Wilson v. State
Decision Date | 20 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 73747.,73747. |
Citation | 71 S.W.3d 346 |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Geno Capoletti WILSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
Connie B. Williams, Houston, for appellant.
Julie Klibert, Assistant State's Attorney, Houston, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.
Appellant was convicted in December 1999 of capital murder. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1994). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071 § 2(g).1 Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises three points of error but does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at either stage of trial. Thus, only those facts essential to answer appellant's points will be set out. We affirm.
In all of his points of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask a defense punishment witness, over objection, "did you know" questions about specific criminal acts which had not been proven before the jury. Appellant contends this violated his right to confront the witnesses against him as granted by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant also asserts that this error affected his substantial rights. In particular, appellant complains that the error affected his "substantial right to confront the witnesses against him" and "the substantial right to have the State ... meet its burden of proof on future dangerousness."
The record reveals that during the punishment phase of trial, appellant called Reverend Rogers Delaney to testify about his interactions with appellant and about appellant's character in general. On cross-examination, the prosecutor established that Delaney had been personally involved in appellant's life and had attempted to ensure that appellant learn right from wrong and become a productive member of society. The prosecutor then asked Delaney a series of questions designed to determine his familiarity with appellant's past violent behavior.2 Delaney responded that he was not aware of any of the incidents to which the prosecutor referred. Appellant did not object to any of these questions.
The prosecutor next asked Delaney if he knew that appellant had driven a stolen car to the scene where he committed the capital murder. After Delaney answered this question and the prosecutor began asking a new question, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and objected:
The trial court overruled the objection.
On re-cross, the prosecutor asked Delaney a number of questions designed to determine his familiarity with appellant's behavior while in jail. Specifically, the prosecutor asked Delaney whether he knew that while in jail, appellant had been charged with extortion in November of 1998. Appellant objected to this question:
The prosecutor resumed questioning Delaney regarding additional incidents of extortion for which appellant was charged with while he was in jail. Appellant once again objected:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] At this point I think we're badgering the witness. He's already testified that he has no knowledge about anything other than his limited involvement and the scope of his—I think the State at this time is badgering this man. And he doesn't deserve that.
The trial court overruled appellant's objection. Without further objections, the prosecutor finished asking Delaney a series of "did you know" questions concerning more charges that had been filed against appellant while he was in jail.
Appellant has failed to preserve error for appellate review. To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a specific objection and obtain a ruling on the objection. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). In addition, the objection must be made at the earliest possible opportunity. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 870, 112 S.Ct. 202, 116 L.Ed.2d 162 (1991). Finally, the point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Appellant first complains of the "did you know" question posed by the prosecutor about the stolen vehicle. At trial, appellant objected on the grounds that no evidence had been introduced to support the facts asserted by the prosecutor. Not only did appellant fail to make a timely objection, but the objection raised on appeal differs from that which was lodged at trial. As such, appellant failed to preserve error regarding this question.
Appellant likewise failed to make the proper objections to the other "did you know" questions regarding the specific acts allegedly committed by appellant while he was in jail. Appellant first objected on the ground that the question on re-cross was outside the scope of the redirect and then because he felt the prosecutor was badgering the witness. At no time did appellant object on the grounds he now raises on appeal.
Even if appellant had preserved error, his claim would be without merit. A witness who testifies to a defendant's good character may be cross-examined to test the witness's awareness of relevant "specific instances of conduct." Drone v. State, 906 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tex.App.Austin 1995, pet. ref'd); Tex.R. Evid. 405(a).3 Character may be proved by either opinion or reputation testimony. While reputation witnesses are generally asked "have you heard" questions, opinion witnesses are asked "did you know" questions.4 See Reynolds v. State, 848 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). In the present case, appellant called Delaney to testify as a character witness. On direct examination, Delaney testified that he was surprised to learn that appellant had just been convicted of capital murder and had a prior criminal history. Moreover, he testified that during the times that he was with appellant, appellant exhibited exceptional behavior. In addition, on re-direct, when asked by appellant's attorney whether in spite of all the things he was asked by the State during cross-examination regarding specific instances of appellant's conduct appellant was still the kind of person with whom he wished to associate, he replied, "Geno is far above in my mind what I have heard going on here."
Because Delaney testified as to his opinion of appellant, the State was entitled to test his knowledge about specific instances of conduct involving appellant by asking a series of "did you know questions." See id. Appellant claims, however, that it was improper for the trial court to allow the State to ask Delaney "did you know" questions about specific criminal acts over objection since the acts had not been proven before the jury.
The right of a party to cross-examine a character witness on specific instances of conduct is subject to certain limitations. See Lancaster v. State, 754 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.App.Dallas 1988, pet ref'd). First, the incidents inquired about must be relevant to the character traits at issue. Id. Second, the alleged bad act must have a basis in fact. Id. Before the questions are asked, the foundation for inquiring into the specific instances of conduct should be laid outside the jury's presence so that the judge will have an...
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