Winter v. Northcutt
| Decision Date | 06 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 18855,18855 |
| Citation | 879 S.W.2d 701 |
| Parties | D.T. WINTER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Josephine Claire Turnage, Deceased, Respondent, v. Bobby NORTHCUTT and Delores Northcutt, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jim R. Bruce, Kennett, for appellants.
William M. Barvick, Jefferson City, James M. Turnbow, Hayti, for respondent.
The trial court entered judgment for one dollar and costs in favor of Plaintiff, D.T. Winter, Personal Representative of the Estate of Josephine Claire Turnage, Deceased, against Defendants, Bobby Northcutt and Delores Northcutt, in an action described by Plaintiff as one for slander of title to real estate. Defendants appeal, asserting the action is barred "by the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of the judgment in an earlier case." That case is Hendricks v. Northcutt, 820 S.W.2d 689 (Mo.App.S.D.1991). We henceforth refer to it as "No. 17260," the number assigned it in this Court.
Many of the facts narrated in No. 17260 are pertinent to the present appeal. To avoid unnecessary length in the present opinion, we shall not repeat those facts, but shall set forth only such additional facts as are needed for consideration of the present issues. To marshal all the relevant facts, one must read No. 17260 as a preface to the present opinion.
The present action originated from two documents. Each is mentioned in No. 17260.
The first document is an "Option to Purchase Real Estate" ("the Option") executed August 7, 1985, by Joe Agnes Holly. No. 17260 refers to her as "Holly." So shall we.
The Option was part of a transaction in which Holly sold 16.4 acres of land to Defendants. 820 S.W.2d at 690. Most, if not all, of that 16.4-acre tract lies in the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 12, township 16, range 11, in Pemiscot County.
The Option described the tract it covered as:
"... a Fifty Acre tract ... in the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 12, Township 16 North, Range 11 East, Pemiscot County, Missouri, lying adjacent to and west of the [16.4-acre] tract of land purchased by [Defendants] from [Holly]...." 1
The terms of the Option are set forth in No. 17260. 820 S.W.2d at 690-91.
The second document pertinent to the present action is a "Notice of Lis Pendens" ("the Notice") filed by Defendants in the office of the Recorder of Pemiscot County. As reported in No. 17260, it was filed September 8, 1989. 820 S.W.2d at 691.
The Notice stated that the lawsuit to which it referred arose from the Option. The Notice described the land covered by the Option as:
"A fifty (50) acre tract of land lying in the NW 1/4 and SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 12, Township 16 North, Range 11 East. Said property is North of a drainage ditch across said quarter section and westward of a certain tract of land sold to Bobby and Delores Northcutt [by Holly]...."
As we have seen, the description of the 50-acre tract in the Option places the tract in the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 12, township 16, range 11. The description in the Option makes no reference to the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter or the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 12 (). It is thus apparent that the description in the Option and the description in the Notice do not match.
The petition in No. 17260 was filed January 3, 1990. 820 S.W.2d at 692. One of the nine plaintiffs in that suit was C.R. Hendricks, then Personal Representative of the Estate of Josephine Claire Turnage, Deceased. No. 17260 refers to Josephine Claire Turnage as "Turnage." So shall we.
Another of the plaintiffs in No. 17260 was Jessie Mead, Personal Representative of Holly's estate.
There were two defendants in No. 17260: Bobby Northcutt and Delores Northcutt (Defendants in the present action).
The petition in No. 17260 pled that the plaintiffs own the southeast quarter of section 12, township 16, range 11, containing 160 acres, more or less, in Pemiscot County, except 16.4 acres previously conveyed to Defendants. The petition further pled that Defendants claim rights in the plaintiffs' land based on the Option (recorded by the Recorder of Pemiscot County), that Defendants recorded the Notice, thereby creating a cloud on the title to the plaintiffs' land, that Defendants were not entitled to exercise the Option, that the Notice covers property not included in the Option, and that the Notice is void. The petition prayed the trial court to declare the Option void, to declare the Option and Notice are clouds upon the plaintiffs' title, to order Defendants to file a release of the Notice with the Recorder of Pemiscot County, and to declare that Defendants have no right, title or interest in the plaintiffs' property.
On February 13, 1990, 41 days after the petition in No. 17260 was filed, two of the plaintiffs in that suit, C.R. Hendricks and Jessie Mead, in their respective capacities as personal representatives of decedents Turnage and Holly, filed the present action.
The petition in the present action concerns the identical land involved in No. 17260. The petition in the present action avers Hendricks and Mead are "partial owners" (presumably in their representative, not individual, capacities) of that land. The petition further avers that Defendants recorded the Notice on September 8, 1989, that the lawsuit identified in the Notice is based on the Option, that Defendants knew the Notice described land not covered by the Option, that the lawyer for Hendricks and Mead reported the error to Defendants' lawyer, that Defendants refused to release the Notice or correct the erroneous description in it, that Defendants knew Hendricks, Mead and others had found a buyer for the land described in the petition (and No. 17260), and that Defendants recorded the Notice with malicious intent to cast a cloud on the title to that land and thereby obtain money. The petition in the present action prays for compensatory and punitive damages.
No. 17260 moved more rapidly through the trial court than the present action. On November 19, 1990, the trial court entered judgment in No. 17260 providing, in pertinent part:
Following entry of that judgment, Defendants amended their answer in the present action. By the amendment, Defendants asserted that the present action is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, based on the judgment in No. 17260. Defendants pled that Personal Representatives Hendricks and Mead were barred from relitigating not only the issues raised in No. 17260, but all other issues which could have been raised there.
In an opinion filed December 6, 1991, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in No. 17260. 820 S.W.2d at 689-94.
On July 21, 1992, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the present action. It was argued November 23, 1992. By that time, D.T. Winter had replaced Hendricks as Personal Representative of Turnage's estate.
At the hearing, Defendants insisted they were entitled to judgment in their favor because No. 17260 was "res judicata as to all issues which were raised or which could have been raised." Defendants asserted the claim for compensatory and punitive damages in the present action was the same claim on which the relief in No. 17260 had been granted. Therefore, said Defendants, the personal representatives of Turnage and Holly could have added a prayer for money damages in No. 17260.
The trial court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In a letter setting forth its analysis, the trial court said:
On April 6, 1993, a document designated "Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," signed by the lawyer for Personal Representative Winter (Turnage's estate), but not by the lawyer for Personal Representative Mead (Holly's estate), was filed in the trial court. It ended with a prayer by "Plaintiffs" for summary judgment in their favor "on the issue of liability only."
On April 23, 1993, Personal Representative Mead (Holly's estate) dismissed her claim with prejudice. We glean from the legal file that the dismissal was the result of a settlement between Personal Representative Mead and Defendants. Because this development left Personal Representative Winter as the sole plaintiff, we henceforth refer to Winter as "Plaintiff."
That same day (April 23, 1993), the trial court granted Plaintiff summary judgment against Defendants "on the issue of liability only."
On April 27, 1993, Plaintiff filed in the trial court a document designated "Waiver of Substantial Damages." It read, in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ollison v. Village of Climax Springs
...as "subject matter of the suit." Barkley v. Carter County State Bank, 791 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Mo.App.1990); see also Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Mo.App.1994); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 531; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 652. The first element is absent The appeal of Case I is reported in ......
-
Johnson v. Gmac Mortg. Corp.
...of rights regardless of which party is entitled to it." Evans v. Brussel, 300 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo.1957); see also Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo.App. S.D.1994) (citing Evans and suggesting that "there may be little, if any, difference between an action to quiet title and an ac......
-
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Miceli
...for" is met, because the subject matter of Commonwealth's Counts I–V and the consent judgments are the same. See Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994). The homebuyers, and in turn Commonwealth, both sought damages against Miceli Homes, because they were unwittingly f......
-
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Miceli
...for" is met, because the subject matter of Commonwealth's Counts I-V and the consent judgments are the same. See Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994). The homebuyers, and in turn Commonwealth, both sought damages against Miceli Homes, because they were unwittingly f......