Wilson v. Crocket

• Decision Date: 31 January 1869
• Citation: 43 Mo. 216
• Parties: JAMES H. WILSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOHN M. CROCKET, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

43 Mo. 216

JAMES H. WILSON, Plaintiff in Error,

v.JOHN M. CROCKET, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1869.

Error to First District Court.

The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

A. J. Seay, for plaintiff in error.

I. The evidence discloses no capture or confiscation, no brand, and does not pretend to try to show that appellant was a public enemy.

II. A larceny of property does not pass the title to the thief or those claiming through him, however remote. No one can transfer to another a greater interest in personal property than he, or the principal for whom he acts, possesses. The owner cannot be divested of title except by his own consent or by operation of law.

III. The government of the United States, having no title, could pass none to the respondent. Appellant having established ownership, it devolves on respondent to show he had parted with the title by his own consent or by operation of law. This the respondent does not attempt to do. The following authorities are referred to: Hoffman v. Haron, 22 Wend. 185; Hill. on Torts, 65, note; Will. on Pers. Prop. top p. 498, and note. The law of caveat emptor clearly applies to this case. The plaintiff has no remedy against the government. (Sto. on Sales, §§ 188, 201, 394; 1 Wend. 185; 11 id. 80; 2 Kent's Com. top p. 380 to 382, and notes.)

IV. The court erred in interlining instructions. A party has a right to stand or fall upon his own proposition. (40 Mo. 151.)

Perry, and Ewing & Smith, for defendant in error.

The title to personal property captured by the United States military forces from the domestic enemy of the United States, during the late war of the rebellion, vested in the government; and under a sale thereof by the government a good title thereto passed to the purchaser thereof as against the original owner. (Wheat. Int. Law, p. 454, § 359; Wheat. Ele. Int. Law, 419; Vatt. p. 364, § 161.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action under the statute for the claim and delivery of personal property, brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover the possession of a horse. The defendant had judgment both in the Circuit and District Courts. It is needless to comment with any particularity on the instructions, as they are somewhat confused and incongruous, and some of them were wholly unsupported by any evidence in the cause.

But the record shows that there is a single point of law involved, the determination of which must decide the whole case. The plaintiff's horse was stolen in 1862, and was purchased at a quartermaster's sale, at Springfield, in January, 1863. There was no evidence to show how the horse came into the possession of the quartermaster--whether he was captured from the enemies of the government--nor that it was ever condemned and confiscated. It was not branded, nor were there any indicia to show that the government asserted any title to it.

Upon proof of bare possession and sale by the officer, the court held that a perfect title passed to the purchaser, and that the plaintiff was divested of his rights without any fault on his part.

It was a maxim of the civil law, and has been generally admitted by the writers on common law, that nemo plus juris inalium transferre potest, quam ipse habet; and this is plainly common sense and justice.

It is said, by the author of a treatise on sales, that the general rule is that the subject of sale must belong to the vendor, and that he can sell no more than the interest which he legally possesses. If, therefore, he sell an article not belonging to him, whether it was obtained by theft, or finding, or by any other means, without consent of the owner, the person whose property it is may claim restitution thereof from the hands of the vendee, although it be sold and purchased bona fide and for a valuable consideration; for, unless the property were divested from the original owner by a legal and valid sale or transfer, it would still remain his property, in whatever innocent hands it might subsequently come. (Sto. Sales, by Perk., § 188.) This doctrine is maintained by a great array of authorities. (See Peer v. Humphreys, 2 Ad. & El. 495; White v. Spettigue, 13 Mees & W. 603; Cooper v. Willomatt, 1 Com. B. 672; Lee v. Boyes, 18 id. 599; Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570; Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cowen, 238; Towne v. Collins, 14 Mass. 500; Ruffington v. Gerrish, 15 id. 156; Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471; Trott v. Warren, 2 Fairfield, 227.)

In Ventress et al. v. Smith (10 Pet. 175), Thompson, J., said: “It is a general rule of law that a sale by a person...