Winters v. Alanco, Inc., s. 82-716
| Decision Date | 22 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 82-716,82-1998,s. 82-716 |
| Parties | Alvin L. WINTERS, Patricia Winters, Robert J. Mizsur, Suzanne J. Mizsur, Drew A. Faulconer, Sandra H. Faulconer, Charles L. Rhodes, Jimmie P. Rhodes, Donald K. Lawter, and Christine M. Lawter, Appellants, v. ALANCO, INC., Lake Padgett Estates Civic Association, Neil Abbondante, Ann Abbondante, Keith M. Johnson, Verna R. Johnson, C. Wayne Brown, Judy Brown, David E. Stenmark, Rosemary Stenmark, Chester R. DeArmond, Denise G. DeArmond, C. Jay Ogborn, Mary S. Ogborn, Blaine B. Gladson, Mary Faye Gladson, Paul Porter, Judy Porter, Thomas Spock, Sr., Ann Spock, Thomas Spock, Jr., Richard Vanyure, Linda Vanyure, Douglas R. McBride, Sue McBride, Anthony Hanily, Audrey Hanily, William Jones, and Susan Jones, Appellees. and ALANCO, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Alvin L. WINTERS, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Gregory J. Orcutt of Anderson, Thorn, Grose & Quesada, Tampa, for appellants/appellees Winters, et al.
Edward I. Cutler and Paul C. Davis of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for appellees Lake Padgett Estates Civic Association, et al.
In case no. 82-716, intervention plaintiffs Alvin L. Winters, et al., appeal a final summary judgment against them in their suit against intervention defendants Alanco, Inc., et al., which judgment was apparently predicated upon a finding that intervention plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity and enforceability of the demand by the original plaintiffs, namely, all of the intervention defendants except Alanco, that Alanco, the original defendant, be required to deed East Lake Recreation Area (the Recreation Area) to plaintiff/intervention defendant Lake Padgett Estates Civic Association (the Association). We affirm that judgment. However, we reverse the portion of the final judgment appealed in case no. 82-1998 which awarded intervention plaintiffs an easement for the use of the Recreation Area.
Intervention plaintiffs are owners of residential property in an area known as Lake Padgett Estates East which they or their predecessors in title purchased from Covington Properties, Inc. (CPI). The purchasers from CPI were given oral assurances, upon which they relied, that they could use the Recreation Area, but none was given and none even requested a written agreement to that effect.
Title to the Recreation Area was subsequently conveyed from CPI to Suncoast Highlands Corporation on June 16, 1977, and later from Suncoast to Alanco. Still later, the Association requested Alanco to deed the Recreation Area to the Association pursuant to a covenant running with the land. When Alanco refused, the Association filed suit against it. Intervention plaintiffs were allowed to intervene. They filed a four-count complaint seeking a determination that they held an implied easement to use the Recreation Area. The trial court entered summary judgment against them on the first three counts but found in their favor on count 4. These appeals followed timely.
As to the dismissal of the first three counts of intervention plaintiffs' complaint (case no. 82-176), we hold that intervention plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the validity and enforceability of plaintiffs' demand for title to the Recreation Area. As this court stated in City of Pinellas Park v. Matthews, 355 So.2d 475, 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978):
As authority for a suit for declaratory judgment concerning a deed, Section 86.021, Florida Statutes (1975), states that "[a]ny person claiming to be interested or who may be in doubt about his rights under a deed ... or whose rights, status, or other equitable or legal relations are affected by a ... deed ... may have determined any question or construction or validity arising under such ... deed ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other equitable or legal relations thereunder." As we read it, before a party can bring suit under this statute he must claim some rights under the deed which he seeks to have construed. In this case, while the deed in question may affect property in which the appellees have an interest, they are claiming no rights under that deed.
Inasmuch as section 86.021 has not subsequently been amended, Matthews and Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 47 So.2d 786 (Fla.1950), upon which Matthews relies, are controlling here. Intervention plaintiffs are not, and do not claim to be, parties to the recorded covenants and restrictions pertaining to the Recreation Area, nor are they claiming any rights under those covenants and restrictions. They merely claim easement rights to the Recreation Area, which is encumbered by the covenants and restrictions. Moreover, they do not claim that their easement rights arise out of or were created by the covenants and restrictions which they seek to have declared invalid. They merely claim an interest in the Recreation Area, an interest they admit is inconsistent with the recorded covenants and restrictions. Accordingly, they do not have standing to contest the Association's demand for title to the Recreation Area.
We further hold that the Statute of Frauds bars intervention plaintiffs from obtaining the relief sought from and awarded by the trial court in case no. 82-1998.
Because easements are interests in land, they cannot be created or transferred except by a written instrument signed by the grantor. §§ 689.01 and 725.01, Fla.Stat. (1981); Canell v. Arcola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla.1953). Intervention plaintiffs produced no such written instrument.
The trial court concluded that the oral agreement had been fully performed by intervention plaintiffs and that, therefore, the Statute of Frauds could not be employed as a defense against its enforcement. However, this finding was in error, as it is contrary to our supreme court's holding in Miller v. Murray, 68 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla.1953), which states:
The governing principles by which part performance may remove an oral contract for the sale of land from the effect of the Statute of Frauds are also well settled. In addition to establishing the fact that an oral contract for sale was made, proof must be submitted as to the following: payment of all or part of the consideration, whether it be in money or in services; possession by the alleged vendee; and the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements upon the land with the consent of the vendor--or, in the absence of improvements, the proof of such facts as would make the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if it were not enforced.
In the first place, intervention plaintiffs failed to prove that the use of the Recreation Area offered to them was intended to be an easement, a permanent and irrevocable estate in land, rather than a mere license. None of intervention plaintiffs testified that they were specifically promised an easement. At best, all they could testify was that they were told that they could use the Recreation Area or that it was for the use of the residents in the area and that they, as well as others, did, in fact, use the Recreation Area. Unfortunately, they made no effort on or before purchasing their property to obtain a clearer definition of their right to use the Recreation Area or a written statement of the agreement regarding the Recreation Area, nor did they check the record title to determine who owned the Recreation Area. Had they done so, they would have found that there is no reference to any such easements in the warranty deed from CPI to Suncoast...
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