Wilson v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, No. 2005-CA-002394-MR (Ky. App. 12/1/2006)
| Decision Date | 01 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-CA-002394-MR.,2005-CA-002394-MR. |
| Parties | Cameron M. WILSON, Appellant v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION; Big Lots Stores, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Jacqueline K. Schroering, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant.
E. Jeffery Mosley, Education Cabinet, Office of Legal Services, Frankfort Kentucky, Brief for Appellee, Unemployment Insurance Commission.
No Brief for Appellee Big Lots Stores, Inc.
Before: JOHNSON and WINE, Judges; MILLER,1 Special Judge.
Cameron M. Wilson appeals from an Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court upholding a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) denying his claim for unemployment benefits. Because Wilson was discharged for misconduct and is thereby disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, we affirm.
Wilson began working for Big Lots Stores, Inc. in May 2000. He was assigned to a Louisville, Kentucky, outlet, and in September 2004, was employed as an assistant store manager.
On September 23, 2004, at approximately 4:00 p.m., a shoplifter stole a fifty-two inch plasma television from the store. Wilson was the only manager on duty during this time. A cashier spotted the shoplifter and was able to get the license plate number of his vehicle before he left the parking lot. The theft was also recorded by store security cameras. Wilson, however, failed to report the theft to store management or the police, and the theft was not reported until the next day.
Because of his failure to report the theft, Wilson was discharged.2 Wilson subsequently filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. Following a hearing, the Referee determined that Wilson was discharged for misconduct and was disqualified from receiving benefits, and affirmed the denial. The Referee's decision was upheld by KIUC. Wilson appealed to Jefferson Circuit Court, which upheld KIUC's decision. This appeal followed.
The legislative purpose in enacting the unemployment compensation act was "to provide benefits for only those employees who have been forced to leave their employment because of forces beyond their control and not because of any voluntary act of their own." Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Kroehler Manufacturing Company, 352 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Ky. 1961). Upon review of an administrative agency's adjudicatory decision, an appeal court's authority is somewhat limited. See American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964)( judicial review involves whether an administrative agency's decision is arbitrary). The judicial standard of review of an unemployment benefit decision is whether the KUIC's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency correctly applied the law to the facts. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Ky. App. 1998)(citing Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969)); Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Stirrat, 688 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ky.App. 1984); Tackett v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 630 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky.App. 1982).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that, taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998); Piper v. Singer Co., 663 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky.App. 1984); and Barren River Mental Health-Mental Retardation Board, Inc. v. Bailey, 783 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ky.App. 1990)(quoting Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972)). If there is substantial evidence to support the agency's findings, a court must defer to that finding even though there is evidence to the contrary. See generally Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999); and Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky. 1981). A court may not substitute its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See Burch, supra at 834; Energy Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Power Co., 605 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Ky.App. 1980); Railroad Commission v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 490 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Ky. 1973). A court's function in administrative matters is one of review, not reinterpretation. See Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky.App. 1983); Piper, supra at 763. "The fact that a reviewing court may not have come to the same conclusion regarding the same findings of fact does not warrant substitution of a court's discretion for that of an administrative agency." Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Ky.2002).
The essential findings of fact in this case — that Big Lots had a uniformly enforced policy requiring employees to report theft to management; that a major theft occurred on September 23, 2004; that Wilson had knowledge of and failed to report the theft; and that Wilson accordingly violated the uniformly enforced policy — are all supported by substantial evidence.
At the November 16, 2004, Referee hearing District Manager Doug Gaskins testified on behalf of Big Lots. Gaskins testified that upon his initial employment, Wilson was given a copy of company's employee handbook, which, among other things, included the provision that employees may be terminated for
Violation of proper store procedures and/or failure of store associates to perform established procedures.
and
Violation of any other Company rules/regulations or any other action/activity that is deemed to be detrimental to the orderly operation of our Company.
While not specifically set forth, Gaskins testified that the foregoing provisions included the requirement that an employee report a theft of which he has knowledge. Gaskins also testified that Wilson had been orally advised that he was required to report thefts from the store. While Wilson appears, in his brief, to disclaim knowledge of this policy,3 Gaskins testified otherwise, and, moreover, we note that the reporting of theft is an inherent duty of a store manager. Accordingly, the findings to the effect that Wilson had knowledge of the policy is supported by...
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