Wilson v. Vikckery
| Decision Date | 17 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.1:01-CV-702 (TH).,CIV.A.1:01-CV-702 (TH). |
| Citation | 267 F.Supp.2d 587 |
| Parties | Laura WILSON, Individually and as Next Friend for Her Mentally Challenged Child, Zola Wilson Plaintiff, v. Joe VICKERY, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Investigator, Hardin County Sheriffs Department, and Ed Cain, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hardin County Sheriff, and Hardin County, Texas Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Laura Wilson, Silsbee, TX, pro se.
Harold V. Dutton, Jr., Law Office of Harold V. Dutton, Jr., Houston, TX, for Laura Wilson.
Frank David Calvert, Benckenstein & Oxford, Beaomont, TX, for defendant.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Clerk's Doc. No. 18]. Having considered the motion, the summary judgment evidence, and the plicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.1
This is a civil rights case arising out of the arrest of Zola Wilson. On November 27, 2000, Officer Joe Vickery, an investigator with the Hardin County Sheriffs Department, and agent of the Narcotics Task Force, purchased a substance represented to be crack cocaine from an unidentified suspect. The drug field test indicated that the substance was cocaine. Unbeknownst to the suspect, this transaction was videotaped.
On January 19, 2001, Officer Vickery positively identified Zola Wilson as the person involved in the transaction. Officer Vickery made this identification from Zola Wilson's high school yearbook and school I.D. Officer Vickery's identification was corroborated by Don MacLeroy, the Silsbee Highschool assistant principal, after he viewed a videotape of the transaction. Two other officers, Brandon Davis and Larry Gilder (Zola Wilson's cousin and neighbor), also identified Zola Wilson as the suspect after viewing the videotape.
This evidence was presented to the Hardin County grand jury and Zola Wilson was indicted on January 24, 2001. That same day, a warrant was issued for his arrest. The warrant was executed on January 25, 2001 and Zola Wilson was taken into custody. For reisons not before the Court, the charges against Zola Wilson were subsequently dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Laura Wilson brings this suit individually and on behalf of her son, Zola Wilson, whom she claims is mentally incompetent. Plaintiff seeks recovery for alleged violations of Zola Wilson's federal civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Invoking supplemental jurisdiction, she further alleges violations of his rights under the Texas Constitution. She brought suit against Hardin County, Officer Vickery in both his individual and official capacities, and Hardin County Sheriff Ed Cain in both his official and individual capacities.
On August 2, 2002, defendants filed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Clerk's Doc. No. 18]. As previously noted, Plaintiff did not respond to the motion in spite of this Court's order extending the submission date and directing her to do so.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment procedures empower the court to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to dispose of factually and legally unsupported claims and defenses while protecting parties' respective rights to trial on disputed issues. Celotex Corp., All U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Disposition by summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural short-cut, but rather, an integral part of the FEDERAL RULES as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of an action.'" Celotex Corp., All U.S. at 327,106 S.Ct. at 2555 .
As an initial matter, the burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.2 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In so doing, the movant need not negate the elements of the non-movant's case, but rather, may establish that there is insufficient evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiffs claim. Summary judgment is also appropriate where the movant conclusively establishes all elements of an affirmative defense. See Crescent Towing & Salvage Co. v. M/V Anax, 40 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir.1994).
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. To carry this burden, the nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings, and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial." Catrett, All U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1996); McGann v. H & H Music, Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir.1991). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law preclude entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-^8, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10. The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). It is not incumbent on the Court to sift through the entire record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v. Ten. Gas Pipeline So., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, pursuant to the Local Court Rule 56(C), the moving party's facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence are deemed admitted as true unless controverted by the non-movant by way of a "Statement of Genuine Issues".
When considering motions for summary judgment, courts must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). "[T]he nonmoving party's evidence `is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 1551-52, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999). "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions.'" Id.
Evidence may be considered on a Rule 56 motion to the extent that it is not based on hearsay or otherwise excludable at trial. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1987).
In light of this procedural framework, the Court now considers the merits of the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed suit against Ed Cain in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Hardin County, Texas. Official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105.
On summary judgment, defendants contend that the Hardin County Sheriffs Department is not a proper defendant because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. The Court agrees.
The capacity for a governmental entity to sue or be sued "shall be determined by the law under which it was organized." FED.R.CIV.P. 17(b). Under Texas law, county sheriff departments are not, as a general rule considered to be legal entities capable of being sued. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir.1991); see also Thomas-Melton v. Dallas County, 39 F.3d 320, 1994 WL 612546 (5th Cir.1994). It is only where the enabling entity—the county, in the case of the sheriffs department—confers such authority upon servient agencies that courts may recognize their "jural authority." Id. Because there is no evidence before the Court that the Hardin County Sheriffs Department enjoys a separate legal existence, it is not a proper party to this suit.3
As such, Plaintiffs claims against Hardin County Sheriffs Department must be dismissed.
Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged violations of Zola Wilson's civil rights as protected by the Texas Constitution. Plaintiff's Original Complaint at ¶ 5. In her complaint, Plaintiff references Article I, Section 9 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint at ¶¶ 1-5. Article IX, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution does not address civil rights, but rather, addresses the legislatures power to create counties.4 Article I, Section 9 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
St. Romain v. Governor's Office of Homeland Sec. & Emergency Preparedness
...Id. at 390. 118. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. at 1391. 119. See Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798. 120. Id. 121. Wilson v. Vickery, 267 F.Supp.2d 587, 598 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 122. Id., citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. 123. Id. 124. Id., citing Snyder, 142 F.3d at 796. 125. City of C......