Wills v. Iron County Bd. of Canvassers
| Decision Date | 01 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 121119 |
| Citation | 183 Mich.App. 797,455 N.W.2d 405 |
| Parties | Francis A. WILLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IRON COUNTY BOARD OF CANVASSERS and West Iron County Public School District, Defendants-Appellees. 183 Mich.App. 797, 455 N.W.2d 405 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[183 MICHAPP 797] Steward, Peterson, Sheridan & Nancarrow by Paul A. Peterson, Ishpeming, for Francis A. Wills. [183 MICHAPP 798] Fisher & Omdahl by Torger G. Omdahl, Iron River, for West Iron County Public School Dist.
Before DOCTOROFF, P.J., and HOOD and GRIFFIN, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from that portion of the August 18, 1989, judgment of the Iron Circuit Court granting defendants summary disposition as to Count I of plaintiff's complaint. Summary disposition was based upon the trial court's ruling that Count I was time-barred by M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545(2). We reverse.
Plaintiff, Francis A. Wills, was a member of the West Iron County School Board. On June 12, 1989, voters in the West Iron County Public School District cast ballots on a school bond millage proposal. A tally of the ballots indicated that the election resulted in a tie. Consequently, the West Iron County School District Board of Education requested a recount by the county's board of canvassers. The recount commenced on June 19, 1989, and concluded June 20, 1989. On that date, the board of canvassers certified that the proposal had passed by one vote.
On July 19, 1989, thirty-seven days after the votes were cast and twenty-nine days after the election was certified, plaintiff filed a complaint against the board of education and board of canvassers. Count I of the complaint was an action sounding in quo warranto. Plaintiff also requested the court to grant him special leave to proceed with a quo warranto action pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545, which provides:
(1) An action may be brought in the circuit court of any county of this state whenever it appears that material fraud or error has been committed [183 MICHAPP 799] at any election in such county at which there has been submitted any constitutional amendment, question, or proposition to the electors of the state or any county, township, or municipality thereof.
(2) Such action shall be brought within 30 days after such election by the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney of the proper county on his own relation, or on the relation of any citizen of said county without leave of the court, or by any citizen of the county by special leave of the court or a judge thereof. Such action shall be brought against the municipality wherein such fraud or error is alleged to have been committed.
(3) After such action is brought the procedure shall conform as near as may be to that provided by law for actions for quo warranto.
Count II of the complaint was a request for superintending control.
On July 27, 1989, defendant West Iron County Public School District filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). On August 7, 1989, defendant Iron County Board of Canvassers also moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(1) and (4).
Plaintiff's application for special leave and defendants' motions for summary disposition were heard by the trial court on August 7, 1989. The court granted plaintiff special leave to proceed on the quo warranto action. However, the court then granted defendants summary disposition as to Count I of plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the quo warranto action was not filed within thirty days of the election as required by M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545(2). The court also dismissed Count II of plaintiff's complaint seeking superintending control on the basis that error did not appear on the face of the returns filed by the board of canvassers. M.C.L. Sec. 168.877; M.S.A. Sec. 6.1877.
On September 8, 1989, plaintiff filed a motion [183 MICHAPP 800] for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on September 13, 1989, ruling that the motion was not timely and presented no new issues.
It is from the trial court's dismissal of Count I that plaintiff now appeals as of right.
Plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that the term "election" means the day on which the ballots were cast and that, under M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545(2), an action must be filed within thirty days of the date when the actual voting took place. The issue we are confronted with encompasses ascertaining the meaning of "election" within the context of this provision.
The trial court opined that the provision in question was not ambiguous and must be strictly construed. The court in part stated:
I do not believe that MCL 600.4545 is ambiguous. I believe it is very clear that the action must be taken with--within 30 days after the election. All the cases that I have cited have referred to the election as being the day of the physical voting. It does not mean the day of certification by the canvassing board, and it does not mean the day of certification by a recount board.
This conclusion was premised upon the court's reliance on several Michigan cases in which the limitation period was measured from the date the ballots were cast. See Finlayson v. West Bloomfield Twp., 320 Mich. 350, 354-355, 31 N.W.2d 80 (1948); Lake v. North Branch Twp., 314 Mich. 140, 141-142, 22 N.W.2d 248 (1946); Voorhies ex rel. Bradburn v. Nier, 222 Mich. 374, 375-376, 192 N.W. 719 (1923); Anderson v. Levin, 218 Mich. 225, 226, 187 N.W. 521 (1922); Heidelmeyer v. Village of Oakwood, 222 [183 MICHAPP 801] Mich. 331, 192 N.W. 565 (1923); Youells v. Morrish, 218 Mich. 194, 195, 187 N.W. 250 (1922). 1
Our review indicates that in each of these cases the date upon which the ballots were cast was looked to as the date of the election. However, the cases did not specifically deal with construing the meaning of the term "election" and did not involve a recount or a delayed certification as did the instant case. Hence we believe that the trial court overstated the import of these decisions.
After thorough research, we have been unable to find a case from this jurisdiction defining what, or more appropriately, when an election is complete for purposes of determining when the limitation period commences under M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545(2). We are therefore dealing with an issue of first impression involving statutory construction.
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is precluded. Land v. The George Schmidt Co., 122 Mich.App. 167, 170, 333 N.W.2d 30 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 1083 (1983). However, if construction is warranted, this Court is obliged to determine and give effect to the intention of the Legislature and assign words their ordinary, normally accepted meaning. Joy Management Co v. Detroit, 176 Mich.App. 722, 730, 440 N.W.2d 654 (1989), lv. den. 433 Mich. 860 (1989). When determining legislative intent, statutory language should be given a reasonable construction considering its purpose and the object sought to be accomplished. An act must be read in its entirety, giving due consideration to all sections so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment of the whole. Finally, statutes are to be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable [183 MICHAPP 802] consequences. Michigan Humane Society v. Natural Resources Comm, 158 Mich.App. 393, 401, 404 N.W.2d 757 (1987).
In the case at bar, it appears at first glance that the provision at issue is clear and unambiguous. However, closer review reveals that the term "election" is capable of different interpretations. On the one hand, it can certainly be argued that the ordinary, normally accepted meaning of "election" is the physical act of voting. Alternatively, it can be maintained that the term "election" encompasses more than just the casting of ballots but also the entire process of counting, certification, et cetera. Under these circumstances, we find that sufficient ambiguity exists, necessitating our construction or interpretation.
We believe that, in enacting M.C.L. Sec. 600.4545; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.4545, the Legislature intended to provide (1) the public and designated officials an opportunity to challenge the validity of elections, and (2) a procedural mechanism for asserting such a challenge within a reasonable amount of time (thirty days). We feel that we must assign a meaning to the term "election" that would further and not hamper this objective.
Our Legislature has provided that a board of county...
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