Wilson v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-00077-MTS |
| Parties | JEREMIAH WILSON, Petitioner, v. JASON LEWIS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jeremiah Wilson's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus. Doc. [1]. For the following reasons Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition is denied.
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center (SECC) in Charleston, Missouri. Petitioner was charged with robbery in the first degree in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri. Petitioner pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment. Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035 claiming that plea counsel misinformed him concerning credit for the Illinois prison time that he served during the pendency of his case. The motion court expressly denied Petitioner's motion without an evidentiary hearing, but resentenced him to seventeen years, eight months, and twenty-four days imprisonment reflecting the credit Petitioner thought he would receive. Petitioner appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that although plea counsel misinformed Petitioner concerning the jail-time credit he would receive, which would normally entitle Petitioner to an evidentiary hearing, the full record demonstrated Petitioner did not suffer any prejudice because the motion court eliminated any potential prejudice by resentencing Petitioner to the amount of time he thought he was going to receive via jail-time credit.
On January 9, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of theft in Illinois and was sentenced to three years in prison. Doc. [10-2] at 34. While Petitioner was serving time in Illinois for the Illinois theft charge, Missouri charged Petitioner with robbery in the first degree for an incident occurring during June 2013. On August 25, 2016, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charged offense without a recommendation from the State.[1] Id. at 100.
At the plea hearing, the State outlined its evidence against Petitioner: Petitioner, acting with another, forcibly stole $41,435.00 in merchandise at gunpoint from an AT&T store and fled the scene in a gray SUV. Doc. [10-3]. Law enforcement later found the gray SUV, which contained DNA and fingerprint evidence linking Petitioner to the vehicle. Id. Petitioner admitted to participating in the robbery. Id. The State outlined the range of punishment as 10 to 30 years or life imprisonment, and that Petitioner would have to serve 85 percent of any sentence imposed. Doc. [10-3] at 12. Petitioner confirmed that he understood the range of punishment. Id. Petitioner also assured the plea court that he understood the nature and consequences of his blind guilty plea, he had sufficient time to speak with plea counsel, plea counsel adequately investigated his case, and he had no general complaints or criticisms of plea counsel's services. Doc. [10-3] at 12-14. Further, Petitioner stated that no one made him any promises about the outcome of the plea and that no one told him how long he would be confined or serve as a result. Id. Specifically:
Doc. [10-3] at 13-14. The plea court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea and scheduled the sentencing hearing.[2] Petitioner's sentencing hearing was held on October 20, 2016. Upon sentencing Petitioner to twenty years in prison, the sentencing court affirmatively stated that Petitioner would receive “credit for time served on [his] Illinois case . . . and [his] time will be run concurrent with any sentence [he has] in Illinois.” Doc. [10-3] at 20. During the sentencing hearing the court inquired about Petitioner's satisfaction with plea counsel:
The written judgment and sentence entered by the sentencing court showed that Petitioner's sentence was twenty years, “to be served concurrent with credit for time served with 13CF1626” (the Illinois conviction). Doc. [10-2] at 102. The Missouri Department of Corrections did not credit Petitioner for the time served in Illinois.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, claiming that he was induced to plead guilty based on plea counsel's erroneous advice that he would receive credit for the time he spent in Illinois custody during the pendency of his Missouri case. The motion court denied Petitioner's Rule 24.035 motion, without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record refuted Petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In other words, the motion court found that Petitioner failed to show he would have proceeded to trial but for counsel's misinformation, and that Petitioner failed to carry the burden of showing his counsel was ineffective based on counsel's alleged statements regarding the amount of time he would serve. Doc. [10-2] at 74. However, despite expressly denying Petitioner's motion, the motion court vacated Petitioner's original sentence and resentenced him to seventeen years, eight months, and twenty-four days of imprisonment.[4] Doc. [10-2]. Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's judgment. Doc. [10-4]. Petitioner, therefore, exhausted his state remedies and subsequently filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. [1].
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a fundamental right and essential to a fair trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). When a criminal case is resolved by a guilty plea instead of a trial, the Constitution requires that the plea be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, with knowledge of “the relevant circumstances and likely consequences,” because it constitutes a waiver of a defendant's right to a trial, right to confront accusers, and privilege against self-incrimination. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). “The entry of a guilty plea . . . ranks as a ‘critical stage' at which the right to counsel adheres.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy this standard in cases involving a guilty plea, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability[5] that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
“Where a state court concludes that there was no ineffective assistance under this ‘highly deferential' standard, a federal court then must review counsel's performance under the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).'” Gray v. Norman, 739 F.3d 1113, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)).
The Court's review of the Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under AEDPA, the decision of the state court is entitled to deference unless the state court's adjudication on the merits, (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The “clearly established Federal law” requirement of habeas review under § 2254(d)(1) requires the habeas court to consider only United States Supreme Court precedent in force when a state court issued its decision. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38-40 (2011).
A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established Federal law if “it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases,...
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