Wilson v. Guy.
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | A20A0969 |
| Citation | 356 Ga.App. 509,848 S.E.2d 138 |
| Parties | WILSON v. GUY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Hawkins Parnell & Young, Peter A. Jacxsens, Jr., Lauren E. Dick, for appellant.
Macklyn A. Smith, Sr., for appellee.
Robert Wilson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in Hunter Guy's action against him. Specifically, Guy alleges that Wilson's negligence was the proximate cause of injuries he suffered while working with V. J. Williamson on Wilson's property. Wilson disagrees, arguing that he is entitled to summary judgment because the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk barred Guy's claims. Wilson further contends that any negligence on Williamson's part cannot be imputed to him and the trial court erred in denying summary judgment as to the issue of punitive damages. For the reasons set forth infra , we reverse.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Guy (i.e. , the nonmoving party),1 the record shows that Wilson owns and operates Robert F. Wilson Builders, Inc., which is a construction, framing, and remodeling business. During all relevant times, Guy and Williamson were employees of Wilson's company, and they worked there Monday through Friday. But occasionally, Wilson offered his employees the opportunity to earn extra money by performing tasks at his residence on the weekends, which was "completely separate" from their work for the company and done solely for Wilson's personal benefit. This work included mowing the lawn, landscaping, cleaning the dog pen, yard work, and other property-maintenance tasks.
In early May 2018, Williamson asked Wilson if he could work at his residence on May 5, 2018 (a Saturday), and be paid in advance. Wilson agreed, and paid Williamson $100 in cash. The day before the scheduled job, Williamson asked Guy if he wanted to help with the work at Wilson's residence to make some extra money, and Guy accepted the offer. According to Guy, Wilson knew that he would be working with Williamson and paid him $100 for doing so.2
On the day in question, Williamson and Guy arrived at Wilson's home around 7:00 a.m., checked on the dog pen, and then began by mowing the lawn. It is undisputed that Wilson left his residence while Williamson and Guy were working, so he was not home to supervise, monitor, or observe them. And before departing, Wilson told Guy to listen to Williamson and do whatever tasks that he was asked to do. Later, after speaking with Wilson, Williamson informed Guy that Wilson instructed them "to trim the fence and then burn the brush."3 So, while Williamson trimmed the fence, Guy gathered all of the brush into a pile to be burned.
The five-foot-tall pile of brush was large, containing over 150 logs. And because of the pile's size, Guy stood on logs somewhere in the pile and began "slinging" gasoline on the brush using a cup.4 Guy stood about a foot away from where he was spreading the gasoline.
Williamson planned to ignite the fire by lighting a ripped piece of t-shirt and throwing it in the pile of brush. But before he had a chance to do so, the brush "blew up" like "an explosion," forced Guy back off the logs, burned him, and "ripped all [his] skin off." Williamson rushed to find tenants on the property to call 911 (which they did), and eventually, an ambulance took Guy to the closest hospital with a burn unit. And due to the severity of his burns, Guy remained in the hospital for about a week and a half.
Thereafter, Guy filed a complaint for damages against Wilson, claiming that Wilson was negligent for: (1) not supervising the burning of the brush on his property; (2) having gasoline on his property to be used in burning the brush; (3) not training Guy as to the proper use of gasoline to burn brush; and (4) not training Williamson on how to properly use gasoline to burn brush or how to supervise others in doing so. Guy also alleged that Wilson was responsible for the negligent acts of Williamson under the doctrine of respondeat superior. According to Guy, he suffered severe permanent physical injuries and financial losses as a direct result of Wilson's negligence. Wilson answered the complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, and discovery then ensued. On March 14, 2019, Wilson filed a motion for summary judgment. Guy filed a response, and ultimately, the trial court denied Wilson's motion.5 This appeal follows.
Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."6 Furthermore, a de novo standard of review "applies to an appeal from a grant or denial of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant."7 Moreover, at the summary-judgment stage, "[w]e do not resolve disputed facts, reconcile the issues, weigh the evidence, or determine its credibility, as those matters must be submitted to a jury for resolution."8 With these guiding principles in mind, we will address Wilson's specific claims of error.
1. Turning to Wilson's last argument first, he contends that he is not vicariously liable for any of Williamson's negligent acts because Williamson was an independent contractor, not an employee. And because we conclude that both Williamson and Guy were working as independent contractors at the time of the brush fire explosion, we agree that Wilson is not liable for Guy's injuries, vicariously or otherwise.
In a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing four essential elements:
(1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff's legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.9
And the threshold issue in any cause of action for negligence is whether, and to what extent, the defendant "owes the plaintiff a duty of care."10 Suffice it to say, whether a duty exists upon which liability can be based is a question of law;11 and it is a well-settled principle of negligence law that "the occurrence of an unfortunate event is not sufficient to authorize an inference of negligence."12 Nevertheless, we are mindful that routine issues of negligence cases are "generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment should not be granted in these cases unless the nonexistence of liability is plain, palpable, and indisputable."13 This is such a case.
In this matter, Guy's complaint alleged that Wilson was negligent for failing to train him and Williamson on the proper way to use gasoline to burn brush, failing to supervise them while they burned the brush, failing to train Williamson on how to supervise the use of gasoline to burn the brush, and having gasoline on the property. Guy also alleged that Wilson is vicariously liable for Williamson's negligence in directing and supervising the burning of the brush. But to determine whether Wilson had an affirmative duty to take any of these actions or he is vicariously liable for Williamson's negligence, we must first determine whether Guy and Williamson were working as Wilson's employees or as independent contractors at the relevant time.
It is well settled that whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is determined by "examining whether the employer has assumed the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work."14 And the right to control the manner and method of executing work "means the right to tell the employee how he shall go about doing the job in every detail, including what tools he shall use and what procedures he shall follow."15 Further, the right to control the time of doing the job "means the right to control the hours of work."16
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Guy,17 it shows that Wilson orally agreed to pay Williamson and Guy a fixed amount to perform property-maintenance work at his home. But there is no evidence that Wilson assumed the right to tell Williamson or Guy exactly how to go about their tasks in every detail, which tools to use, or what procedures to follow in carrying out their work. Indeed, there is no evidence that Wilson even knew the method by which Guy and Williamson planned to set the brush on fire—i.e. , Guy standing on logs in the pile of brush and dousing them with gasoline from a cup only a foot away. As Guy testified, Wilson merely instructed them as to the general tasks to be done, including mowing the lawn, trimming the fence, and burning the brush. Importantly, Wilson was not even home while the two men worked. And according to Guy, Wilson instructed him only to listen to Williamson and do whatever Williamson told him to do. Guy also admitted that he was under the "direct supervision" of Williamson, not Wilson. Significantly, Guy never heard Wilson tell Williamson that they should use gasoline to burn the brush. Instead, Guy averred only that he "took [Williamson's] word for it." Needless to say, Williamson's statements in this regard are inadmissible hearsay.18 Further, while Wilson agreed to the particular Saturday that Williamson requested to work at his home, there is no evidence that Wilson controlled the specific hours during which Williamson and Guy worked or the order in which the requested tasks would be performed. Under such circumstances, although Williamson and Guy were employees of Wilson's business during the week, they worked as independent contractors on the Saturday when Guy was injured.19
Additionally, Guy has provided no legal authority that an employer has a duty to train and supervise an independent contractor and can be held liable for negligently failing to do so....
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