Wintjen v. State

• Decision Date: 30 January 1979
• Parties: Ray M. WINTJEN, Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 780

398 A.2d 780

Ray M. WINTJEN, Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Nov. 20, 1978.

Decided Jan. 30, 1979.

Upon appeal from Superior Court, Keat County. Reversed.

John W. Noble, of Parkowski & Noble, Dover, for defendant-appellant.

M. Jane Brady, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dover, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., DUFFY, McNEILLY and QUILLEN, JJ., constituting the Court en Banc.

DUFFY, Justice:

Ray M. Wintjen (defendant) was convicted by a Superior Court jury of six violations of the Criminal Code: one count each of third-degree burglary, third-degree criminal solicitation, third-degree conspiracy, second-degree conspiracy, and two counts of misdemeanor theft. The Trial Judge imposed sentences amounting to a total of eight years imprisonment, from which defendant appeals. We reverse.

All of Wintjen's convictions were based on a single set of facts: It was alleged that, after requesting the aid of other persons (some of whom were juveniles) and conspiring with those persons, defendant burglarized a farmhouse in Kent County and removed property from the house and other farm buildings.

In support of his appeal, defendant submits three arguments which we consider in turn.

I

The State's case rested largely on the testimony of Wintjen's alleged accomplices. Defendant's first contention is that the State produced insufficient evidence to convict him of the offenses charged. He admits that the testimony of the accomplices implicates him in the crimes, but contends that the State must produce some evidence corroborating their testimony.

The law in Delaware is settled on this point and it is contrary to what Wintjen argues. Briefly stated, corroboration of accomplice testimony is not required, absent extraordinary circumstances. Bland v. State, Del.Supr., 263 A.2d 286 (1970); Jacobs v. State, Del.Supr., 358 A.2d 725 (1976). In this case, there is no "irreconcilable conflict" in the testimony of defendant's alleged accomplices which might otherwise warrant removal of the case from consideration by the jury. Bland, supra, 263 A.2d at 288. ¹ Rather, the testimony of the accomplices is substantially consistent. Its credibility was a matter for the jury to weigh. Wintjen's first argument is without merit.

II

Defendant's second contention involves the Trial Judge's instruction to the jury. Defendant says that the instruction on reasonable doubt misled the jury because it erroneously equated "reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt." ²

The instruction given conforms to the pattern approved long ago by this Court and used by the Trial Courts of this State almost universally. See Lane v. State, Del.Supr., 222 A.2d 263, 267 (1966). Accordingly, for the purpose of deciding this case, there was no error in the Trial Judge's instruction on reasonable doubt.

III

Wintjen's most significant argument, which is determinative of the appeal, is that cross-examination of the State's key witness was improperly terminated.

William Clark, a sixteen-year-old boy and one of defendant's alleged accomplices, gave a written statement to the police when he was arrested. That statement became the basis for Clark's testimony at trial because the prosecutor had instructed him to repeat at trial what he had already told the police. Defense counsel, therefore, sought to question Clark regarding his state of mind at the time the statement was made. The cross-examination on this point was as follows:

"BY MR. NOBLE (Defense Counsel):

Q. I gather that at the time of your arrest you discussed these charges with the police officer?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the police officer suggest that you would be better off if you implicated Ray Wintjen?

MS. BRADY (the Prosecutor): Objection, Your Honor.

I don't know what the basis is for that statement but the implication is that the witness has been requested to assist the State by the officer and I don't know what he is suggesting that he has got in return.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Proceed."

Defense counsel did not pursue the matter further.

It was error for the Trial Judge to terminate this line of questioning. The possible bias of a witness is always a relevant inquiry, and a cross-examiner need not lay a foundation to explore it. More important, cross-examination on bias is an essential element of the constitutional right of confrontation. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Ward v. State, Del.Supr., 366 A.2d 1194, 1196 (1976); Ward v. State, Del.Supr., 395 A.2d 367 (1978).

In some cases, an improperly terminated cross-examination may be harmless error. However, in this case, we hold that the error deprived defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. And, for that reason, it was reversible error.

Clark's testimony was central to the State's case against defendant his testimony incriminated Wintjen on all counts. That is to say, Clark's testimony touched on all six of the charges, and that is not true of any other State witness. Moreover, Clark gave the only testimony which implicated defendant in the solicitation charge, ³ in the third-degree conspiracy charge, and in one of the two theft charges. Under these circumstances, any evidence that tended to discredit Clark might have significantly affected the outcome of the trial. Evidence of favorable treatment of Clark by the police or prosecutor would have tended to reflect on Clark's credibility, particularly because his testimony was largely unspontaneous, and appears to have been based on a mechanical repetition of his prior written statement.

A careful review of the transcript shows that the jury heard little or no evidence about possible favorable treatment by the State. Clark testified under a limited grant of immunity, but no mention of that fact was made before the jury. Although Clark testified...