Wilson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 274, No. 23, No. 351.
• Citation: 135 N.M. 506,2004 NMCA 51,90 P.3d 525
• Parties: Floyd D. WILSON et al., for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Intervenor-Appellant, v. State of Texas, Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

90 P.3d 525

135 N.M. 506

2004 NMCA 51

Floyd D. WILSON et al., for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, Intervenor-Appellant, v. State of Texas, Intervenor-Appellant.

Nos. 23,274, 23,351.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 3, 2004.

Certiorari Denied April 26, 2004.

Steven L. Tucker, Tucker Law Firm, P.C., George Gary Duncan, Santa Fe, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Sarah M. Singleton, Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, Vaughn C. Williams, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, L.L.P., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Peter Breen, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, for Intervenor-Appellant New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Maureen Powers, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Intervenor-Appellant State of Texas.

Certiorari Denied, No. 28,564, April 26, 2004.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.

{1} The New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (New Mexico) and the State of Texas (Texas) appeal the trial court's denial of their joint motion to intervene in a nationwide class action. The states sought to challenge the terms of the class action's final settlement as a contravention of their unclaimed property acts. See NMSA 1978, §§ 7-8A-1 to -31 (1997, as amended through 2003); Tex. Prop.Code Ann. §§ 72.001 to 74.705 (Vernon 1985, as amended through 2003). We find that the Texas appeal was untimely filed and therefore do not consider the merits of its arguments. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, New Mexico's unclaimed property act does not apply. We therefore affirm the denial of the intervention motion.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The class action arose out of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company's (MassMutual's) practice of applying modal charges when policyholders pay premiums on an installment basis, either monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually, rather than annually. In December 1998, Plaintiff Floyd D. Wilson (Wilson) filed the lawsuit on behalf of a class of persons who at any time owned disability or life insurance policies issued by MassMutual and who paid any modal charges for their policies. Other named plaintiffs were subsequently added. They alleged breach of contract; breach of common law and statutory duty to disclose modal charges; and failure to account for the modal charge when calculating annual dividends, policy cash values, and amounts of insurance coverage.

{3} On February 22, 2002, the district court preliminarily approved the second of two settlements reached, class counsel having previously withdrawn his support for the first settlement. The district court scheduled a fairness hearing for June 20, 2002, to consider final approval of the second settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, MassMutual agreed to provide policyholders a certificate for each policy on which they paid a modal charge and to make various disclosures about modal charges. Class members could either use each certificate for $100 credit toward the purchase of select MassMutual products or redeem each certificate for $30 cash. The redemption period for the certificates was limited to a period of eighteen months from the date of issuance.

{4} The states, non-class members, filed a joint motion to intervene on May 30, 2002, and requested to appear at the fairness hearing. Their motion challenged the legality of the time-limited certificates and asserted that the "value [of certificates not redeemed after eighteen months] reverts to MassMutual, instead of being delivered to the states' unclaimed property fund." At the fairness hearing, the district court heard arguments concerning the applicability of the unclaimed property acts from both states and from proponents of the settlement. New Mexico additionally provided an oral offer of proof; Texas was granted leave to file an offer of proof by affidavit. On June 27, 2002, the district court issued two orders. One denied the motion to intervene; the other gave final approval to the settlement. The states appealed both orders.

{5} We consolidated the states' appeals with those of six individuals or groups of individual class members who appealed the settlement's final approval. The class members raised issues of class certification, the adequacy of notice, the fairness of the settlement, the level and allocation of attorney fees, and the awards to class representatives. This Court was notified shortly before oral argument that the class members had settled their six appeals; we subsequently granted the joint motion to dismiss the class members' appeals. We therefore address only the states' appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

{6} We first address two threshold questions: the timeliness of the Texas appeal and standing to move for intervention. We then turn to the intervention motion.

A. The Notice of Appeal by Texas Was Untimely Filed

{7} Wilson urges this Court to dismiss Texas' notice of appeal for untimeliness. Rule 12-201(A)(2) NMRA 2004 requires that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the entry of final judgment. The district court's orders denying the intervention motion and approving the final settlement were filed on June 27, 2002; since the thirtieth day fell on a weekend, the notice of appeal was due Monday, July 29, 2002. See Rule 12-308(A) NMRA 2004. The appeal was filed on July 30, one day late.

{8} The district court's authority to grant an extension is governed by Rule 12-201(E). Where the motion for an extension is filed prior to the expiration of the thirty-day time limit, the extension of time for filing a notice of appeal may be granted upon a finding of good cause. Rule 12-201(E)(1). When the motion is filed after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline, there must be a finding of excusable neglect or circumstances beyond the control of the appellant. Rule 12-201(E)(2). The district court has sixty days to grant an extension to appeal. Rule 12-201(E)(4).

{9} Texas dispatched its notice of appeal on July 24, 2002, in a United Parcel Service (UPS) second-day air overnight package; the notice was not delivered by UPS until July 30. On August 9, 2002, Texas incorrectly sought leave from this Court for an extension to file its notice of appeal; we directed Texas to request the extension from the district court, which Texas did on August 12, 2002. Without a hearing or a notice to the parties, the district court ordered the extension on August 14, 2002, upon a finding of good cause. Unaware of the court's order, Wilson on August 20, 2002, timely objected to Texas' motion for an extension. The next day, Wilson learned of the order and filed a motion for reconsideration. Wilson challenged the court's use of the good cause standard and argued that Texas was unable to meet the proper standard of excusable neglect or circumstances beyond its control. New Mexico and MassMutual joined Texas in opposing Wilson's motion for reconsideration. Following a hearing, the district court issued an order on September 24, 2002, that denied Wilson's motion and substituted a finding of circumstances beyond Texas' control for the good cause finding in the court's August 14 order. Wilson then asked this Court to dismiss the Texas appeal on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction for the September 24 order because the sixty-day period for granting extensions had expired; or, alternatively, that the district court's finding of circumstances beyond the control of Texas was unsupported by the record.

{10} We review de novo the question of whether a district court has authority to grant an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. See Chavez v. U-Haul Co., 1997-NMSC-051, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 165, 947 P.2d 122. If authority exists, we uphold the extension, absent abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 26. The district court's authority to grant an extension is limited to sixty days. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Rule 12-201(E)(4)). In this case, there is no question that the district court's initial order of August 14 was entered within the sixty-day period. The court apparently misread the standard to be applied in that order and attempted to amend it on September 24. However, we find no precedent allowing for an extension order to be amended after the sixty-day period. See id. ¶ 15 (reiterating that "the sixty-day period circumscribing the district court's authority is tolled only in cases where post-trial motions are filed"). Therefore, we consider the September 24 order to be a second order for an extension and find it without effect; the court lacked authority to grant an extension by that date. {11} Furthermore, the circumstances in this case are not those that warrant the extension. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a mandatory precondition to jurisdiction, not an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Executive Sports Club, Inc. v. First Plaza Trust, 1998-NMSC-008, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 78, 957 P.2d 63. However, an appellant's untimely filing will be overlooked in "[o]nly the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties—such as error on the part of the court." Chavez, 1997-NMSC-051, ¶ 19, 124 N.M. 165, 947 P.2d 122 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Executive Sports Club, Inc., 1998-NMSC-008, ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 78,957 P.2d 63 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); San Juan 1990-A., L.P. v. El Paso Prod. Co., 2002-NMCA-041, ¶ 23, 132 N.M. 73, 43 P.3d 1083 [hereinafter San Juan]. Texas' late filing was admittedly due solely to its reliance on the timeliness of the UPS delivery; there is no suggestion that a court administrative or clerical error caused the delay. See Trujillo v. Serrano, 117 N.M. 273, 278, 871 P.2d 369, 374 (1994)

(discussing failure of district court to notify parties of its decision after telling the parties it would do so and holding that "if the actions of the...