Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 6822
| Decision Date | 09 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 6822,6822 |
| Citation | 669 P.2d 569 |
| Parties | Arthur E. WILSON, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
James T. Brennan and John S. Hedland, Hedland, Fleischer & Friedman, Anchorage, for appellant.
Margaret J. Rawitz, Asst. Mun. Atty., and Jerry Wertzbaugher, Mun. Atty., Anchorage, for appellee.
Jonathan B. Rubini, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Norman C. Gorsuch, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for amicus curiae state of Alaska.
Before BURKE, C.J., RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ., and HANSON, Judge. *
The primary issue in this appeal is whether AS 09.65.070(d)(1) 1, which confers immunity to municipalities for liability arising from safety inspections of private property violates the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. The statute is also challenged under two other constitutional provisions, article I, section 15, and article II, section 21. We hold that AS 09.65.070(d)(1) is constitutional under all three provisions, and affirm the superior court's judgment.
In January of 1981, appellant Arthur E. Wilson was injured when he touched temporary electrical wiring while working at a construction site in Anchorage. Wilson sued appellee Municipality of Anchorage ("Anchorage"), alleging that Anchorage inspected the electrical installation but negligently failed to detect any defects. 2 Anchorage moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting immunity from liability under AS 09.65.070(d)(1). The superior court granted Anchorage's motion and entered a final judgment against Wilson.
Prior to 1977, a municipality did not enjoy any immunity from tort liability. 3 In State v. Jennings, 555 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1976), we held that municipalities are not immune from liability for negligence in the course of performing safety inspections. In the companion case of Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976), we refused to recognize governmental immunity in the absence of legislative action: "[S]overeign immunity ... is a matter dealt with by statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine." In 1977, the legislature amended AS 09.65.070 to preclude municipal liability in actions based on the inspection of private property for violations of statutes, regulations and ordinances, or for hazards to health or safety. Ch. 37, § 3, SLA 1977. 4
Wilson challenges the validity of AS 09.65.070(d)(1) under three provisions of the Alaska Constitution. First, he contends that the statute violates article I, section 15, which provides in relevant part that "no law making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be passed." This contention is meritless. Article I, section 15, does not bar the legislature from granting to municipalities all rights and immunities that are not also held by private entities; otherwise, municipalities would lose their power to govern. Therefore, AS 09.65.070(d)(1) does not violate article I, section 15.
Second, Wilson asserts that AS 09.65.070(d)(1) conflicts with article II, section 21, which provides: "The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against the State." He contends that the framers of the constitution intended that section 21 empower the legislature only to establish the means for asserting claims against the state, not to bar such claims entirely. We need not reach the issue of whether the legislature lacks the power to bar claims against the state under section 21 because AS 09.65.070(d)(1) only bars certain claims against municipalities. Section 21 expressly refers only to "suits against the State," it does not address "suits against municipalities." If the framers had meant to include municipalities, they could have referred, for example, to "suits against governmental entities." As we stated in State v. Debenham Electric Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Alaska 1980), "Unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage." See also AS 01.10.040; 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01, at 48-49 (4th ed. 1973). In the absence of any indication that section 21 applies to municipalities, we decline to expand the express application of this provision. Therefore, AS 09.65.070(d)(1) does not violate article II, section 21.
Last, Wilson contends that AS 09.65.070(d)(1) infringes upon his right to equal protection under article I, section 1, because it in effect creates impermissible classifications between tortfeasors and also between persons injured by tortfeasors. If an individual sustains an injury as a result of a municipality's negligence in performing a safety inspection, he or she cannot maintain an action against the municipality. If, on the other hand, the individual is injured as a result of a negligent state or private safety inspection, he or she can maintain an action against the state or private inspector. Thus, the statute divides tortfeasors into two classifications: state and private tortfeasors, who are liable for negligent safety inspections, and municipal tortfeasors, who are not liable for identical conduct. The statute also has the effect of dividing injured persons into two classes: persons injured as a result of state or private safety inspections, who can recover for the tortfeasor's negligence, and persons injured as a result of municipal safety inspections, who cannot recover for similar negligence.
In order for a classification to be valid under Alaska's equal protection test, it must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must bear a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental objective. Depending on the importance of the individual's interest involved, a greater or lesser burden will be placed on the state to show this fair and substantial relationship. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). To determine the proper level of scrutiny, therefore, the nature of the individual's interest must first be examined.
The interest in suing a particular party, in this case a governmental entity, is not fundamental. See, e.g., Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 511, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611, 66 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (). On the other hand, the interest in redressing wrongs through the judicial process is significant. AS 09.65.070(d)(1), however, does not completely bar access to the courts. Whenever harm is caused by a municipality's failure to inspect, discover or abate a health or safety violation, it is also caused by the private party who violated the health or safety regulation. Therefore, although AS 09.65.070(d)(1) prevents recovery from the municipality, it does not prevent the injured person from seeking recovery from the principal tortfeasor. It may often be easier to recover from the municipality than from the concurrent tortfeasor; however, the interest in recovering from a "deep pocket" is only economic. Economic interests have traditionally been afforded minimal protection under equal protection analyses. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 516-17 (1976); State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1193-1194. We thus conclude that Wilson's interest is of limited constitutional importance; accordingly, although the relationship between the classification and the legitimate governmental objective must be fair and substantial, a less than perfect fit between the means and ends will be tolerated.
Anchorage identifies several objectives served by the municipal immunity statute, which fall into two general categories: (1) alleviation of the administrative and financial burdens of liability; and (2) encouragement of safety inspection at the local level.
The first objective proferred by Anchorage is the need for municipalities to conserve their financial resources and to conduct safety inspections "without hindrance or intimidation caused by burdensome litigation." The validity of this objective is acknowledged in a dissenting opinion in Adams To assure total compliance [with fire, health and safety laws] would require an enormous expenditure of time and money by the government....
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