Willis v. Town of Beaufort

• Decision Date: 17 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. COA00-371.,COA00-371.
• Citation: 143 NC App. 106,544 S.E.2d 600
• Parties: Robert WILLIS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BEAUFORT, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation and Jim Lynch, Individually and in his Official capacity as Chief of the Beaufort Fire Department, Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

544 S.E.2d 600

143 NC App. 106

Robert WILLIS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BEAUFORT, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation and Jim Lynch, Individually and in his Official capacity as Chief of the Beaufort Fire Department, Defendants.

No. COA00-371.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 17, 2001.

Davis, Murrelle & Lumsden, P.A., by Edward L. Murrelle, Beaufort, for plaintiff-appellant.

Crossley McIntosh Prior & Collier, by H. Mark Hamlet and Brian E. Edes, Wilmington, for defendant-appellees.

HUNTER, Judge.

Robert Willis ("plaintiff") appeals from an order granting summary judgment dismissing his claims of negligence in favor of defendants Town of Beaufort ("Town") and Jim Lynch. On appeal, plaintiff's two assignments of error are (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town as the public duty doctrine no longer applies as a defense for the municipal provision of fire protection services after the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652, reh'g denied, 352 N.C. 157, 544 S.E.2d 225 (2000), and (2) the trial court similarly erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Lynch, in his official capacity and individually, as the public duty doctrine is not available as a defense for a fire chief following Lovelace. We agree with plaintiff, and therefore reverse the trial court.

The relevant allegations of plaintiff's complaint show that on 14 October 1998, plaintiff was attempting to repair the fuel tanks on board his shrimping vessel known as the DEL-ANN, which was docked at the Homer Smith Seafood House in the Town of Beaufort, North Carolina. Sparks from a welding machine subsequently ignited a fire aboard the vessel, and plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to extinguish the fire. 9-1-1 was called, and the Beaufort Fire Department was notified.

At all times relevant to this action, defendant Lynch was Chief of the Beaufort Fire Department. The Beaufort Fire Department arrived on the scene of the fire within four minutes of first being contacted. Upon arrival of the fire department, plaintiff was still on board the burning vessel attempting to extinguish the fire, and defendant Lynch ordered plaintiff off the vessel. When plaintiff did not comply, defendant Lynch repeated his order two additional times; defendant Lynch also notified plaintiff that he would have him arrested if he continued to disregard the order. Consequently, plaintiff left the vessel.

Defendant Lynch then requested assistance from several additional fire departments, and shortly thereafter fire departments from Morehead City, Otway, Atlantic Beach, Marshallberg, and the United States Coast Guard arrived. Initially, the Beaufort Fire Department assumed jurisdiction, and water was used in an attempt to extinguish the fire. After some time passed, defendant Lynch ordered all fire fighting efforts to cease. At this point, defendant Lynch allegedly forbade other fire fighters from using foam to extinguish the fire, as well as refused to adhere to any recommendations, suggestions, alternatives, or advice from any other trained professional on the scene. After approximately two hours passed, defendant Lynch allowed foam to be applied to the fire. The fire was extinguished, but the interior of the vessel was destroyed.

On 1 February 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town alleging negligence on the part of the Beaufort Fire Department in their handling of the fire. Subsequently on 20 October 1999, plaintiff filed an amended complaint to add defendant Lynch as a named defendant, both in his official capacity as Fire Chief and individually, alleging gross negligence on his part arising from the events of 14 October 1998. The Town and defendant Lynch filed a motion for summary judgment, and a hearing was held on 13 December 1999 in Carteret County Superior Court before the Honorable James E. Ragan, III. By order filed on 28 December 1999, Judge Ragan allowed defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. In his first assignment of error, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town when it is clear that the public duty doctrine no longer applies as a defense for the municipal provision of fire protection services after the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652. We agree.

"At the outset, we note that the standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C.App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998). Furthermore, "the evidence presented by the parties must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Id. Therefore, summary judgment is only proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (1999). Summary judgment "is an extreme remedy and should be awarded only where the truth is quite clear." Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C.App. 231, 233, 178 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1970).

"The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals." Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991). The public duty doctrine was first adopted in North Carolina by our Supreme Court in Braswell. Id. "As originally applied and adopted, the doctrine operated to shield a governmental entity from liability for the failure of the government and its law enforcement agents to furnish police protection to specific individuals." Hargrove v. Billings & Garrett, Inc., 137 N.C.App. 759, 761, 529 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2000).

Since Braswell, "[t]he [public duty] doctrine has ... been extended by this Court to shield municipalities and their agents from liability for negligence in providing fire protection services, Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C.App. 44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995)...." Hargrove, 137 N.C.App. 759, 761-62, 529 S.E.2d 693, 694-95 (Hargrove, which lists the services the public duty doctrine had been been extended to shield, was decided by this Court after the Supreme Court's decision in Lovelace ). However, in Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the public duty doctrine does not insulate a city from liability for the alleged negligence of a city 9-1-1 operator in causing a death by failing to timely dispatch the fire department after receiving a call reporting a fire. Significantly, our Supreme Court held:

While this Court has extended the public duty doctrine to state agencies required by statute to conduct inspections for the public's general protection, we have never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local government agencies other than law enforcement departments when they are exercising their general duty to protect the public.... Thus, the public duty doctrine, as it applies to local government, is limited to the facts of Braswell.

Id. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654 (citations omitted).

Hence, this Court's holding in Davis extending the public duty doctrine to the municipal provision of fire protection services has been overruled by our Supreme Court's holding in Lovelace. The Town of Beaufort, therefore, may not utilize the public duty doctrine as a defense for the alleged negligence on the part of its fire department. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town.

In regards to the Town's governmental immunity defense, we recognize that "[t]he organization and operation of a fire department is a governmental ... function." Insurance Co. v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 257 N.C. 367, 370, 126 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1962). "Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a municipality is not liable for the torts of its officers and employees if the torts are committed while they are performing a governmental function...." Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C.App. 604, 607, 436 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1993). However, "[a]ny city may ... waive its immunity from civil tort liability by purchasing liability insurance." Id.; see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A-485. "Immunity is waived only to the extent that the city or town is indemnified by the insurance contract from liability for the acts alleged." Combs v. Town of Belhaven, 106 N.C.App. 71, 73, 415 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1992).

Here, the Town purchased North Carolina League of Municipalities liability insurance covering itself and its agents. Consequently, the Town is deemed to have waived its governmental immunity defense to the extent of its coverage.

In his second assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Lynch, in his official capacity and individually, as the public duty doctrine is not available as a defense for a fire chief following the Supreme Court's decision in Lovelace. Again, we agree.

On 20 October 1999, plaintiff amended his complaint to add Jim Lynch as a defendant, both in his official capacity as Fire Chief of the Beaufort Fire Department and individually, alleging gross negligence on his part. We note that, "official-capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity." Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 554, 495 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998). Therefore, the claim against defendant Lynch in his official capacity is effectively a claim against the Town. As the public duty doctrine no longer applies as a defense for the municipal provision of fire protection services, the doctrine is similarly not...