Wilson v. Patton, 87

• Decision Date: 28 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87,87
• Citation: 49 Ohio App.3d 150,551 N.E.2d 625
• Parties: WILSON et al., Appellants, v. PATTON, Appellee. CA 18.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 150

49 Ohio App.3d 150

551 N.E.2d 625

WILSON et al., Appellants, v. PATTON, Appellee.

No. 87 CA 18.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Hocking County.

June 28, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. State correctional facilities are, in general, exempt from the provisions of R.C. Chapter 1347, the Ohio Privacy Act. (R.C. 1347.04[A][d], applied.)

2. In the absence of a grant of exclusive jurisdiction, state courts have concurrent authority to adjudicate federally created causes of action. Thus, state courts have jurisdiction to hear actions brought pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.

3. The right to privacy must be limited to those rights which are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," which most often involve matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.

4. A claim by an inmate to the "right of nondisclosure" of confidential prison medical records without appropriate authorization states a cause of action for invasion of privacy. (R.C. 102.03[B], Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code, and Civ.R. 12[B], construed.)

5. In passing on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, only statements contained in the pleadings can be considered and matters outside the pleadings are only to be considered if the court converts a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion into a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment.

Pearly L. Wilson and Everett Hunt, Jr., pro se.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Frederick C. Schoch, for appellee.

STEPHENSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion of Jerry Patton, defendant below and appellee herein to dismiss the complaint and the amendment to the complaint of Pearly L. Wilson and Everett Hunt, Jr., plaintiffs below and appellants herein, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Appellants assign the following errors:

I. "Did the trial court err to [the] prejudice of plaintiffs when it granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?"

II. "The trial court erred to [the] prejudice [of] the plaintiffs-appellants when it dismissed the action although it appears beyond doubt that complainants can prove [a] set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to the relief prayed for."

On May 22, 1987, appellants, inmates at Hocking Correctional Facility, filed a pro se complaint which averred in pertinent part as follows. On or about March 16, 1987, appellee, a nurse and health care administrator at Hocking Correctional Facility, was induced to invade the privacy of appellants by Ohio Assistant Attorney General Frederick C. Schoch in violation of appellants' constitutional right to privacy, R.C. Chapter 1347, and R.C. 102.03(B). On March 16, 1987, appellee executed under oath an affidavit for Assistant Attorney General Schoch which disclosed privileged information from appellants' medical files and records, which appellants did not divulge to either appellee or Schoch and which was not waived in order that it could be divulged to any source. Appellee's disclosure and use of such confidential information was without appropriate authorization. As a result of the intentional acts of appellee and Assistant Attorney General Schoch, appellants suffered psychological problems of fear, stress, sleeplessness, anxiety, depressed identity, and confusion. Appellants both prayed for $750,000 in damages.

On June 23, 1987, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Civ.R. 12(B)(1). Appellee's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss stated that the affidavits executed by appellee which appellants' complaint referred to were filed in a separate lawsuit.

On July 2, 1987, appellant Pearly L. Wilson filed an amendment to the previously filed complaint wherein he averred that appellee had again violated his constitutional right to privacy as well as his rights pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1347 and R.C. 102.03(B) by disclosing more confidential information without appropriate authorization on June 8 and June 17, 1987. On July 15, 1987, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellant Pearly L. Wilson's amendment to the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Attached to appellee's motion to dismiss the amendment to the complaint was a copy of appellant Pearly L. Wilson's motion to strike certain documents in a federal case styled as Pearly Wilson v. Dr. Tenoglia (S.D.Ohio 1987), No. C2-83-2367, unreported, wherein appellant Pearly L. Wilson moved to strike affidavits executed by appellee on June 8 and June 17, 1987 on the asserted basis that the affidavits did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and (g).

On July 15, 1987, appellee filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. Attached to such memorandum was a copy of appellants' motion to strike certain documents in Pearly Wilson v. Richard P. Seiter (S.D.Ohio 1987), No. C2-86-1046, unreported, wherein apppellants moved to strike an affidavit executed by appellee partly on the basis that the information contained in the affidavit was privileged and confidential.

On July 27, 1987, appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching several affidavits and exhibits. On August 6, 1987, the trial court entered judgment granting appellee's motions to dismiss the complaint and the amendment to the complaint.

Appellants' first assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and appellants' second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed the action although it appeared beyond doubt that they could prove a set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to the relief prayed for. In that appellants' assignments of error raise similar issues of law and fact, they will be considered jointly.

Appellee argues that the trial court correctly dismissed appellants' complaint and amendment to the complaint in that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether appellee was protected by the immunity statute, appellants failed to allege a claim under either state statutory or constitutional law, appellants waived their right to privacy when they filed prior federal lawsuits, and such prior federal lawsuits collaterally estopped appellants from raising the claims herein.

With respect to whether the trial court properly dismissed appellants' complaint and amendment to the complaint on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has been held that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred upon the court by agreement of the parties, may not be waived, and is the basis for mandatory sua sponte dismissal. * * * " State, ex rel. Lawrence Development Co., v. Weir (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 96, 11 OBR 148, 463 N.E.2d 398, paragraph two of the syllabus.

R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter * * *."

The sovereign immunity rule in Ohio is based upon the constitutional provision stating that suits may be brought against the state in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by law. Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution. In R.C. 2743.02, the legislature has waived the state's immunity from liability and consented to be sued in the Court of Claims. Moss v. Coleman (1982), 5 Ohio App.3d 177, 177-178, 5 OBR 360, 361, 450 N.E.2d 725, 726; McIntosh v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 116, 118, 24 OBR 187, 189, 493 N.E.2d 321, 323. "A major purpose of the Court of Claims Act was to centralize the filing and adjudication of all claims against the state [, and] [t]he Court of Claims was created to become the sole trial-level adjudicator of claims against the state * * *." Friedman v. Johnson (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 85, 87, 18 OBR 122, 124, 480 N.E.2d 82, 84.

Appellee argues that the court of common pleas was without jurisdiction to proceed in an action brought against a state employee absent a prior determination by the Court of Claims that the state official acted manifestly outside the scope of his employment, or acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless man- 3. Appellee's argument is based upon the contention that "the court" referred to in R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) is the Court of Claims, thereby divesting other courts of jurisdiction until the Court of Claims makes the applicable determination. See McIntosh, supra, 24 Ohio App.3d at 120, 24 OBR at 190-191, 493 N.E.2d at 324-325; Smith v. Stempel (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 36, 19 O.O.3d 23, 414 N.E.2d 445. This argument has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cooperman v. Univ. Surgical Assoc., Inc. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 191, 513 N.E.2d 288, where it held as follows in the second paragraph of the syllabus:

"A court of common pleas does not lack jurisdiction over an action against state officers or employees merely because the Court of Claims has not first determined that the act or omission, which is the subject of the action, was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's office or employment, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, unless the aggrieved...