Willis, In re

• Decision Date: 26 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 108,108
• Parties: In the Matter of Albert Lee WILLIS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 771

215 S.E.2d 771

288 N.C. 1

In the Matter of Albert Lee WILLIS.

No. 108.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 26, 1975.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Fred P. Parker, III, Raleigh, for the Board of Law Examiners, petitioner appellant.

Pearson, Malone, Johnson, DeJarmon & Spaulding by W. G. Pearson, II, and C. C. Malone, Jr., Durham, for Albert Lee Willis, respondent appellee.

HUSKINS, Justice:

The sole question presented on this rehearing is whether G.S. § 84--24 is a lawful delegation of legislative authority and is constitutional on its face and as applied to the applicant in this case.

G.S. § 84--24, enacted in 1933 and entitled 'Admission to practice,' established the Board of Law Examiners 'for the purpose of examining applicants and providing rules and regulations for admission to the Bar including the issuance of license therefor.' The statute authorizes the Board of Law Examiners, subject to the approval of the Council of the North Carolina State Bar, to make such rules and regulations for admission to the Bar as in its judgment will promote the welfare of the State and the legal profession. Provisions of that statute pertinent to this appeal read:

'The Board of Law Examiners shall have full power and authority to make or cause to be made such examinations and investigations as may be deemed by it necessary to satisfy it that the applicants for admission to the Bar possess the qualifications of character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law and to this end the Board of Law Examiners shall have the power of subpoena and to summons and examine witnesses under oath and to compel their attendance and the production of books, papers and other documents and writings deemed by it to be necessary or material to the inquiry and shall also have authority to employ and provide such assistance as may be required to enable it to perform its duties promptly and properly.' (Emphasis added.)

Rule VIII of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in the State of North Carolina, promulgated in accordance with G.S. § 84--24 and in effect at the time of the applicant's application, provides that every applicant shall have the burden of proving his good moral character and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public. 279 N.C. 733, 737 (1971). The rule requires every applicant to appear before a Bar Candidate Committee to be examined about any matter pertaining to his moral character, and states that an applicant may be required to appear before the Board. In this regard each applicant must furnish the Committee with such information as may be required on forms provided by the Board and with such other information and documents as the Committee may reasonably require. The rule further provides that technical rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, need not be observed in investigations of moral character. Section (3) of Rule VIII in pertinent part reads:

'No one shall be certified (licensed) to practice law in this State by examination or comity:

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(2) Who fails to disclose fully to the Board, whether requested to do so or not, any and all facts relating to any civil or criminal proceedings, charges or investigations involving the applicant, whether the same have been terminated or not in this or any other state or in any of the Federal Courts or other jurisdictions.' 279 N.C. at 737.

Applicant alleges that G.S. § 84--24 and Rule VIII of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in the State of North Carolina do not contain adequate standards for the Board to follow in determining whether an applicant possesses the qualifications of character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and, therefore, the provisions are unconstitutional on their face in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 19 and Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina. In this regard, he contends that 'good moral character,' as a guideline or standard of itself, will not suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements. We find this contention unsound.

The applicant relies upon Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957), one of several cases reaching the United States Supreme Court in which states have refused to permit applicants to practice law because bar examiners have been suspicious about applicants' loyalties and about their views on Communism and revolution. In Konigsberg the State Committee of Bar Examiners of California refused to certify the applicant to practice law on grounds that he had failed to prove (1) he was of good moral character and (2) he did not advocate overthrow of the Government of the United States or California by unconstitutional means. There, the United States Supreme Court held that the applicant's exclusion from the practice of law violated due process because the evidence did not rationally support the State's finding. In reference to the use of 'good moral character' as a qualification for the California Bar, the Supreme Court said:

'The term 'good moral character' has long been used as a qualification for membership in the Bar and has served a useful purpose in this respect. However the term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal view and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law.' 353 U.S. at 262--63, 77 S.Ct. at 728, 1 L.Ed.2d at 819.

Because of the vagueness of the term 'good moral character,' that Court turned to California case law for a definition, but found none. The Court finally accepted, for the purpose of its decision, the definition proposed by counsel for the State of California that 'good moral character' is 'honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.' Although the Court considered the definition too broad, it nevertheless concluded that the State's action could not be sustained on the facts.

A similar approach was taken by the United States Supreme Court in the more recent case of Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S.Ct. 720, 27 L.Ed.2d 749 (1971), in which the appellants, purporting to represent a class of law students and law graduates, attacked New York's system for screening applicants for admission to the New York Bar primarily on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds. In reference to arguments alleging the unconstitutionality of New York's requirement that the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in the judicial department where an applicant resides must 'be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law,' the Supreme Court held:

'The three-judge District Court, although divided on other questions, was unanimous in finding no constitutional infirmity in New York's statutory requirement that applicants for admission to its Bar must possess 'the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor- at-law.' We have no difficulty in affirming this holding. (Citations omitted.) Long usage in New York and elsewhere has given well-defined contours to this requirement, which the appellees have construed narrowly as encompassing no more than 'dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profession,' . . . (Citations omitted.) The few reported cases in which bar admission has been denied on character grounds in New York all appear to have involved instances of misconduct clearly inconsistent with the standards of a lawyer's calling.' 401 U.S. at 159, 91 S.Ct. at 724--25, 27 L.Ed.2d at 756.

The Supreme Court went on to note that every state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and even the Supreme Court itself requires some similar qualification.

We note that both Konigsberg and Law Student Research Council involved questions of whether action by the Bar examiners of California and the entire applicant screening process of New York violated First Amendment freedoms of expression and association, and could be distinguished on that ground from the present case, which does not involve such First Amendment ramifications. Even so, those decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not support the suggestion that 'good moral character' is an unconstitutional standard. To the contrary, the quoted language from those cases seems to say that the term 'good moral character,' although broad, has been so extensively used as a standard that its long usage and the case law surrounding that usage have given the term well-defined contours which make it a constitutionally appropriate standard.

Such has been the case in North Carolina. As early as 1760 every applicant to the Bar in this State was required by law to be of 'good character.' 25 State Records of North Carolina at 448 (1906); Coates, Standards of the Bar, 6 N.C.L.Rev. 34 (1927). After this Court was organized in 1818, it was authorized to determine an applicant's character. In the first reported decision of this Court considering a bar application, Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. 355 (1824), the Court denied the applications of two applicants because of their alien status. Although not directly faced with the question of the applicants' moral character, the Court said: 'Whatever discretion resides in the judges relative to the admission of attorneys ought to be exercised with a view to the advantage and security of the suitors in the several courts; for to them the license is a guarantee that in the opinion of the magistrates signing it the licentiate is...