Wilson v. Ribbens
| Decision Date | 07 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1632.,02-1632. |
| Citation | 678 N.W.2d 417 |
| Parties | Shannan WILSON, Appellant, v. Michael RIBBENS, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Brian J. Muench, and Jerald L. Rauterkus of Erickson & Sederstrom, Omaha, for appellant.
Daniel B. Shuck of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra & Prahl, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee. STREIT, Justice.
The judicial system has a keen interest in the prompt and effective administration of justice. In this case, justice was neither prompt nor effective. The plaintiff filed a petition alleging the defendant's negligence caused her injuries in a car accident, but waited thirteen months to serve him. The plaintiff contends she did not serve the defendant because her attorney entered into an agreement with the defendant's insurance adjuster to hold off service until a settlement could be reached. Absent a scheduling order, her petition gathered dust in the courthouse long after the statutory deadline for service passed.
After settlement negotiations apparently evaporated, service was made and the defendant's attorney moved to dismiss for failure to effect timely service. The district court dismissed. The statute of limitations has passed.
We find the district court erred in failing to correctly recognize that an agreement not to effect timely service may constitute "good cause" for failing to effect service within the ninety-day period required by the rules of civil procedure. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We review a motion to dismiss for failure to effect timely service of process for the correction of errors at law. Carroll v. Martir, 610 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Iowa 2000); Henry v. Shober, 566 N.W.2d 190, 191 (Iowa 1997). Where the district court makes findings of fact, those findings are binding upon us so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Carroll, 610 N.W.2d at 857. We are not, however, bound by the district court's legal conclusions or application thereof. Id.
Motions to dismiss are usually limited to the pleadings, and on such a motion a court generally ought not consider matters outside the pleadings. Id. at 856 (citing Estate of Dyer v. Krug, 533 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1995)). Usually, "[s]ummary judgment is the appropriate remedy when parties wish to rely on facts outside the pleadings." Id.
In a limited number of circumstances, however, resort to matters outside the pleadings is permissible on a motion to dismiss. Id. As we explained in Carroll, matters outside the pleadings may be considered when
(1) those facts arise after the plaintiff has filed the petition, (2) the parties do not dispute those facts, and (3) the issues in the motion to dismiss do not concern the adequacy of the petition to state a claim for relief.
Id. Although the record before us contains an affidavit and two letters which the plaintiff filed in support of her resistance to the motion to dismiss, our analysis is hampered by the dearth of factual findings in the record: endemic in a ruling on a motion to dismiss in this context, the defendant has not filed an answer, and the district court's "Statement of the Facts" is mostly a summary of the plaintiff's claims.
On July 30, 2001, Shannan Wilson filed a lawsuit in the district court for Sioux County, Iowa, alleging she suffered injuries on August 1, 1999, in a car accident as result of Michael Ribbens' negligence. Shortly before filing the lawsuit, Wilson's attorney, Jerald Rauterkus, sent a letter to Jim Edwards, a claims adjuster for Allied Insurance. On July 27, 2001, Rauterkus wrote:
Dear Mr. Edwards:
Enclosed is a copy of the lawsuit that was filed on behalf of Ms. Wilson.
Pursuant to our agreement, I will not have your insured served with this suit; rather, we will delay serving process in the hopes that we can reach a settlement in this matter.
Approximately ten days later, Edwards responded in a letter:
In an affidavit later filed with the district court, Rauterkus swore Edwards made inquiries every sixty to ninety days; in turn, Rauterkus provided Edwards with updated medical information when it was available. A final medical report was finished on May 29, 2002, and Rauterkus forwarded a copy to Edwards. Settlement negotiations broke down, however, and Rauterkus served Ribbens on July 22, 2002.
Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(6) (2002),1 on July 25, 2002, Ribbens' attorney moved to dismiss for failure to serve in a timely manner. The motion pointed out Wilson had not served Ribbens within ninety days, as required by the rule.
Wilson alleged there was "good cause" for the delay, and the district court ought not dismiss the case. Wilson also claimed the doctrine of promissory estoppel prohibited Ribbens from seeking a dismissal for lack of timely service. To buttress these arguments, in an affidavit Wilson's counsel stated Edwards had represented he had the authority to settle on Ribbens' behalf, and that Edwards had previously settled Wilson's husband's claim arising out of the same car accident.
The district court dismissed. The court, relying upon our decision in Henry v. Shober, 566 N.W.2d 190 (Iowa 1997), held there was no good cause for the delay. The court also raised, sua sponte, another issue: whether rule 1.302 gives the court discretion to extend the timeframe for process even absent good cause. In spite of the fact other courts have exercised discretion under similarly-worded rules absent good cause, the district court refused to do so because we had not yet determined whether our rule permitted it. See generally 4B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1137, at 365 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]. The district court did not rule on Wilson's estoppel argument.
On appeal, Wilson again asserts there was good cause for her delay in service. Taking a cue from the district court, Wilson also contends that, even if we should decide there was not good cause for the delay in service, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302 gives the court discretion to grant an extension. Wilson claims the court erred because it failed to exercise this discretion. Ribbens, in turn, maintains Wilson should not be allowed to raise the discretion issue because principles of error preservation forbid an appellate court from entertaining an argument not raised in the district court. In the alternative, Ribbens argues the court does not have such discretion.
Wilson also renews her claim Ribbens is estopped from seeking dismissal because of the parties' agreement. On appeal, however, Wilson's estoppel argument has evolved to incorporate two separate analyses: Wilson now alleges both promissory and equitable estoppel, although Wilson's equitable estoppel argument was not presented to the trial court.
A civil action is commenced when a petition is filed in the district court. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.301(1) (2002). The plaintiff must also serve the defendant with notice the action was filed. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302. "An original notice is the formal writing, issued by authority of law, for the purpose of bringing defendants into court to answer plaintiff's demands in a civil action." Jacobson v. Leap, 249 Iowa 1036, 1040, 88 N.W.2d 919, 921 (1958). Our rules of civil procedure expressly require plaintiffs to effect service within ninety days after the filing of the petition, or risk dismissal. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.302; see Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 541 (Iowa 2002)
(). Iowa's service rule reads as follows:
If service of the original notice is not made upon the defendant ... within 90 days after filing the petition, the court... shall dismiss the action without prejudice... or direct an alternate time or manner of service. If the party filing the papers shows good cause for the failure of service, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
We begin our analysis with the recognition the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure "are to be liberally construed for the purpose of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits...." Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 772, 779, 48 N.W.2d 266, 270 (1951).
We cannot, however, ignore a clear statutory requirement to achieve what appears to be the best result in a particular case. Such action almost always makes bad law....
Krebs v. Town of Manson, 256 Iowa 957, 963, 129 N.W.2d 744, 748 (1964) (quoting Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199, 1208, 110 N.W.2d 241, 246 (1961)). The...
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