Windham v. Windham, 38855
Decision Date | 26 October 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 38855,38855 |
Citation | 67 So.2d 467,218 Miss. 547 |
Parties | WINDHAM v. WINDHAM. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
E. L. Dent, John K. Keys, Collins, for appellant.
Wingo & Finch, Hattiesburg, for appellee.
Mrs. Windham, the appellee, filed this bill praying for (1) divorce from appellant, (2) custody of their two minor children, (3) alimony for herself and (4) support for the two children, (5) a half interest in the real and personal property of appellant, and solicitor's fees.
Appellant, by answer, took issue on all of the asserted claims, and, by cross-bill, asked that he be granted a divorce from appellee.
The chancellor granted a divorce to the wife and awarded her the custody of the two minor children; decreed her the use of the homestead as long as she should remain unmarried and purported to divest out of the husband and invest in the wife a half interest in 120 acres of land, legal title to which was in the husband, and to divest out of the wife and invest in the husband a half interest in 37 acres of land, title to which was in the wife. He awarded no alimony to the wife nor support to the minor children and did not allow the wife a fee for her solicitor. From this decree the husband appeals.
He complains only of that part of the degree undertaking to divest out of him and invest in the wife a half interest in his lands. He says, first, the testimony is too vague and indefinite as to the services rendered by the wife in respect to the land to afford any foundation for determining the value of such services, and, second, that a court of equity has no power, simply by decree or fiat, to lift out of one person his title to real property and invest that title in another.
As bearing upon the first question, it is shown that when the parties hereto married in 1928 appellant then owned two tracts of land, constituting approximately 120 acres, on one of which tracts was located a house which was used by them as a residence after their marriage. This house was repaired and enlarged after the marriage. Subsequent to the marriage appellant acquired and conveyed to appellee a tract of 37 acres of land. The decree undertook to divest out of appellant a half interest in the 120 acres and invest that half interest in appellee. Likewise it purported to divest out of the appellee a half interest in the 37 acres and invest that half interest in appellant. Appellant also acquired, after the marriage, a leasehold upon 80 acres of sixteenth section school lands, this lease to expire about five years after the trial of the case. He also owned certain farming tools, cattle and other personal property used about the operation of a farm. The chancellor did not disturb title to the leasehold nor to the personal property, and, there being no cross-appeal by Mrs. Windham, the correctness of his action, or non-action, in that respect is not before us.
Mrs. Windham detailed her services, as a basis of her claim for an interest in the 120 acres of land, in these words:
'Q. At the time that you married your husband in 1928, what, at that time, did you own by way of real property? A. I didn't own any.
'Q. What did he own at that time? A. He had a deed to both places of his but neither of the places wasn't paid for.
'Q. By both places--what are you speaking of? A. The eighty acres south of the Lone Star Highway and---- 'Q. Eighty acres? A. Yes, sir.
'
'
She also said the husband had a small store and she worked part-time at that store.
These general activities over a period of twenty-eight years afford no clear basis for determining, with certainty and accuracy, their money value, assuming, but not adjudicating, a wife may create an indebtedness against the husband by such activities under the stated circumstances. She does not claim there was any understanding or agreement she would be paid, and we do not decide whether such an agreement, if had, would have been void under Section 454, Miss.Code 1942, restricting contracts between husband and wife.
Nor could the wife, under the circumstances here, become the beneficiary of a resulting trust, in the lands of the husband, as contended by Mrs. Windham. Mr. Windham owned the lands at the time of the marriage. The wife does not claim she paid any of the purchase price, or that she did any act or performed any services before, at or about the time of the purchase of, or acquisition of the title to the lands, creating for her benefit a resulting trust therein. , although the trust is not affected by the failure of the person purchasing the land to obtain a valid deed or title thereto at the date of the transaction, but the trust attaches when the title is obtained subsequently. 54 Am.Jur., p. 159, Sec. 204; Moore v. Moore, 74 Miss. 59, 19 So. 953; Bush v. Bush, 134 Miss. 523, 99 So. 151. In the Moore case Judge Whitfield, speaking for the Court, quoted from the old case of Rogers v. Murray, 3 Paige, N.Y., 397, where it is said: 'After the legal title has once passed to the grantee by the deed, it is impossible to raise a resulting trust, so as to divest the legal estate, by the subsequent application of the funds of a third person to the improvement of the property, or to satisfy the unpaid purchase money.' [74 Miss. 59, 19 So. 954.] To avoid confusion the case points out that in executory contracts of purchase the title does not pass until the deed is executed. Since appellant had title to the lands before the parties hereto married and the contributions in labor by Mrs. Windham to making improvements and repaying borrowed money on the lands were made thereafter no resulting trust arose in her favor in the lands.
On the second question, the decree undertakes to adjudicate that '* * * Mrs. Annie Windham is entitled to 50% of the property (the land) now held in both her name and that of her husband, Ben W. Windham', and 'she is hereby vested with a 50% interest * * *' to the lands of her husband (except the leasehold) and that to which she has title. Appellant says the chancery court has no power to divest and invest title in that manner; that there must be some vehicle for such transmission of title--such for instance, as appointment of a commissioner and sale by him in proper cases, or execution of a deed by the owner pursuant to direction of the court, under Section 1376, Code 1942, etc. There is some confusion in the late cases from this Court as to the power of chancery, merely by judicial fiat, to lift title out of one and...
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