Wilson v. Thomas (In re Thomas)

• Citation: 110 So.3d 363
• Decision Date: 26 October 2012
• Docket Number: 1111294.
• Parties: Ex parte Kim THOMAS et al. (In re Albert Wilson et al. v. Kim Thomas et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

110 So.3d 363

Ex parte Kim THOMAS et al.(In re Albert Wilson et al.

v.Kim Thomas et al.).

1111294.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 26, 2012.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and John C. Neiman, Jr., deputy atty. gen., and Anne Adams Hill, gen. counsel, and Scott L. Rouse, asst. atty. gen., Legal Division, Alabama Department of Corrections, for petitioners.

Kimberly R. Dodson, Birmingham, for respondents.

STUART, Justice.

The Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), the Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority (“ACIFA”), and Kim Thomas, in his official capacities as the commissioner of ADOC and as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its May 17, 2012, order denying their motion seeking a partial summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. We grant the petition as it relates to ADOC and Thomas in his capacity as commissioner and deny it as it relates to ACIFA and Thomas in his capacity as vice president.

I.

On August 17, 2010, Albert Wilson, Rufus Barnes, Joseph Danzey, Bryan Gavins, and Donald Simmons, all of whom are employed by ADOC as correctional officers (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the correctional officers”), sued ADOC and its then commissioner Richard Allen in the Barbour Circuit Court, alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees.

On September 22, 2010, ADOC and Allen moved the trial court to dismiss the correctional officers' claims for money damages, arguing that ADOC and Allen were entitled to State immunity under Article I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901. Before the trial court ruled on that motion, however, the correctional officers filed an amended complaint adding ACIFA as a defendant and asserting claims against Allen in his capacity as vice president of ACIFA as well. On December 21, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying ADOC and Allen's September 22 motion to dismiss, without stating its rationale.

Thereafter, ADOC, ACIFA, and Allen filed an answer to the correctional officers' amended complaint. On March 3, 2011, ADOC, ACIFA, and Thomas, who succeeded Allen as commissioner of ADOC and vice president of ACIFA on January 17, 2011,¹ moved the trial court to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to § 6–3–9, Ala.Code 1975, which provides that “if, on the trial of any case in any county, it is suggested by the Board of Corrections or is otherwise shown that the state is interested on account of the prison system, such case must be transferred to the proper court of Montgomery County.” See also Ex parte Daniels, 941 So.2d 251, 258 (Ala.2006) (holding that the State does not waive its right to transfer a case to Montgomery County pursuant to § 6–3–9 even if venue is not challenged within the time prescribed by Rule 12(h)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.). On or about May 24, 2011, the Barbour Circuit Court granted the motion, and the case was transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court.

The trial court thereafter approved class certification for the action, and, on April 17, 2012, ADOC, ACIFA, and Thomas moved the trial court to enter a partial summary judgment in their favor, arguing that the correctional officers' claims seeking money damages from ADOC were barred by the doctrine of State immunity and that the claims against ACIFA had no factual or legal basis. The correctional officers filed a response, arguing that the summary-judgment motion was without merit and that, in any event, the Barbour Circuit Court had already rejected the State-immunity argument before the case was transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court. On May 17, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment motion and, later that day, entered an order denying the motion without stating its rationale. ADOC, ACIFA, and Thomas now petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying their summary-judgment motion and to enter an order granting the same.

II.

“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and will be issued ‘ “only when there is: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought, (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so, (3) the lack of another adequate remedy, and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’ Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 847, 850 (Ala.2000) (quoting Ex parte Horton, 711 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala.1998)). When we consider a mandamus petition, the scope of our review is to determine whether the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion. Ex parte Tegner, 682 So.2d 396 (Ala.1996).”

State v. Bui, 888 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Ala.2004). We further note this Court's general rule that we will not review the denial of a motion for a summary judgment on a petition for the writ of mandamus because an adequate remedy exists by way of an appeal. Ex parte Par Pharm., Inc., 58 So.3d 767, 775–76 (Ala.2010). However, an exception to that general rule is “that the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.” Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.2000) (citing Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996)). In the instant case, ADOC and Thomas moved for a summary judgment on the claims for money damages asserted against ADOC and Thomas in his capacity as commissioner of ADOC on State-immunity grounds; thus, review of the trial court's denial of their motion seeking a summary judgment on those claims is available by a petition for a writ of mandamus.

However, ACIFA and Thomas have not argued that they are entitled to State immunity on the claims asserted against ACIFA and against Thomas in his capacity as vice president of ACIFA; rather, they argue that they are entitled to a summary judgment because “they have no connection whatsoever to the [correctional officers'] claims” because ACIFA has no role in personnel or payroll matters affecting ADOC employees. They assert that ACIFA exists solely to facilitate the finance and acquisition of land, institutions, and facilities for ADOC, and they argue that the lack of any connection between the correctional officers' claims and ACIFA effectively renders those claims nonjusticiable; therefore, review of the trial court's denial of their summary-judgment motion on a petition for the writ of mandamus is available because, they argue, the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction has been raised. See University of South Alabama Med. Ctr. v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 89 So.3d 735, 740–41 (Ala.2011) (stating that justiciability is jurisdictional), and Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 805 (Ala.2000) (holding that the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus).

We disagree, however, that a justiciability issue has been raised. “ ‘Concepts of justiciability have been developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action .... The central concepts often are elaborated into more specific categories of justiciability—advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions.’ ” Black's Law Dictionary 943–44 (9th ed.2009) (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3529, at 278–79 (2d ed.1984)). Indeed, this Court has recognized the above-cited specific categories of justiciability in previous cases. See, e.g., University of South Alabama Med. Ctr., 89 So.3d at 741–42 (dismissing appeal where there was no actual controversy between parties whose legal interests were adverse and where appeal sought merely an advisory opinion); Fenn v. Ozark City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 9 So.3d 484, 486 (Ala.2008) (“ ‘Chief among these elements [composing the concept of justiciability] is the requirement that a plaintiff have “standing to invoke the power of the court in his behalf.” Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala.1990).’ ” (quoting Ex parte State ex rel. James, 711 So.2d 952, 960 (Ala.1998))); Ex parte Riley, 11 So.3d 801, 806 (Ala.2008) (“Alabama cases often address ripeness in the context of whether a case is justiciable, or appropriate for judicial review.”); Town of Elmore v. Town of Coosada, 957 So.2d 1096, 1100 (Ala.2006) (“Because mootness goes to justiciability, this Court will not consider the merits of a claim that is moot.”); and Birmingham–Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So.2d 204, 221 (Ala.2005) (declining to consider “nonjusticiable political question” involving the legislature's voting procedures).

In this case, however, ACIFA and Thomas are essentially arguing that the correctional officers' claims against ACIFA have no basis because, they claim, ACIFA has nothing to do with the manner in which correctional officers are compensated or the funds with which they are compensated. This argument goes to the merits of the correctional officers' claims, and, regardless of whatever merit the argument might have, it does not raise a justiciability issue. The trial court's denial of the motion for a summary judgment as to ACIFA and Thomas in his capacity as vice president of ACIFA is accordingly not subject to mandamus review. See Ex parte Alabama State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 11 So.3d 221, 226–27 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (declining to address petitioners' argument that they were entitled to a writ of mandamus on the ground that the...