Wilson v. Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 27 January 1964
• Citation: 36 Cal.Rptr. 559,224 Cal.App.2d 340
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: H. J. WILSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Harry Albert, O. Richard Capen, and Thelma Thomas Mahoney, Its Members, Harry P. Petrie, Its Secretary, and Willard Shank, Hearing Officer, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 27061, 27062.

Page 559

36 Cal.Rptr. 559

224 Cal.App.2d 340

H. J. WILSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Harry Albert, O. Richard Capen, and Thelma Thomas Mahoney, Its Members, Harry P. Petrie, Its Secretary, and Willard Shank, Hearing Officer, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 27061, 27062.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 27, 1964.

H. J. Wilson, Los Angeles, in pro. per.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, James W. Briggs, Deputy County Counsel, for respondents.

HERNDON, Justice.

Appellant in these two consolidated appeals seeks reversal of the judgment entered against him in a proceeding wherein he sought a writ of prohibition, declaratory relief and an injunction against the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles and several of its officers. Appellant also appeals from several intermediate orders, including ones denying a preliminary injunction. The intermediate orders, other than those relating to the preliminary injunction, are not appealable; the appeals from those orders, therefore, will be dismissed.

Normally, orders denying or granting an injunction are appealable. (Code of Civil Procedure, section 963.) The orders here presented, however, dealt solely with the right to preventive relief pending final judgment and they denied such relief. The entry of final judgment rendered the question of the right to interim relief moot, and therefore the appeals from said orders will also be dismissed. (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.2d 1, 2, 330 P.2d 385; Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal.App.2d 820, 821, 12 Cal.Rptr. 507.)

Although appellant's opening brief presents numerous contentions and arguments, he recognizes in his reply brief the correctness of respondent's observation that the determinative issue presented herein is whether respondent Civil Service Commission exceeded the powers granted it by the Los Angeles County Charter in promulgating its rules providing for hearings by the commission after a decision of the secretary and chief examiner of the civil service department with respect to the promotional examination in question.

In substance, appellant's petition alleged that he was an applicant for the position of county clerk and had participated in an examination held on November 16, 1961. He was placed number four on the eligible list developed on the basis of this examination. Thereafter, appellant sought a hearing before the commission in accordance with the rules, the validity of which he now challenges. His petition for hearing was granted by the commission, a hearing officer was appointed and a hearing date was set; all this was done in accordance with the challenged rules.

During this hearing proceeding, but prior to its completion, appellant decided to challenge the power of the commission to conduct such hearing. Accordingly, he moved the hearing officer to terminate the proceedings. This motion being denied, the present action was instituted. By this action he seeks to enjoin the commission and its officers from completing the hearing, and he requests a declaration of the rights of the parties which, he alleges, would demonstrate the propriety of the relief requested. His complaint also seeks to challenge the validity of certain of the commission's rules regarding situations not relevant to his particular circumstance as well as the propriety of manner in which the hearing is being conducted. However, as heretofore indicated, such issues are not now properly before the court, if the commission has jurisdiction to conduct the hearing itself. The decision thereof will be reviewable pursuant to the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Following the denial of appellant's motions for the issuance of an alternative writ of prohibition or for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, respondents filed general demurrers to the complaint. The trial court, after determining that the complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to entitle appellant to the relief requested, sustained the demurrers. However, in accordance with the rule set forth and analyzed at length in Wilson v. Board of Retirement, 156 Cal.App.2d 195, 199-203, 319 P.2d 426, the court filed its judgment determining the rights of the parties to the extent required to dispose of the only issue properly before it.

Where a complaint sets forth a good cause of action for declaratory relief regarding a disputed question on law, the court should make a declaration thereon, rather than to enter a mere order of dismissal, even though the declaration is not in accord with the declaration sought by the plaintiff. Appellant makes the parenthetic contention that it was improper for the trial court to make this declaration in the course of sustaining a demurrer.

While it may be conceded that such a decision might more normally be made upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, no reason appears why it may not also be done in connection with a demurrer (cf. Wilson v. Board of Retirement, supra, 156 Cal.App.2d p. 200, 319 P.2d pp. 427-428), and certainly appellant has wholly failed to indicate how he was in any manner prejudiced by the procedure here followed. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 475; California Constitution, article VI, section 4 1/2.)

On the primary issue here presented, appellant contends that since the Los Angeles County Charter itself does not specifically require that hearings be held or that appeals be heard by the commission with respect to challenged examinations, and does not prescribe the manner in which such hearings or appeals shall be conducted, the commission is without authority to so provide by its adopted rules. We deem this contention to be without merit.

The true rule is that the commission has the power to promulgate appropriate rules for its own government. Rules so promulgated have the same force as charter provisions so long as they are applied within the scope of the authority contemplated by the charter. (Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.App.2d 310, 312, 117 P.2d 901.) This basic rule is recognized in the very cases relied upon by appellant such as Bruce v. Civil Service Board, 6 Cal.App.2d 633, 637, 45 P.2d 419, wherein it is stated:

'A rule within the scope of its application has the force and dignity of a law, but since the board owes its existence to the organic instrument it cannot, under the guise of exercising a rule-making authority, alter the instrument which has created it.' (Emphasis added.) Earlier decisions such as Cronin v. Civil Service Com., 71 Cal.App. 633, 642-643, 236 P. 339, are not in conflict, for in those instances the commissions had no adopted any rules providing for hearings. These decisions stand only for the proposition that, absent such a provision either in the charter or in the rules, the courts may not supply such deficiency.

There is nothing whatsoever in the provisions of...