Wilson v. Univ. of Ala. Health Servs. Found., P.C.
Decision Date | 15 December 2017 |
Docket Number | 1160654 |
Citation | 266 So.3d 674 |
Parties | Lisa WILSON v. UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA HEALTH SERVICES FOUNDATION, P.C., et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Tom Dutton of Pittman, Dutton & Hellums, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Robert P. MacKenzie, Sybil V. Newton, J. Will Axon, and Amber M. Whillock of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Birmingham, for appellees.
Lisa Wilson, the plaintiff below, appeals from the dismissal of her complaint seeking damages against the defendants, University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C. ("UAHSF"); Carla Falkson, M.D.; Tina Wood, M.D.; Ravi Kumar Paluri, M.D.; and Mollie DeShazo, M.D., based on the tort of outrage. We reverse and remand.
In February 2017, Wilson sued UAHSF and its employees, Dr. Falkson, Dr. Wood, Dr. Paluri, and Dr. DeShazo (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the doctors"), in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Wilson's complaint alleged that, in late 2011, her elderly mother, Elizabeth Monk Wilson ("Elizabeth"), was diagnosed with and underwent treatment for colon cancer
. According to Wilson, before the onset of Elizabeth's illness, Elizabeth had executed an advanced health-care directive that "instruct[ed] ... caregivers to use all available means to preserve [Elizabeth's] life" and further named Wilson as Elizabeth's health-care proxy "in the event [Elizabeth] became ‘too sick to speak for’ herself."
Elizabeth subsequently suffered a recurrence of her cancer
. In August 2015, she was admitted to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital, a facility operated by UAHSF. In her complaint, Wilson alleged that, while Elizabeth was in the hospital, she was treated by the doctors. She further alleged that the doctors made numerous and repeated tactless comments to Elizabeth and Wilson about Elizabeth's condition and her impending death, and to the effect that she was wasting resources by being in the hospital instead of dying at home. The complaint provides a long, extremely detailed discussion of countless alleged egregious statements made to Elizabeth and Wilson and numerous altercations between Wilson and Elizabeth, on the one hand, and the doctors, on the other. We see no need to repeat those allegations here. The complaint further details the alleged physical and mental distress experienced by both Elizabeth and Wilson in response to the doctors' alleged conduct.
Based on the foregoing, Wilson's complaint alleged a single claim for damages "for the tort of outrage, and for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress"1 and sought compensatory and punitive damages. Wilson sought to hold UAHSF vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of the doctors, which conduct, she alleged, occurred within the line and scope of the doctors' employment with UAHSF.
In response, UAHSF and the doctors jointly moved to dismiss Wilson's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. More specifically, in addition to denying that the conduct Wilson attributed to them had ever occurred, they argued that Alabama law recognizes the tort of outrage only in certain narrowly defined circumstances not applicable in the instant case. See Callens v. Jefferson Cty. Nursing Home, 769 So.2d 273, 281 (Ala. 2000). They further argued that this Court has repeatedly rejected the expansion of the tort of outrage to encompass "alleged extreme behavior in the healthcare context." See, e.g., Grantham v. Vanderzyl, 802 So.2d 1077 (Ala. 2001) ; Callens, supra ; and Gallups v. Cotter, 534 So.2d 585, 588 (Ala. 1988). Thus, according to UAHSF and the doctors, Wilson's claim was unsupported by Alabama law and represented an "attempt to expand the scope of [the] tort" and, therefore, failed to state a claim as a matter of law.
The trial court dismissed the action, stating:
Wilson appeals.
Standard of Review
In their brief, the doctors deny that they were "heartless or insulting" during their interactions with Wilson and Elizabeth. Nevertheless, the standard of review in this type case requires that we accept as true the allegations in the complaint, however implausible:
Ex parte Austal USA, LLC, 233 So.3d 975, 981 (Ala. 2017).
For a plaintiff to recover under the tort of outrage, she must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990). The conduct complained of must "be so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id.
This Court has previously recognized the tort of outrage in three circumstances:
Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000). However, as Wilson notes in her brief, this Court has not held that the tort of outrage can exist in only those three circumstances:
Little v. Robinson, 72 So.3d 1168, 1172–73 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis added).
The trial court's holding that the tort of outrage "is limited to three situations" is an incorrect statement of the law. As noted in Little, the tort can be viable outside the context of the above-identified circumstances and has previously been held to be so viable. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings where the trial court should, under the standard appropriate for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), determine whether the alleged conduct was "so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Green Tree, 771 So.2d at 465.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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