Windsperger v. Broadway Liquor Outlet

• Decision Date: 30 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. C4-82-1687,C4-82-1687
• Citation: 346 N.W.2d 142
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Linda WINDSPERGER, Relator, v. BROADWAY LIQUOR OUTLET, Respondent, Commissioner of Economic Security, Respondent.

Page 142

346 N.W.2d 142

Linda WINDSPERGER, Relator, v. BROADWAY LIQUOR OUTLET, Respondent, Commissioner of Economic Security, Respondent.

No. C4-82-1687.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 30, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

An isolated hotheaded incident by an employee which does not adversely affect an employer's business is not "misconduct" which disqualifies an employee from unemployment compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. Sec. 268.09, subd. 1(2) (1982).

Lawrence W. Pry, Minneapolis, for relator.

Thomas R. Nelson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondents.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

SCOTT, Justice.

This matter is before the court for review on a writ of certiorari to the Commissioner of Economic Security. The issue is whether the relator, Linda Windsperger, should be disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that her discharge was for "misconduct" within the meaning of Minn.Stat. Sec. 268.09, subd. 1(2) (1982). The Commissioner, reversing the Appeal Tribunal, disqualified Windsperger from receiving benefits. We reverse.

Respondent Broadway Liquor Outlet employed Linda Windsperger as a cashier from August 30, 1980, until May 28, 1982. She was discharged while arguing about scheduling with her manager. The argument concerned a scheduling request initially made in writing by Windsperger on May 27, 1982, for permission to leave work two hours early at 1:00 p.m. on Saturday May 29, 1982. She hoped to leave work early that day so her family could leave town early for the Memorial Day weekend.

Her manager denied the request by so indicating on the back of the note when he arrived at work on the following day, May 28, 1982. After several attempts, Windsperger was able to discuss the matter with her manager that evening at about 8:00 p.m. He refused to change his decision because he expected Saturday to be a very busy day. He did say she could leave a half-hour early if she skipped her lunch break.

In the course of the discussion Windsperger asked for permission to leave work early the following Friday. The manager testified that, although such a request would normally be granted, it was not possible to do so for that weekend and that Windsperger became, as he put it, "very upset and threw a temper tantrum." Three times the manager told Windsperger he was warning her, but each time she became angrier and louder. After the third time she was fired on the spot for "insubordination and a temper tantrum."

Windsperger did not use any vulgarity or profanity during the incident, which occurred in the manager's office in the back of the store. No customers in the store heard any of the confrontation. Nothing in the record indicates that other employees could hear the argument. The entire episode took 15 to 20 minutes.

Windsperger testified that she was upset because she had done her employer many favors, had a good work record, and she felt that enough employees were scheduled on May 28 to handle the work without her. She also testified that she was upset because her manager had been ignoring her and other workers doing the same job were paid more than she.

The manager testified that Windsperger had once, over a year before, thrown a three-minute temper tantrum when told she would not be getting a raise. This old tantrum was not the basis for her dismissal.

The Appeal Tribunal held that, although Windsperger had exhibited poor judgment, the confrontation was an isolated incident not amounting to statutory misconduct. The Commissioner reversed, noting that she had no compelling reason to leave early and her persistence in arguing indicated a lack of concern about her employment. He determined that her action constituted misconduct under Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644 (1973), and Feia v. State Cloud State College, 309 Minn. 564, 244 N.W.2d 635 (1976).

The Commissioner erred in determining that Windsperger's conduct constituted misconduct disqualifying her from unemployment compensation benefits under the statute. The employer has the burden of proving an employee guilty of misconduct. Lumpkin v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 296 Minn. 456, 459-60, 209 N.W.2d 397, 400 (1973). The disqualification provisions of section 268.09 are to be narrowly construed. Mortel v. Independent School District No. 831, 334 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.1983). The issue in this case is not whether Windsperger should have been terminated, but whether, now that she is unemployed, she should be denied unemployment compensation benefits as well.

In Tilseth, we adopted the construction of "misconduct" enunciated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 259, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941):

"[T]he intended meaning of the term 'misconduct' * * * is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed 'misconduct' * * *."

295 Minn. at 374-75, 204 N.W.2d at 646.

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an isolated temper tantrum or single hotheaded incident of the sort here involved does not amount to misconduct justifying the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. In Johnson v. Brown, 134 So.2d 388, 389 (La.App.1961), an employee was discharged for making derogatory remarks about the company to a supervisor when he discovered he had been docked pay for not reporting for work on a day which the company had previously agreed to consider as part of his annual vacation. The court said:

We may at the outset state that a single hotheaded incident cannot be considered the type of premeditated and seriously improper conduct which constitutes, within the meaning of the statute, the serious cause sufficient to deny unemployment compensation benefits to an employee. An employer has, of course, the legal right to discharge an employee without cause or for any cause; but such employee ordinarily is upon application entitled to unemployment compensation benefits when his terminated employment is covered by the Louisiana Unemployment Compensation Law. LSA-R.S. 23:1471 et seq. Those benefits are not paid primarily to reward the employee or to punish the employer, but rather to protect the stability of the state of the family.

134 So.2d at 389.

In Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 549 P.2d 270 (1976), an unhappy toilet cleaner "blew his stack" upon discovering a number of particularly dirty units. The court found no misconduct:

Misconduct, which will disqualify a claimant from receiving employment benefits under the Employment Security Act, includes a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee. While an employer has a right to expect that his employees will not engage in protracted argument after an order or directive is given to an employee, yet he cannot expect that his employees will at all times be absolutely docile or servile.

* * *

* * * The law does not set such a standard. A single incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect by complaining and arguing is not misconduct. 76 Am.Jur.2d, Unemployment Compensation, Sec. 52 and Sec. 55 (1975); and annotation entitled "Employee's Insubordination as Barring Unemployment Compensation," 26 A.L.R.3d 1333 (1969).

In this case we are not concerned with the right of an employer to terminate an employment, but solely with the issue of whether the termination was for "misconduct" within the purview of I.C. Sec. 72-1366(e). Under the facts of this case, we hold that the employee's conduct which precipitated his discharge did not as a matter of law constitute misconduct so as to render appellant ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.

97 Idaho at 614-15, 549 P.2d at 273-74.

In Silva v. Nelson, 106 Cal.Rptr. 908, 31 Cal.App.3d 136 (1973), a supervisor confronted an employee about an unauthorized absence made when the employee felt he was going to "blow up." Upon being asked about his absence the employee said he didn't "give a shit," and may have added "about you or your job." The court, which defined "misconduct" in exactly the same terms we have used, found that the outburst was "a mere mistake or error in judgment--a 'minor peccadillo'--and is not misconduct disqualifying appellant from unemployment insurance benefits." 106 Cal.Rptr. at 911, 31 Cal.App.3d at 142.

In Beaird-Poulan, Inc. v. Brady, 154 So.2d 589 (La.App.1963), an employee, hot and tired after a long night's work, was discharged when he refused his supervisor's order to pick up a mold knocked down by a co-worker. The court found the refusal "a single hotheaded incident" which did not amount to statutory misconduct.

In the case at bar, Linda Windsperger's frustration erupted into, as her manager described it, a "temper tantrum." This is the sort of isolated "hotheaded incident" where an employee "blows her stack" which the courts do not consider misconduct justifying denial of unemployment benefits. While we cannot condone Windsperger's irrational outburst at her manager, her tantrum does not evince such a willful disregard for her employer's interests as to justify denying her unemployment benefits now that she is unemployed.

The Commissioner's reliance on Feia, 309 Minn. 564, 244 N.W.2d 635, is misplaced. There, a custodian offended by the...