Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 89-8522

• Decision Date: 30 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-8522,89-8522
• Citation: 915 F.2d 1503
• Parties: 31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 682 Lois Elaine WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BICYCLE SOUTH, INC., a Georgia Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1503

915 F.2d 1503

31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 682

Lois Elaine WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BICYCLE SOUTH, INC., a Georgia Corporation, et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 89-8522.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 30, 1990.

Robert H. Benfield, Jr., Middleton & Anderson, Atlanta, Ga., for Lois Elaine Wilson.

Stephen F. Dermer, Smith Gambrell & Russell, Atlanta, Ga., for Trek Bicycle.

Jonathan Mark Engram, Swift Currie McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Ga., for Bicycle South.

Tommy T. Holland, Christopher N. Shuman, Carter & Ansley, Atlanta, Ga., for Opportunities, Inc.

Palmer H. Ansley, David A. Sapp, Long Weinberg Ansley & Wheeler, Atlanta, Ga., for Skid Lid.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before CLARK, Circuit Judge, MORGAN and HILL ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

HILL, Senior Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal concerns a products liability action based upon alleged breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence resulting in injuries to Lois Elaine Wilson ("Wilson"), appellant. Wilson incurred head injuries during an accident in Georgia while on a cross-country bicycle trip. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilson and against one defendant on a bicycle helmet defect claim, and against Wilson and in favor of three defendants on a bicycle wheel defect claim. The district court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the helmet claim. Plaintiff appeals this grant and also alleges several other errors by the district court concerning the bicycle wheel claim.

A. Issues Presented

Appellant raises four distinct categories of issues on appeal. First, appellant claims that the district court erred in granting appellee Skid Lid Manufacturing Company's ("Skid Lid") motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Second, appellant contends that the district court improperly commented on the evidence. Third, she asserts that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to admit "similar accident" evidence. Finally, appellant maintains that the district court erred in charging the jury on the defense of "legal accident."

We hold that the trial court did not err in granting the JNOV. Nor do the trial judge's comments on the evidence provide cause for reversal. Similarly, we find appellant's third and fourth contentions to be meritless.

B. Factual and Procedural History

On January 6, 1983, appellant purchased a Trek 614 touring bicycle. Trek Bicycle Corporation ("Trek") manufactured the bicycle, Opportunities, Incorporated ("Opportunities") assembled the bike's rear wheel according to Trek's specifications, and Bicycle South, Inc. ("Bicycle South") sold the bike to appellant. The latter three parties will be referred to collectively as "the bicycle defendants." On February 9, 1983, appellant also purchased, from a company not a party to this lawsuit, a bicycle helmet manufactured by Skid Lid. Rather than purchase a helmet covering her entire head, appellant chose one that only covered the top half of her head, coming down to about the top of her ears.

Wilson purchased the bike and helmet for a cross-country bicycling trip from Florida to California. Eight days into her trip, on April 23, 1983, Wilson sustained head injuries in a fall from the bicycle while she was riding downhill on a two-lane Georgia highway between Plains and Americus, Georgia. Between January 6 and April 23, Wilson had ridden approximately 1200 to 1600 miles on the bicycle.

The cause of appellant's fall is disputed by the parties. Appellant maintains that the rear wheel collapsed into a saddle-like shape as a result of an improper manufacturing process and a failure to retrue the spokes of the wheel after the rim was assembled. Under this theory, the tension in the wheel, which was not released after the rim was formed and the wheel assembled, caused the spokes to loosen after use and led to the collapse. The bicycle defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the fall did not result from the wheel collapse, but that the wheel collapsed as a result of appellant's fall from the bike. ¹

The point of initial impact between Ms. Wilson's head and the pavement was behind her left ear and below the edge of the helmet. As a result of the impact, she claims that she sustained three injuries. The first two, a basilar skull fracture and occipital scalp laceration, were not particularly serious and do not comprise the more serious damage. The more serious injury was a "contre-coup" (an injury to the opposite side of the head from the point of initial impact) brain contusion.

Alleging defects in the bicycle wheel and helmet, Ms. Wilson filed a complaint in this products liability action based upon breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence. During the trial, appellant attempted to introduce evidence of a prior bicycle wheel defect claim brought by another party against Trek, Opportunities, and another bicycle store, alleging that the incidents were substantially similar. The trial court excluded the earlier incident.

At the beginning of his charge, the trial judge explained to the jury:

As a federal judge, I have the right, power, and duty to comment on the facts, to express my opinion with respect thereto ... but remember, in the last analysis, every factual issue in this case must be decided by you, by you alone, and anything that anybody else in this room says about the facts is a mere opinion, not binding upon you.

Subsequently, referring to witness testimony, the judge again emphasized that "as sole judges of the facts, you, the jury, and you only, must determine which of the witnesses you believe and what portion of their testimony you accept and what weight you attach to it." Prior to analyzing and giving his opinion of the evidence that Ms. Wilson presented, ² the judge again cautioned the jury that "you, as jurors, are at liberty to disregard each, every, and all comments of the court in arriving at your own findings of the facts." At the conclusion of his remarks, the trial judge further emphasized:

Let me stress as strongly as I can that you, the jury, are the sole and only judges of the facts. The past several minutes I have been giving you my opinion with respect to matters committed solely to your decision, not mine. My comments are and can only be expressions of a personal opinion and are not binding on you in any way, shape, or form. Remember that in considering every issue in this case, including those to which I have just alluded, you must resort to your own recollection of the evidence, not that which I have just stated.... You must, in the diligent performance of your duty, rely on your recollection of all the evidence and not merely that which I may have called to your attention and emphasized.

On April 13, 1989, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant against appellee Skid Lid in the amount of $265,000 on the helmet claim. On the bicycle wheel claim, the jury returned a verdict against appellant and in favor of the bicycle defendants.

On April 21, 1989, appellee Skid Lid moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and on May 24 the trial court entered an Order granting the motion. The court did so because it found that Ms. Wilson had "assumed the risk of injury as to parts of her body patently not covered by the helmet."

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Helmet & the Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

We review the district court's grant of a JNOV under the same standard as the district court used in determining whether to grant a JNOV. As we stated in Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir.1988):

All of the evidence presented at trial must be considered "in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion." A motion for judgment n.o.v. should be granted only where "reasonable [people] could not arrive at a contrary verdict...." Where substantial conflicting evidence is presented such that reasonable people "in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusion, [sic]" the motion should be denied. (citations omitted)

In applying this standard for the sufficiency of evidence, we also look to Georgia substantive law to determine whether Skid Lid deserved judgment as a matter of law. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Salter v. Westra, 904 F.2d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir.1990).

Defendants in products liability actions have asserted two similar defenses in attempting to steer clear of liability, assumption of the risk and the "open and obvious rule." ³ While the trial judge in this case based the JNOV on assumption of the risk, we also address the open and obvious rule because affirmance of the JNOV is proper even if based on a different rationale. See Paisey v. Vitale, 807 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir.1986).

We need not reach the assumption of the risk issue if the helmet was not defective because Skid Lid would have breached no duty to Ms. Wilson. We thus initially address the open and obvious rule. The open and obvious rule states that a product is not defective if the peril from which injury could result is patent or obvious to the user. Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Construction Machinery, Inc., 163 Ga.App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1982). This determination regarding the peril is made on the basis of an objective view of the product. Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 195 Ga.App. 169, 393 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1990) (certiorari denied June 21, 1990). In assessing what is obvious, it must be remembered that, contrary to the belief of some, the American public is not child-like. Stodghill is instructive in this respect. In Stodghill, the plaintiff was using a bulldozer manufactured by the defendants to clear felled trees from a construction site when a tree jumped over the bulldozer blade and struck him in the chest. The plaintiff claimed that the machine was defective because it had no...