Ex Parte Daniels

• Decision Date: 21 April 2006
• Docket Number: 1040771.
• Parties: Ex parte Howard DANIELS and Ronald Sellers. (In re Donna Walker, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Julius Finley, Jr., deceased v. Howard Daniels and Ronald Sellers, individually and in their capacities as warden and assistant warden of the Camden Community Based Facility).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

941 So.2d 251

Ex parte Howard DANIELS and Ronald Sellers (In re Donna Walker, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Julius Finley, Jr., deceased v. Howard Daniels and Ronald Sellers, individually and in their capacities as warden and assistant warden of the Camden Community Based Facility).

1040771.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 21, 2006.

Kim T. Thomas, gen. counsel and deputy atty. gen., and Greg Biggs, asst. gen. counsel, and asst. atty. gen., Alabama Department of Corrections, for petitioners.

T. Blake Liveoak of Collins, Liveoak & Boyles, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.

SMITH, Justice.

Howard Daniels and Ronald Sellers, the warden and assistant warden, respectively, of the Camden Community Based Facility, petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to transfer the underlying action pending in the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. We grant the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

Julius Finley, Jr., was an inmate at the Camden Community Based Facility, a work-release facility in Wilcox County operated by the Alabama Department of Corrections. While Finley was an inmate, Daniels was the warden of the facility, and Sellers was the assistant warden.

On May 2, 2002, Finley lost consciousness. He was allegedly placed in his bed at the facility, and, when he did not later regain consciousness, he was transported to Atmore Community Hospital on May 3, 2002. Finley died the next day.

In August 2003, Donna Walker, Finley's daughter and the personal representative of his estate, sued the Camden Community Based Facility; Wilcox County; and Daniels and Sellers, individually and in their official capacities, in the circuit court in Talladega County, where she resided.¹ The action sought damages for negligence, negligent supervision and training, and the denial of medical attention in violation of Finley's civil rights.

In a motion dated September 9, 2003, Wilcox County moved the Talladega Circuit Court to dismiss it from the case or to transfer the action to Wilcox County, the county in which the Camden Community Based Facility is located. Three days later, the Talladega Circuit Court transferred the case to the Wilcox Circuit Court.

On November 25, 2003, the Camden Community Based Facility, Daniels, and Sellers filed a motion to dismiss. This motion raised various defenses, including immunity and Walker's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

According to Walker, in January 2004 she "agreed" to dismiss Wilcox County from the action. However, all of the defendants were apparently dismissed from the case at that time. Walker filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order insofar as it dismissed Daniels and Sellers from the action. The trial court granted this motion on January 30, 2004, by a stamp and the following notation on a copy of the motion: "Case reinstated; motion to dismiss is denied: order of dismissal is set aside and voided." The trial judge initialed the notation.²

On February 6, 2004, Walker amended the complaint to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and to assert a claim under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act. This amended complaint specifies Daniels and Sellers as the defendants; it also includes fictitiously named defendants "A-D," who were guards or employees of the Camden Community Based Facility.³

On March 17, 2004, the Alabama Department of Corrections, which is not a

named party in this case, filed a motion in the trial court arguing that Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-9, required that the action be transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court. Walker filed an objection, and the trial court did not immediately rule on the motion.

On January 31, 2005, Daniels and Sellers filed a motion titled "Renewed Motion for Change of Venue and Stay of All Proceedings." This motion renewed the March 17 motion for a change of venue. Walker filed a response to the motion, arguing that both the March 17, 2004, motion filed by the Department of Corrections and the January 31, 2005, motion filed by Daniels and Sellers were due to be denied because: (1) Daniels and Sellers did not raise the issue of improper venue in their November 25, 2003, motion to dismiss, and (2) the March 17, 2004, motion was untimely.

According to the case action summary, on February 23, 2005, the trial court denied both motions to transfer. Daniels and Sellers subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the trial court be directed to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Standard of Review

"`The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'" Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So.2d 886, 888 (Ala.2000)).

"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."

Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001). "This Court reviews mandamus petitions seeking review of a venue determination by asking whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting or denying the motion for a change of venue." Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So.2d 307, 310 (Ala.2003).

Discussion

Daniels and Sellers argue that Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-9, requires that this case be transferred to Montgomery County. Section 6-3-9 provides:

"All actions where the prison system or the state on account of the prison system is interested must be commenced in Montgomery County in any court having jurisdiction of the amount involved, except actions to condemn property under Section 18-1A-271, which must be commenced in the county where the property sought to be condemned is located. And if, on the trial of any case in any county, it is suggested by the Board of Corrections or is otherwise shown that the state is interested on account of the prison system, such case must be transferred to the proper court of Montgomery County. All actions commenced under this section must be commenced in the name of the state."

This Code section has been generally interpreted as controlling the venue of actions involving the prison system. See, e.g., Ex parte Madison County, 406 So.2d 398 (Ala.1981); Hartley v. State, 882 So.2d 869 (Ala.Civ.App.2003); and Pinkard v. State, 859 So.2d 449 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).

In Ex parte Madison County, the plaintiffs filed in the Madison Circuit Court a declaratory-judgment action against the Governor of the State of Alabama, in his capacity as temporary receiver of the prison system of Alabama; the commissioner of the Department of Corrections; and others. 406 So.2d at 399. The action sought declaratory relief regarding, among other things, the confinement of state prisoners in the Madison County jail. The Governor and the commissioner moved the trial court to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court, arguing that § 6-3-9 mandated such a transfer. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order transferring the case.

In denying the petition, we stated:

"The plain language of this statute mandates the venue as Montgomery County when the State Prison System `is interested.' That phrase, in fact, is repeated within the body of the statute. The phrase `[a]ll actions' is clear and unambiguous, and means what the phrase describes, `[a]ll actions,' whether those initiated by the state or those in which the state's `system' is a party. The concluding sentence of the statute refers to only one category of `[a]ll actions,' i.e., those commenced by the state—those must be commenced in the state's name (rather than in the names of those holding positions of authority). Cf. Moore v. Stephens, 264 Ala. 86, 84 So.2d 752 (1956) (Syl. 4).

"The petitioners' scholarly argument in brief dealing with the historical development of and changes in this statute to the effect that its present language signifies a legislative intent to govern only those actions filed by the state, is unpersuasive. Our cases uniformly hold that plain language in a statute should be considered to mean what it says. Fletcher v. Tuscaloosa Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn., 294 Ala. 173, 314 So.2d 51 (1975); State v. Robinson Land & Lumber Co. of Ala., 262 Ala. 146, 77 So.2d 641 (1955); Hawkins v. Jefferson County, 233 Ala. 49, 169 So. 720 (1936). Accordingly, we hold that § 6-3-9 controls the venue of this action. The Governor of Alabama, as `Temporary Receiver' of the prison system, and the Prison System Commissioner are made parties defendant. The state `on account of the prison system' is interested in the action because those officials in their official capacities are sought to be made liable for past and future expenditures made by the plaintiffs on behalf of state prisoners housed in the Madison County jail."

Ex parte Madison County, 406 So.2d at 400-01.

The Department of Corrections is vested with all the responsibilities, powers, and authority previously vested in the Board of Corrections. Ala.Code 1975, § 14-1-1.1. Additionally, the Department of Corrections "is a department of the State." Latham v. Department of Corr., 927 So.2d 815, 820 (Ala.2005). Daniels and Sellers are each being sued in their official capacities as warden and assistant warden, respectively, for acts performed in operating a corrections facility and caring for an inmate. Consequently, Walker essentially asserts claims against the Department of Corrections and the State of Alabama. See Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004) ("[C]laims against state...