Willis v. State
| Decision Date | 16 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A0941,A94A0941 |
| Citation | 214 Ga.App. 659,448 S.E.2d 755 |
| Parties | WILLIS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Adams & Adams, W. Allen Adams, Jr., Thomaston, for appellant.
Johnnie L. Caldwell, Jr., Dist. Atty., for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of two counts of burglary and sentenced to serve 20 years consecutively on each count. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial.
1. The appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on either count of the indictment. Count 1 concerned the burglary of an auto parts store between July 26 and 27, 1989, in which two screwdrivers were taken. Five days after the burglary, the appellant's girl friend informed the police that the appellant had hidden some things under a pear tree in her yard. The police found a pry bar there, along with two screwdrivers which were positively identified as those taken in the burglary. The appellant denied having any knowledge of the screwdrivers found by the officers.
"Although ... proof of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant is sufficient to create an inference that the defendant is guilty of burglary of the goods, proof of recent, unexplained possession is not automatically sufficient to support a conviction for burglary." Bankston v. State, 251 Ga. 730, 309 S.E.2d 369 (1983). In the instant case, however, the inference arising from the appellant's unexplained possession of the stolen screwdrivers, accompanied by the evidence of the appellant's concealment of the goods, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary, as charged in Count 1 of the indictment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); McLendon v. State, 210 Ga.App. 404(2), 436 S.E.2d 524 (1993).
Count 2 alleged that between July 27 and 28, 1989, the appellant made an unauthorized entry into a retail warehouse where he worked, with the intent to commit a theft. Access to the warehouse had been gained by breaking through a sliding glass door in the rear of the building, and $80 to $90 were missing from a money box hidden on the premises. Also in evidence was a statement by the appellant's girl friend, made to the police prior to her knowledge of this burglary, that the appellant had told her he knew how to get into the building where he worked and knew where the money was hidden. The appellant denied any participation in that burglary and instead claimed that he was with his girl friend on the night it occurred.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) O'Quinn v. State, 153 Ga.App. 467, 471-472, 265 S.E.2d 824 (1980).
In the instant case, although the evidence presented as to Count 2 may have created a strong suspicion that the appellant burglarized the warehouse, mere suspicion is insufficient to support a conviction. Id. Fitz v. State, 201 Ga.App. 83, 86, 410 S.E.2d 186 (1991). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence as to Count 2 must be reversed.
2. On direct examination by the State, the appellant's girl friend testified that she had lied in the statement she gave the police. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach its own witness by admitting her prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence without any showing of surprise or entrapment; that the statement was not made under oath and irrelevant portions, including mention of unrelated criminal transactions, were not redacted; and that introduction of the statement was prejudicial and crucial to his conviction. See OCGA § 24-9-81. We disagree.
"[A] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence, and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes." Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982). Further, the allusions to the appellant's parole officer or other criminal acts committed by the appellant, where the evidence was otherwise relevant, did not become inadmissible because his...
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...on direct examination, he cannot now complain that the prosecutor followed up on cross-examination. [Cit.]" Willis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 659, 661(3), 448 S.E.2d 755 (1994). 4. Morgan enumerates as error the admission of his custodial statement. Prior to making the statement, he signed a wai......
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...if inadmissible portions were redacted. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 220 Ga.App. 295(2), 469 S.E.2d 424 (1996); Willis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 659, 660(2), 448 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Compare Eiland v. State, 213 Ga.App. 838, 445 S.E.2d 765 (1994) (Given extreme prejudicial nature of indictment an......
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Locklear v. State, A01A0401.
...evidence creates a strong suspicion of guilt, "mere suspicion is insufficient to support a conviction." Willis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 659, 660(1), 448 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Further, "[e]vidence of mere presence at the scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in ......
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