it is brought before the right to enforce it has accrued. La.Code. Civ. Proc. art. 423. Under the Medical Malpractice Act, a medical malpractice claim against a private qualified health care provider is subject to dismissal on a timely filed exception of prematurity if such claim has not first been reviewed by a pre-suit medical review panel. La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47 A. The burden of proving prematurity is on the exceptor, in this case the defendant health care provider; therefore, the defendant must show that it is entitled to a medical review panel. Hidalgo v. Wilson Certified Exp. Inc., 94-1322 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/14/96), 676 So.2d 114, 117; Bennett v. Krupkin, 00-0023 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/02); 814 So.2d 681, 685-86. Accordingly, the question before the court is whether the plaintiff's claim is one of medical malpractice.
As we have observed on numerous occasions, the legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Act in 1975 in response to a "perceived medical malpractice insurance `crisis.'" Hutchinson v. Patel, 93-2156 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 415, 419; see also Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So.2d 517, 521 (La.1992)
; Galloway v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 602 So.2d 1003, 1005 (La.1992); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1261 (La.1978). The legislature intended the Act to reduce or stabilize medical malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability of affordable medical services to the public. Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So.2d at 419. We have recognized that, to achieve those goals, the Act gives qualified health care providers two substantial advantages in actions against them for malpractice, namely, a limit on the amount of damages and the requirement that the claim first be reviewed by a medical review panel before commencing suit in a court of law. Id.; see also La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.42(B); La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47.
This court has, without exception, emphasized that the MMA and its limitations on tort liability for a qualified health care provider apply strictly to claims "arising from medical malpractice," La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41(I), and that all other tort liability on the part of the qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. Coleman v. Deno, p. 15, 813 So.2d at 315; Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation, 98-1977 (La.2/29/00), 758 So.2d 116; Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So.2d at 419; Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1992). In Sewell, we explained:
The Medical Malpractice Act's limitations on the liability of a health care provider are special legislation in derogation of the rights of tort victims. As such, the coverage of the Act should be strictly construed. These limitations apply only in cases of liability for malpractice as defined in the Act. Any other liability of the health care provider to the patient is not subject to these limitations.
The Act defines "malpractice" as follows:
"Malpractice" means any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs and medicines, or from defects in or failures of prosthetic devices, implanted in or used on or in the person of a patient.
La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41 A(8). The Act further defines "tort" and "health care" as follows:
La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41 A(7) and (9).
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Esparza v. Univ. Med. Ctr. Mgmt. Corp.
...to a medical review panel because the allegations fall within the LMMA." Id. at 523-24; see also Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 888 So. 2d 782, 785 (La. 2004). If a health care provider satisfies its burden, then a court must dismiss the claim. See Dading, 2005 WL 20374......
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Esparza v. Univ. Med. Ctr. Mgmt. Corp.
...to a medical review panel because the allegations fall within the LMMA." Id. at 523-24; see also Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 888 So. 2d 782, 785 (La. 2004). If a health care provider satisfies its burden, then a court must dismiss the claim. See Dading, 2005 WL 20374......