Womack v. Womack

• Decision Date: 01 January 1856
• Citation: 17 Tex. 1
• Parties: FRANKLIN M. WOMACK v. JOHN F. WOMACK.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

17 Tex. 1

FRANKLIN M. WOMACK

v.JOHN F. WOMACK.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1856.

Where an act of the legislature reorganizing two judicial districts was passed on the 18th of December, 1855, to take effect immediately, it was held that it did not take effect immediately so as to affect a term of court which was held under the former law, commencing on the 24th day of December, 1855.

This case distinguished from Doss v. Waggoner, 3 Tex. 515.

Error from Harrison. Tried before the Hon. W. W. Morris.

The court commenced in Harrison under the former law, on the 24th December, 1855, at which term the judgment in this case was rendered. The act of December 18, 1855, was entitled “an act to change the sixth and ninth judicial districts of the state of Texas, and to define the time of holding courts therein.” On the 14th of January, 1856, a supplemental act was passed, declaring that the original act should not be so construed as to prevent the judge from holding the fall terms of the district court for 1855 in the counties of Panola and Harrison, as required by law, as it aforetime was.

N. H. Wilson, for defendant in error, cited Const. art. 4, sec. 6; Conner v. City of New York, 2 Sandf. Sup. Ct. 355; Cannon v. Vaughan, 12 Tex. 402. As to the effect of the supplemental act, Matter of Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Barr, 204;Hess and others v. Weets, 4 S. & R. 356; Blacking v. Farmers' Bank, 17 S. & R. 64;Andrews v. Russel, 7 Blackf. 474;Beach v. Woodhull, Pet. C. C. 2; Wilkinson v. Leland et al. 2 Pet. 627;Leland v. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294; 1 Kent, seventh ed. top pages 501, 502 and 503, Dwarris, 628; McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Geo. 213; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97;Tate and Wife v. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35;Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472;Watson et al. v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 109;Simmons v. Hanover, 23 Pick. 188.

LIPSCOMB, J.

The only question presented for the consideration of the court in this case is, whether the court below, in which the judgment was rendered, was held at a time authorized by law for holding the same. By the first section of an act of the legislature, approved 18th December, 1855, the counties of Wood, Upshur, Harrison and Rusk compose the sixth judicial district. The second section directs that the courts shall commence in the county of Wood on the first Monday in February and August, and be held in Harrison on the fourth Monday thereafter. The fifth section is in the following words, i. e.: “All process returnable to, and cases triable at, the regular terms of the district courts of the sixth and ninth judicial districts, shall be returnable at the regular terms thereof respectively, as herein provided.” And by the last section, all laws and parts of laws coming in conflict with the provisions of this act are repealed. This statute is made to take effect from its passage.

In construing this act, it is important to inquire what was the main and primary object the legislature had in view in its enactment. Taking in view the provision in our constitution requiring the district court to be held twice a year in each county, it seems to me manifest that the intention and main and primary object in view was prospective, and to fix the time when the courts were to be held in each of the counties, commencing in the year succeeding this act; that is to say, the year eighteen hundred and fifty-six. This is sufficiently provided for, and the first term for the year eighteen hundred and fifty-six is specially designated without in any degree conflicting with the time for holding the second and last term in the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five. This I believe to be a fair construction of...