Wilson-Sinclair Co. v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 19 September 1973
• Docket Number: No. 55918,WILSON-SINCLAIR,55918
• Citation: 211 N.W.2d 133
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: 6 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1057, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8839 COMPANY, Appellee, v. Leo L. GRIGGS and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Appellants.

Page 133

211 N.W.2d 133

6 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1057, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8839

WILSON-SINCLAIR COMPANY, Appellee, v. Leo L. GRIGGS and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Appellants.

No. 55918.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 19, 1973.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Roxanne Barton Conlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by Leo L. Griggs, a black, and the Iowa Civil Rights Commission from a district court decree which nullified a Commission finding that Willson-Sinclair Company had discriminated against Griggs in his employment. We affirm the district court decision.

Wilson-Sinclair Company (Wilson) operates a meat processing plant in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Approximately 2600 persons are employed at this plant, of whom 75 to 80 (about 3 percent) are black. Members of the black race in Cedar Rapids total only 1746 persons and constitute 1.58 percent of the city population.

Wilson's employees work in approximately 50 separate departments. Pursuant to the union contract, all vacancies are first filled from within the department according to seniority. Employees ordinarily transfer from one department to another on a seriority basis. An exception is the mechanical department, comprising approximately 80 employees, where the applicants for transfer (or employment) must first achieve a score of 44 on the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. This is a standard test for measuring mechanical aptitude. Most employees in the mechanical department are craftsmen or work with large, complex equipment. At present there are no blacks in this department.

The background leading to the institution of the test is established by uncontroverted and competent evidence. In the ten year period prior to the 1963 adoption of the testing program, people were hired for or transferred to the mechanical department on a trial and error basis. Forty-two such employees were released as incompetent and unsatisfactory for the work. Since 1963 only one man has been released from that department, not on the basis of incompetency but because of his attitude and lack of interest in mechanical work.

Mr. Griggs, a 44 year-old black, has worked for Wilson since 1945. His work record is good. At time of hearing he was working in the beef offal department making $4.04 per hour. Commencing in 1962 he has attempted transfer to the mechanical department ten times. The first attempt in 1962 was before adoption of the testing procedure. Company records initialed by Griggs state the transfer was discussed by him and the master mechanic and both agreed Griggs was not qualified for the available position. The latter claimed on hearing the record was blank at the time he initialed it. Thereafter, his applications for transfer to the mechanical department were denied because he failed to achieve the company's cut-off score of 44 on the mechanical aptitude test. Grigg's scores ranged from 43.5 to only 18 on his last effort.

The record reflects a total of 116 persons have taken the aptitude test since its adoption as a hiring or transfer criterion. All were white with the exception of Mr. Griggs. Sixty-seven white applicants and Griggs failed to pass. The remaining 48 applicants passed the test and were employed in the mechanical department.

On May 18, 1970 Griggs filed complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging he was discriminated against by the testing procedure.

After hearing, the Commission, on October 7, 1971, issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. It found Wilson discriminated in employment by use of tests, and ordered that it discontinue use of the Bennett Mechanical Aptitude Test, transfer Griggs to the mechanical department with back pay, 'said pay to be based upon the highest grade level seniority would have permitted him to reach had he been properly awarded the job when he first applied.' Wilson was ordered to adopt an affirmative action program (designed in cooperation with the Commission) for the recruitment, promotion and upgrading of minority employees. It was ordered to confer with the union relative to methods other than a departmental seniority system for the mechanical department and to submit proposals to the Commission prior to implementation. No tests were to be employed unless 'validated and proof of validation submitted' to the Commission before being used. Wilson was directed to report monthly to the Commission the names and address of minority group members applying for employment or transfer and the action taken with respect to each, and to maintain a working relationship with the Cedar Rapids Human Rights Commission, the Commission itself, and with minority groups in the Cedar Rapids area.

Wilson filed petition for judicial review in district court. At time of hearing the court granted Wilson's application to present additional evidence.

On June 13, 1972 the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree reversing the Commission's order and dismissing the complaint.

Trial court's findings included the following:

'The Bennett test, testified to by complainant's own witnesses, is a leading test to determine mechanical aptitude and is a reliable predictor of mechanical ability. The employees of the mechanical department through normal progression of jobs, and in varying degrees, operate and work with complex machines where mechanical ability is needed to protect the safety of fellow plant employees and the property of the employer. Respondent does not have sufficient employees in the mechanical department to conduct validity tests on the usefulness of the Bennett test, but complainant has not shown the test to be an invalid predictor. Complainant has further not shown the test was given by respondent to prevent blacks from transferring to the mechanical department or that because of Leo Griggs' race, the test prevents his transfer to said department.'

Summarized, the issues raised by the Commission and Griggs are: (1) Should district court have allowed Wilson to introduce additional evidence without showing good cause for failure to present that evidence at the Commission hearing? (2) Should district court have concluded, on the basis of the record before it, that Wilson's use of the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test did not discriminate against Griggs and the class he represents? (3) Should district court have required Wilson to submit empirical proof of business necessity for continuing use of the Bennett Test? (4) Was district court right in setting aside and dismissing Commission's total order, even assuming Griggs' claim was unfounded?

I. Before going to the merits of the controversy, we are compelled to comment on a procedural matter. We approved counsel's stipulation to follow the revised rules of appellate procedure effective January 1, 1973. Papers filed missed the mark by a wide margin. Attached to appellants' brief are pages entitled 'Appendix.' These set forth relevant pleadings, the Commission's Order, and the findings, conclusions, judgment and decree in district court, but nothing relating to the evidence. A single entry purports to incorporate the full transcripts of the proceedings before the Commission and before the district court, totaling 367 pages, as 'exhibits.' Two copies of these transcripts ultimately were submitted to us.

This procedure violates both the letter and the purpose of the rules. Rule 344.1(a), Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:

'The appellant shall prepare and file an appendix to the briefs Which shall contain: * * * any Relevant portions of the * * * transcript * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

Appellee's counsel fell into lockstep with counsel for appellants and appellee's brief is keyed to the voluminous transcripts. No one could conscientiously contend even half of the 367-page transcript was relevant to this appeal.

The rule change was made on the theory it would save litigation time and expense formerly consumed in laboriously abstracting the transcript and in hearings to settle the record. Recognizing the proliferation of federal litigation, we adopted the federal format, anticipating the Iowa lawyer could then move with ease from state to federal appeals and back again.

It was intended only those portions of the transcript unquestionably relevant to the litigants' contentions would appear verbatim in the appendix. The following provision in rule 344.1(b), R.C.P. was inserted to persuade counsel to minimize the volume of materials to which this court must refer:

'In designating parts of the record for inclusion in the appendix, the parties shall have regard for the fact that the entire record (which includes the transcript) is always available to the court for reference and examination And shall not engage in unnecessary designation.'

Unnecessary designation will of course result in taxing of costs to that litigant. Rule 344.1(b), R.C.P. See generally Blackburn, 'The Appellate Rules Amendments--Suggested Forms and Timetables,' 22 Drake L.Rev. 223, 242-45 (1973). Only where we grant prior approval may a case be submitted on the original record alone. Rule 344.1(f), R.C.P.

It is true rule 344.1(e), R.C.P. provides the transcript of a proceeding before an administrative agency may be included in the appendix or bound with other exhibits in a separate volume, or volumes, suitably indexed. In that event, eighteen copies are to be filed with the appendix and two copies served on opposing counsel. No attempt was made to comport with this rule. In any event, unnecessary parts of an exhibit transcript should be eliminated through careful designation by counsel of those portions to be included in the appendix or separate volume.

The procedure here employed also violates rule 344.2, R.C.P. The transcript submitted is not in such form as to...