Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 13 January 1897
• Citation: 38 S.W. 624
• Parties: WILSON v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

38 S.W. 624

WILSON v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

January 13, 1897.

On rehearing.

For former opinion, see 35 S. W. 390.

HENDERSON, J.

This case was reversed at the Austin term, 1896, and it now comes before us on motion for rehearing on the part of the state. The motion for a rehearing brings in question the constitutionality of the law of the Twenty-Fourth legislature, changing the time of holding the district court in the Forty-Sixth judicial district; it being contended that the law of 1895, if given effect from the date of its approval, which was April 1, 1895, would be violative of section 7, art. 5, of the constitution of the state of Texas. That part of said section claimed to be violated by the act in question reads as follows: "He [the district judge] shall hold the regular terms of his court at the county seat of each county in his district, at least twice each year, in such manner as may be prescribed by law." This is a nice question, and, if it was one of first impression, would be fraught with some difficulty of construction; but a similar clause in a prior constitution was construed by the supreme court of this state in Womack v. Womack, 17 Tex. 1, and it was there held, if a law was passed by the legislature which, if given immediate effect, as provided by the act, would deprive a county of its constitutional two terms during the year, the new law so changing the holding of courts would be postponed, and not given effect until such time as the constitutional two terms during the year could be held. This was followed by our court of appeals in Graves v. State, 6 Tex. App. 228, and in Ex parte Murphy, 27 Tex. App. 492, 11 S. W. 487. So that this question may be considered as settled in this state.

By looking to the law of 1892, which, prior to the act of 1895, regulated the terms of holding court in the various counties composing the Forty-Sixth judicial district, we see that the act authorized one of the terms of the district court of Greer county to be held on the eighth Monday after the first Monday in February, which, in the year 1895, would be on the 1st day of April. By reference to the law of 1895, we observe that this act requires a term of the district court in said district to be held in the county of Collingsworth on the eighth Monday after the first Monday in February, which, as above stated, would fall on the 1st day of April in the year 1895. The new law provided that the spring term of the district court of Greer county should be holden on the sixth Monday after the first Monday in February, which would fall on the 18th of March in the year 1895. Now, this date for holding the spring term in Greer county had already passed when the new law took effect, and no court had hitherto been holden in Greer county for the spring term of 1895. The date for holding the same, as above stated, fell on the 1st day of April, the very day when the new law required court to be holden in Collingsworth county. So, to give effect to the new law on the 1st...