Willis v. Board of Selectmen of Easton

• Decision Date: 14 June 1989
• Citation: 539 N.E.2d 524,405 Mass. 159
• Parties: , 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2819 John L. WILLIS v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF EASTON et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 524

539 N.E.2d 524

405 Mass. 159, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2819

John L. WILLIS v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF EASTON et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Bristol.

Argued Feb. 9, 1989.

Decided June 14, 1989.

Philip Collins for defendant.

Kevin P. Phillips, William A. Navarro with him, for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ. LIACOS, Justice.

The plaintiff, John L. Willis, a fire fighter for the town of Easton (town), filed a complaint against the town seeking a declaration of his rights to compensation under G.L. c. 41, § 111F (1986 ed.) (compensation for public safety employees). The plaintiff's action was based on his alleged work-related back injury. A Superior Court judge rendered a judgment ordering the town to pay Willis his regular compensation and to restore Willis's sick leave. The judgment further required the town to continue Willis's compensation under § 111F until he retires or recovers.

The town appeals the judgment claiming that (1) the trial judge erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974); (2) the action should have been dismissed because the dispute was subject to a valid collective bargaining agreement and Willis failed to utilize the grievance procedure; (3) the ultimate finding for the plaintiff was erroneous; and (4) the judge erred in excluding the report of a medical panel appointed to review Willis's application for disability retirement.

Willis has been employed as a fire fighter for the town since May, 1968. On November 7, 1983, Willis changed a tire on a fire truck and felt a pull, a sharp pain, in his lower back. The fire department procedure for reporting injuries included making a report to the captain on duty and documenting the injury in a journal. Willis did not file any injury reports or seek medical attention at that time. He continued to work regular shifts.

On December 26, 1983, Willis drove to Maine for a one-week vacation. After arriving in Maine, he began to experience pain in his back. On December 30, 1983, he returned to Massachusetts and went to the Goddard Memorial Hospital emergency room. Willis was instructed to apply heat to his back, to get bed rest, and not to return to work for a week. Willis called in sick on January 2, 1984, the day he was scheduled to return to work after his vacation. His absence from work was charged to his sick leave.

On January 9, 1984, Willis consulted Dr. B. Hoagland Rosania because of his continuing back pain. ² In January, 1984, Willis discussed his back condition and its relation to the November 7 incident with the fire chief. Willis filed an incident report at that time. The chief and the town administrator refused to place Willis on "injured on duty" status. Willis eventually met with the board of selectmen in an attempt to receive compensation pursuant to G.L. c. 41, § 111F. Willis was not placed on "injured on duty" status. Willis exhausted his sick leave and returned to work on "light duty" status on April 2, 1984, dispatching fire apparatus and answering the telephone. Willis remained on light duty status until September, 1985. In September, 1985, the fire chief ordered Willis to return to full time duty. Willis then filed this suit.

1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The town challenges the judge's order, arguing that the judge failed to comply with Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a). This rule requires a judge who sits without a jury to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his or her decision. ³ We conclude that the judge's order, although not detailed to the extent that is desirable, substantially complies with rule 52(a) because it includes the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We have previously stated that rule 52(a) does not require extensive detail and only imposes a duty on a judge to articulate the essential grounds for a decision. Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 638, 437 N.E.2d 205 (1982), citing Advisory Committee Note on 1946 Amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Such findings of fact and conclusions of law ensure that a judge has dealt fully and properly with all the issues, and that the parties and reviewing court may be fully informed as to the bases for the judge's decision. Schrottman, supra at 639, 437 N.E.2d 205. Markell v. Sydney B. Pfeifer Found., Inc., 9 Mass.App.Ct. 412, 416, 402 N.E.2d 76 (1980). Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-752 (3d Cir.1965). "The nature and exactness of the findings required depends on the circumstances of the particular case." Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 224, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985), quoting Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 419, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 1143, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943).

The judge's order and judgment stated that Willis is a fire fighter, that he suffered a back injury, that he is incapacitated for duty, that his injury was sustained in the performance of his duty without fault of his own, that the town failed to present evidence that Willis's incapacity no longer exists, and that Willis is not yet retired or pensioned. ⁴ This was sufficient under G.L. c. 41, § 111F, which states that, "[w]henever a ... fire fighter ... is incapacitated for duty because of injury sustained in the performance of his duty without fault of his own, ... he shall be granted leave without loss of pay for the period of such incapacity; provided, that no such leave shall be granted for any period after such ... fire fighter has been retired or pensioned ... or ... a physician ... determines that such incapacity no longer exists." The judge's findings and conclusions satisfied rule 52(a). Contrast Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 224, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985) (case remanded for judge to explicate grounds for conclusion that stock price offered to minority shareholders by defendants was fair and reasonable); Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 639-640, 437 N.E.2d 205 (1982) (case remanded to determine whether judge applied proper negligence standard); Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 236-237, 408 N.E.2d 860 (1980) (court did not condone findings and conclusions prepared ex post facto by counsel, and then signed by judge).

2. The Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The town argues that its refusal to accept Willis's back ailment as job-related was a grievable matter under the grievance procedures of the fire fighters' collective bargaining agreement. The town argues that Willis has not exhausted the remedies available to him under the agreement's grievance provisions, and that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the matter. ⁵ Willis argues that the collective bargaining agreement does not pertain to this dispute, which concerns the proper application of G.L. c. 41, § 111F. Willis argues further that the agreement does not override § 111F in the absence of clear language expressing that intent. We agree and conclude that Willis's action is not barred by the collective bargaining agreement.

This case involves the interpretation and application of G.L. c. 41, § 111F, rather than that of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the agreement does not address Willis's statutory right of compensation under § 111F. Article VII of the agreement specifically defines "grievance" as a dispute over the application, meaning, or interpretation of a specific provision of the agreement. Willis was not obligated to submit his dispute to the grievance procedure because the collective bargaining agreement does not govern his dispute. ⁶ See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1228 v. Freedom WLNE-TV, Inc., 760 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1985) (parties to collective bargaining agreement bound to arbitrate only disputes within scope of arbitration clause); Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir.1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938, 78 S.Ct. 780, 2 L.Ed.2d 813 (1958) (dispute not involving interpretation or application of agreement not subject to compulsory arbitration).

The town cites only one provision in the collective bargaining agreement as relevant to this dispute. Article IX, paragraph F, states that "[l]oss of time directly attributed to injury incurred while performing assigned duties shall not be charged to sick leave." ⁷ We are reluctant to construe a collective bargaining agreement as one which overrides statutory provisions absent clear language expressing that intent. See Rein v. Marshfield, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 519, 524, 452 N.E.2d 298 (1983). Chalachan v. Binghamton, 55 N.Y.2d 989, 990, 449 N.Y.S.2d 187, 434 N.E.2d 256 (1982).

We conclude that Willis's collective bargaining agreement neither conflicts with, nor overrides, the provisions of G.L. c. 41, § 111F. This action was not barred by the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the remedies of his collective bargaining agreement.

3. Review of the Judge's Order and Judgment.

The town challenges the judge's ultimate finding that Willis is a fire fighter incapacitated for duty because of an injury sustained in the performance of duty without fault of his own. A judge's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge ... the credibility of the witnesses"). See Jones v. Wayland, 374 Mass. 249, 255, 373 N.E.2d 199 (1978), S.C., 380 Mass. 110, 402 N.E.2d 63 (1980). The test to assess whether a finding is clearly erroneous is whether, "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Sanguinetti v. Nantucket Constr. Co., 5 Mass.App.Ct. 227, 228, 361 N.E.2d 954 (1977), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).

There is ample...