Wilson v. Brownfield Const. Co. et al.
| Decision Date | 06 September 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 5414.,5414. |
| Citation | 74 S.W.2d 377 |
| Parties | L.E. WILSON, RESPONDENT, v. BROWNFIELD CONSTRUCTION CO. ET AL., APPELLANT. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Stone County Circuit Court. — Hon. Robert L. Gideon, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).
George A. Hodgman and Williams & Stone for appellants.
Neither the circuit court nor any appellate court has any power or authority to make findings of fact in a case arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, that power being exclusively vested in the Compensation Commission, and expressly withheld from the circuit court and appellate court. Sec. 3342, R.S. Mo. 1929; Teague v. Laclede-Christy Clay Products Company (Mo.), 52 S.W. (2d) 880, 882; Jones v. Century Coal Co. (St. Louis Ct. App.), 46 S.W. (2d) 196, 198; Beecham v. Greenlease Motor Co. (K.C. Ct. App.), 38 S.W. (2d) 535, 537. The findings of the Compensation Commission are in the nature of a special verdict, and if supported by any substantial competent evidence the award is conclusive and binding upon both the circuit court and the appellate court upon appeal. Sec. 3242, R.S. Mo. 1929; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (Mo.), 40 S.W. (2d) 601, 604; Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Co. (Spgfd. Ct. App.), 30 S.W. (2d) 650; Harbour v. Gardner (St. Louis Ct. App.), 38 S.W. (2d) 295, 297; State ex rel. Probst v. Haid (Mo.), 62 S.W. (2d) 869, 871; Gillick v. Construction Co. (Mo.), 65 S.W. (2d) 927, 928. In determining whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support the award, the court must consider only the evidence taken before the Commission, which is most favorable in support of the award, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, and must disregard all of the opposing or conflicting evidence. Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Co. (Spgfd. Ct. App.), 30 S.W. (2d) 650; Jones v. Century Coal Co. (St. Louis Ct. App.), 46 S.W. (2d) 196, 198; Doughton v. Marland Refining Co. (Mo.), 53 S.W. (2d) 236, 240.
J. William Cook for respondent.
No special appeal should be granted unless it appear from an inspection of a copy of the record that error was committed by the trial court against the party applying for the order. Sec. 1023, R.S. Mo. 1929. In the instant case, the respondent testified as to his back injury, Dr. Doggett, his physician, also testified that it was his opinion respondent's back was injured, which evidence, not denied by appellants, makes a complete case for respondent. Herndon v. Robertson Construction Co., 59 S.W. (2d) l.c. 77. Since respondent made his case and the evidence of the back injury was not considered by the Commission, the circuit court could modify the judgment of the Commission as was done in the instant case, or could have sent the case back to the Commission for further action, under proper directions. Hoffman v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 63 S.W. (2d) 428; Russell v. Ely and Walker, 60 S.W. (2d) 44; Seifert v. Packing Co., 52 S.W. (2d) 579.
This is a special appeal granted by this court from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Stone County, modifying a judgment of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission.
The special appeal in this case was granted on the 13th of October, 1933, upon an application filed by the defendants, the Brownfield Construction Company and the Fidelity & Casualty Company, of New York. The application filed was exceedingly comprehensive. The original files and complete record were filed with the application. Upon examination of the application and record this court, under and by virtue of Section 1023, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, allowed said special appeal upon the ground that error had been committed by the circuit court against said petitioners, defendants herein, "materially affecting the merits of the action." It is urged by plaintiff that the special appeal was improvidently granted. To this we are unable to agree.
The application for the appeal shows that the Workmen's Compensation Commission approved a finding of its referee, which was in part, as follows: "`I find from the evidence that on August 12, 1932, employee sustained an injury in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. That as a result thereof he was temporarily, totally disabled from that day to and including September 26, 1932. That the disability now complained of is due to natural causes, and is not the result of the accident.
"`The reasonable cost of medical treatment not furnished by employer, including drugs, for the period from August 12, 1932, to September 26, 1932, is $54.25.'"
It also appears that on the 6th of February, 1933, the Commission made an award to the employee in the sum of $41.19 compensation for six and three-sevenths weeks or $6.41 per week and $54.25 for medical aid or a total sum of $95.44, and on review of the above finding, the whole Commission made and entered its final award approving same. Thereafter said employee, L.E. Wilson, duly filed his appeal from said award to the Stone County Circuit Court, to which court were transmitted all documents and papers in said cause together with a transcript of the evidence. At the March adjourned term, 1933, of said Stone County Circuit Court, the cause was submitted to the judge of said court and on the 13th day of June, 1933, the last day of said March adjourned term, said court duly entered a judgment purporting to modify the judgment or award, of the Commission, which judgment, of the circuit court, is in part, as follows: "`The court finds from the evidence that L.E. Wilson was an employee of the defendant Brownfield Construction Company and that he was and is entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Missouri; that while working for the defendant on August 12, 1932, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his back, his kidneys and internal injuries; that such injuries caused plaintiff to suffer total disability; that the referee who heard the evidence at the original hearing in Galena, Missouri, on February 1, 1933, did not consider plaintiff's evidence as to his back injury and internal injuries other than the injury to the kidney; that on appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Commission did not consider the uncontradicted evidence offered by plaintiff as to the injury to his back and internal injuries, other than the injury to the kidney; that the record shows that the referee at the original hearing and the Workmen's Compensation Commission only considered the evidence relating to the injury to kidney of plaintiff; that plaintiff introduced uncontradicted evidence that he had suffered serious injuries to his back and internal injuries and that at the date of the hearing, plaintiff was unable to work, had been unable to work since August 13, 1932, and that he was under the care of a physician who had instructed and advised him not to work because of his physical condition caused by the injuries received while working for defendant on August 12, 1932; that plaintiff had suffered total disability ...
"`It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged that the judgment rendered in this matter heretofore by the Workmen's Compensation Commission of Missouri be modified and it is hereby modified, so that the judgment shall be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and that plaintiff recover of and from the defendants the sum of $6.41 per week for the first three hundred weeks and $6 per week thereafter, so long as said plaintiff shall suffer total disability, and that plaintiff recover of and from defendants the sum of $54.25 for medical aid, and for his costs, and let execution issue therefor.'"
From the foregoing record it is apparent that the circuit court undertook to make a separate finding of facts and weigh the evidence taken before the referee. In particular does the court find, contrary to the finding of facts made by the Commission, that plaintiff had suffered total disability. It has been expressly held that a finding in regard to the nature, extent and duration of a disability, resulting from an injury sustained by an employee, is a finding of fact. [
In the case of Teague v. The LaClede-Christy Clay Products Company, 52 S.W. (2d) 880, 331 Mo. 147, it was held that: "Under the plain mandate of the statute neither the circuit court nor this court has power or jurisdiction to make findings of fact in any case arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Such power and jurisdiction, by the express terms of the act, is given to the Commission. The pertinent part of Section 3342, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929 (Mo. St. Ann. 3342), reads as follows:
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