Wilson v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance

• Decision Date: 02 June 2004
• Citation: 441 Mass. 846,809 NE 2d 524
• Parties: DAVID WILSON v. COMMISSIONER OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

441 Mass. 846

809 NE 2d 524

DAVID WILSON v. COMMISSIONER OF TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 1, 2004.

June 2, 2004.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

James J. Arguin, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Ruth A. Bourquin for the plaintiff.

SPINA, J.

The Commissioner of the Department of Transitional Assistance (department) appeals from an order that preliminarily enjoined him from reducing the level of monthly benefits paid to the elderly, disabled, and children under the emergency aid (EA) program during fiscal year (FY) 2004. See G. L. c. 117A. The commissioner had determined that the benefit reduction was necessary to operate the EA program within the legislative appropriation for the year, but a judge in the Superior Court concluded that the appropriation enactment mandated a minimum level of benefits. We conclude that the commissioner acted within his discretion and that the order granting the injunction must be vacated.

Background. The EA program provides benefits to low income elderly and disabled residents and to children who are ineligible for Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits. G. L. c. 117A, § 1. The EA program benefits include a monthly payment, emergency rent or mortgage payments, utility arrearage payments, home heating payments, and emergency shelter for individuals without alternative housing. G. L. c. 18, § 2 (D) (a)-(d). To qualify for EA, an individual's monthly income must be less than $303.70. 106 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 321.260, 321.420, and 321.500 (2003). According to the regulations, eligible recipients may receive a monthly payment of up to $303.70, the "payment standard" in effect since 1991.¹

On June 20, 2003, the Legislature enacted the budget for FY 2004, appropriating $63,891,268 to the EA program, subject to fifteen provisos, including:

proviso 2: "the payment standard shall equal the payment standard in effect under the general relief program in fiscal year 1991";

proviso 3: "the department may provide benefits to persons age 65 or older who have applied for benefits under chapter 118A of the General Laws, to persons suffering from a medically determinable impairment or combination of impediments which is expected to last for a period as determined by department regulations and which substantially reduces or eliminates the individual's capacity to support himself and which have been verified by a competent authority, to certain persons caring for a disabled person, to otherwise eligible participants in the vocational rehabilitation program of the Massachusetts rehabilitation commission, and to dependent children who are ineligible for benefits under both chapter 118 of the General Laws and the separate program created by § 210 of chapter 43 of the acts of 1997 and parents or other caretakers of dependent children who are ineligible under said chapter 118 and under the separate program"

proviso 8: "in initially implementing the program for this fiscal year, the department shall include all eligibility categories permitted herein at the payment standard in effect for the former general relief program in fiscal year 1991"

proviso 9: "in promulgating, amending or rescinding its regulations with respect to eligibility or benefits, including the payment standard, medical benefits and any other benefits under this program, the department shall take into account the amounts available to it for expenditure by this item so as not to exceed the amount appropriated herein"

proviso 14: "notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, the funds made available herein shall be the only funds available for the program, and the department shall not spend funds for the program in excess of the amount made available herein"

proviso 15: "notwithstanding any general or special law, or of this item to the contrary, 30 days before implementing any eligibility or benefit changes, or both, the commissioner shall file with the clerks of the house of representatives and the senate a determination by the secretary of health and human services that available appropriations for the program will be insufficient to meet projected expenses and a report setting forth the proposed changes." St. 2003, c. 26, § 2, item XXXX-XXXX.

In July, 2003, based on an unexpected increase in the number of persons who became eligible for EA, the commissioner projected that spending for the EA program would exceed the year's appropriation by $5.9 million.² In order to operate the program within the spending limits imposed by the Legislature, the commissioner proposed a reduction in benefits by approximately 11.5%, effective September 1, 2003. Practically, this reduction would affect approximately 16,000 recipients, resulting in a $35 decrease in an individual's typical monthly EA benefit, but would not disturb the benefit level of recipients in rest homes and nursing homes. On August 1, 2003, the commissioner filed the benefit reduction plan with the clerks of the Massachusetts House of Representatives and Senate and notified the chairpersons of the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees of the plan pursuant to proviso 15 of St. 2003, c. 26, § 2, item XXXX-XXXX.

On August 15, 2003, David Wilson, a recipient of EA, filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the commissioner from implementing the benefit reduction. His primary contention was that proviso 2 mandates a minimum payment of benefits. A judge in the Superior Court agreed and entered an order on August 21, 2003, preliminarily enjoining the commissioner from reducing EA benefits and from notifying recipients of the benefit reduction. The order further provided that the commissioner "may move for reconsideration of this ORDER if the present funds approach exhaustion and if the Legislature does not furnish timely supplemental appropriations." The commissioner appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par., and we granted his application for direct appellate review.

In November, 2003, the Legislature approved, and the Governor did not veto, a supplemental budget for an additional $2.4 million in funding for the EA program in FY 2004. See St. 2003, c. 140, § 2, item XXXX-XXXX. On March 5, 2004, the Legislature provided the supplemental money necessary to fund the EA program for the remainder of the fiscal year at the 1991 payment standard. St. 2004, c. 40.

Mootness. The commissioner suggests that the appeal is now moot, but that we should exercise our discretion and decide the case because "the question is one of public importance, is very likely to arise again in similar circumstances, and . . . appellate review could not be obtained before the question would again be moot." Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 403 Mass. 370, 380 (1988). Wilson does not oppose the commissioner's suggestion, but has expressed concerns about the likelihood that a similar case is likely to arise again, and that review could not be obtained before the question would again become moot.

However, assuming the case is moot,³ we agree that the case involves substantial questions of public importance, including the ability of the executive branch to exercise discretion in spending monies appropriated by the Legislature for the EA program, as well as constitutional and statutory principles concerning spending within a legislative appropriation. The issues have been fully briefed and argued by both sides. See Ott v. Boston Edison Co., 413 Mass. 680, 683 (1992). The situation is likely to arise again in similar circumstances. Although this case involves the interpretation of a line item in an appropriation enactment, the text of the line item appropriations for the EA program has remained essentially the same since FY 1992, and this is the second fiscal year in which there has been litigation challenging the commissioner's authority to reduce benefits in order to keep EA program spending within appropriation levels. Joslin vs. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, Suffolk Superior Court No. 01-0803. The issue is capable of repetition, and may well evade review, where the cycle in which the issue will likely arise is the fiscal year and where mootness may develop as a result of legislative response. For these reasons, we think it is appropriate to decide this appeal.

Discussion. The commissioner claims that the judge erred because proviso 2 does not preclude a reduction in the EA benefit standard and that the benefit reduction plan is a matter of spending committed to his discretion. Wilson argues that (1) the plain language of proviso 2 requires the Department of Transitional Assistance to maintain the payment standard in effect in fiscal year 1991 until appropriated funds are depleted; and (2) the commissioner's plan to reduce the payment standard, if implemented, will cause immediate and irreparable harm to EA recipients.

When reviewing interlocutory injunctive orders, we examine the "same factors properly considered by the judge in the first instance," Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616 (1980), see Boston Athletic Ass'n v. International Marathons, Inc., 392 Mass. 356, 362 n.7 (1984), to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion. See Lawless-Mawhinney Motors, Inc. v. Mawhinney, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 743 (1986). For the denial or issuance of a preliminary injunction, a judge conducts an "initial evaluation in combination of the moving party's claim of injury and its chance of success on the merits." Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, supra at 617. If the moving party demonstrates both a likelihood of success on the merits and a substantial risk of irreparable harm, such harm is to be balanced against a risk to the nonmoving party. See Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 383 Mass. 286, 288 (1981).

We first consider whether Wilson has...