Wilson v. Kijakazi

• Decision Date: 21 September 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 4:20-CV-00064-HBB
• Parties: JASON WILSON v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER[1] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

JASON WILSON v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER^[1] SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT

Civil Action No. 4:20-CV-00064-HBB

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division

September 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

H Brent Brennenstuhl, United States Magistrate Judge

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Jason Wilson (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g). Both Plaintiff (DN 14) and Defendant (DN 19) have filed a Fact and Law Summary. For the reasons that follow, the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and judgment is GRANTED for the Commissioner.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 12). By Order entered February 8, 2021 (DN 13), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on December 17, 2016 (Tr. 11, 179-82). Plaintiff alleges to have become disabled on November 30, 2014, as a result of a back injury and anxiety (Tr. 11, 82-83, 98). The claim was initially denied on April 4, ^[2] 2017, and the claim was again denied upon reconsideration on June 27, ^[3] 2017 (Tr. 11, 94-95, 96, 110). After these denials, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing (Tr. 11, 126-27). Administrative Law Judge David Peeples (“ALJ”) conducted a video hearing from Paducah, Kentucky on October 16, 2018 (Tr. 11, 51-53). Virtually present at the hearing from Owensboro, Kentucky was Plaintiff and his attorney Sara Martin Diaz (Id.). During the hearing, Kenneth Boaz testified as a vocational expert (Tr. 11, 51-53, 76-80).

At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 30, 2014, the alleged onset date (Tr. 13). At the second step, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's sole severe impairment was degenerative disc disease (Id.). The ALJ also found Plaintiff's digestive disorders, status post leukemia, obesity, depression, panic disorder, and anxiety to be nonsevere (Tr. 14). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr. 15).

At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) except for the following limitations: Plaintiff can lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently balance and kneel; occasionally stoop, crouch, and crawl; and avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards such as unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts (Tr. 16). The ALJ found Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a mortgage loan closer, as this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC (Tr. 20). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a “disability, ” as defined in the Social Security Act, since February 24, 2017, the date the application was filed (Tr. 25).

Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 176). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-3).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review

Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by “substantial evidence, ” 42 U.S.C § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court “may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” Cohen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).

As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-3). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of the Commissioner's decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Commissioner's Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The term “disability” is defined as an

[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See “Evaluation of disability in general, ” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:

1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2) Does the claimant have a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the duration requirement and significantly limits his or her ability to do basic work activities?

3) Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within Appendix 1?

4) Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to return to his or her past relevant work?

5) Does the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience allow him or her to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy?

Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim at the fourth step.

Challenge to Findings 4 and 5: ALJ's Use of MRI Evidence

1. Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff begins by arguing that “[t]he ALJ committed clear error in his treatment of the MRIs in [Plaintiff]'s medical records which directly influenced the holding” (DN 14-1 PageID 4645). Plaintiff notes that the ALJ relied upon MRIs which were conducted without contrast (Id. at PageID 4645-46). Plaintiff asserts that contrast “mak[es] it easier to detect herniated discs, pinched nerves, spinal tumors, spinal cord compression, and fractures” (Id. at PageID 4646) (quoting Overview of MRI Contrast, GE HEALTHCARE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.gehealthcare.com/article/overview-of-mri-contrast).^[4] Later MRIs purportedly used contrast and showed more severe diagnoses (Id. at PageID 4646-47). Therefore, “[i]n the absence of surgical intervention of any sort during the relevant time period, it was clear error for the ALJ to have relied so heavily on [the MRI without contrast] in making his determination of disability” (Id. at PageID 4647).

Defendant claims, “[T]he ALJ reasonably considered the objective medical evidence associated with Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease and appropriate determined that the medical evidence did not fully support his allegations of symptom severity” (DN 19 PageID 4673) (citing Tr. 20). Defendant recounts several medical documents, which were also considered by the ALJ, showing “some neuromuscular deficits, but not to the extent alleged by Plaintiff[, and] . . the ALJ explained that Plaintiff maintained normal motor strength, deep tendon reflexes, and sensation in both legs” (Id.) (citing Tr. 17, 18, 482). As for Plaintiff's visit to the emergency department in August 2017, Defendant explained that the “MRI showed disc herniation but not central canal stenosis or lesion that would result in cauda equine syndrome” (Id.) (citing Tr. 18, 2166-67). When turning to Plaintiff's argument regarding the MRIs with and without contrast, Defendant claims, “Plaintiff is substituting his own interpretation of the 2016 and 2017 MRI findings for that of a medical professional” (Id. at PageID 4674). “[R]ather than obtain[] a medical opinion to support his theory that the MRIs taken in 2016 were more accurate because they were performed ‘with and without contrast,' Plaintiff simply cites to a website” (Id.). As such, Defendant contends that Plaintiff “failed to meet his burden of producing...