Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 1970
• Citation: 264 A.2d 510
• Parties: Aubrey WILSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 510

264 A.2d 510

Aubrey WILSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. The STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

March 9, 1970.

Sheldon N. Sandler, Wilmington, for appellant.

Francis A. Reardon, State Prosecutor, Wilmington, for appellee.

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice:

This case presents constitutional questions rising out of the conviction of defendant for possession of a Molotov cocktail ^* in violation of 11 Del.C. § 360. The statute involved reads:

' § 360. Molotov cocktails or other explosive devices prohibited

'(a) Whoever manufactures, transfers, uses, possesses or transports any Molotov Cocktail or any other device, instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion with intent to cause bodily or physical harm shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 3 years nor more than 10 years.

'(b) Any person over 16 years old who violates the provisions of this section shall be prosecuted as an adult.

'(c) In any prosecution under this section, it is prima facie evidence of intent to cause bodily or physical harm if the accused had possession of the device prescribed by this section in a public place.'

Defendant raises three grounds for appeal:

Whether 11 Del.C. § 360, (1) is so vague and indefinite as to violate due process of law; (2) raises a presumption in subparagraph (c) which deprives defendant of due process of law and violates his privilege against self-incrimination; (3) violates Art. 2, Del.Const., § 16, Del.C.Ann. by including in the body of the statute subjects not expressed in the title.

Before considering these contentions, we must observe that defendant has stated his grounds in terms too sweepingly broad. The constitutionality of a statute is considered in the light of the standing of the party who seeks to raise the question and of its particular application. It is an established principle of law that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a statute if he is not harmfully affected by the particular feature of the statute alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586.

With this fundamental in mind, we consider defendant's claims.

Defendant asserts that the phrase 'any device, instrument, or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion' is too vague to inform defendant what type of devices are prohibited by the statute. It is clear that this defendant lacks standing to attack this portion of the Act. He was charged with possession of a Molotov cocktail, and there is no vagueness as to that term which has dictionary meaning.

The test which must be applied to defendant's contention concerning the presumption created by subparagraph (c) of § 360 has recently been spelled out by the United States Supreme Court. In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L.Ed.2d 57, it was held:

'* * * a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact How does § 360 fare when this standard is applied to the facts of this case?

is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. And in the judicial assessment the congressional determination favoring the particular presumption must, of course, weigh heavily.'

The presumption, quoted above, authorizes the jury to infer from defendant's possession of a Molotov cocktail in a public place the necessary element of 'intent to cause bodily or physical harm.' We think it is important that a Molotov cocktail, as was discussed previously, is defined as an 'incendiary bomb'. We hold that it can be said with 'substantial assurance' that a person who possesses such a device in a public place, 'more likely than not', has the intent to cause bodily or physical harm.

Finally, we consider defendant's claim that 11 Del.C. § 360 violates Art. 2, Del.Const., § 16 by including material in subparagraphs (b) and (c) which are not expressed in the title. The provision of Art. 2, Del.Const., § 16 here invoked is, in pertinent part:

'No bill * * * shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title.'

This court has often held that the title of an act need not be an index of the...